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Citizenship in ux:
Introduction and a conceptual approach
Markus Bayer, Oliver Schwarz and Toralf Stark
1. Introduction
e history of this edited volume is probably di ferent from those of others.
It dates back to 2012 when some early career researchers at the University of
Duisburg-Essen dared the endeavour to bring together the expertise of Po-
litical Science and Sociology to study the foundations and consequences of
the erosion of traditional models of legitimacy.1 Such forms of collaboration
between di ferent disciplines of social sciences are still rare – even or espe-
cially at bigger faculties like ours in Duisburg. For most of the authors and
editors that have been involved, this project was an important milestone for
their career and an inspiring academic experience. e outcome, the edited
volume »Legitimitätspraxis« (Practices of legitimacy) published by Springer
VS in 2016, has been downloaded over 11.000. (Aug. 2020) times and can be
regarded as an important contribution to the scientific debate on the concept
of legitimacy (Lemke et al. 2016).
Some four years later, we decided that it is time for a revival. In times of
Brexit, increasing worldwide migration movements and rising nationalism
(not only) in Europe, we decided to deal with the important topic of »demo-
cratic citizenship« as the current debates on this concept are obviously »in
lux«. However, we opted for some changes in the concept of this edited volu-
me: First, we deemed it beyond argument that visibility is of great importance
to young academics, the main target group of our call. us, we decided to
publish an English edited volume in Open Access (OA). OA is not only a possi-
bility to increase visibility and readership but also a form of publication that
provides open access to knowledge to everyone beyond academic paywalls.
1 For more information, see: https://www.uni-due.de/legitimitaet/
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In other words, it contributes to the democratisation of our knowledge and
findings. e next innovation concerned the publishing procedure: A double-
blind peer review,meaning that every contribution is evaluated independent-
ly and anonymously by two peer reviewers, currently represents the state of
the art in terms of academic quality control and is therefore widely used in
the academic community. Furthermore, publishing double-blind reviewed ar-
ticles represents major achievements for young scholars. However, as such a
procedure is not very common for edited volumes, this volume here is one of
the few that implements such a rigorous form of quality control. Finally, we
decided to extend the circle of contributors beyond researchers at the Univer-
sity of Duisburg-Essen with the aim to stimulate academic cooperation and
the exchange between young researchers from di ferent universities.
2. Citizenship and democracy
Given its historical origin, the connection between citizenship and democracy
is not surprising. e term citizenship was first used in ancient Greece. Since
then, the meaning of citizenship was essentially contested and is in constant
lux till today (Isin 2009). When Aristotle was confronted with the task of de-
fining »citizen« at the beginning of Book III of his Politics, he described it as
»a man who shares in the administration of judiciary and in the holding of
o fice« (cf. Johnson 1984: 74). According to this, citizens must actively partici-
pate in judiciary and government. erefore, it is not enough to simply enjoy
the right to seek o fice, but citizens must actually hold it. Still, this is a very
narrow conception of citizenship. Moreover, it is not an accurate description
of democratic involvement in today’s modern societies. Today, the possibili-
ties for participation range from elections, participation in political parties
or citizens’ initiatives to joining demonstrations and political protest.
While political a filiation in the form of citizenship in ancient Greece was
the exception and limited to the city-state and the able-bodied free men, no-
wadays it represents the norm and describes a relationship between the ci-
tizen and a nation state »in which the two are bound together by recipro-
cal rights and obligations« (Heywood 1994: 155). In that sense, the Aristoteli-
an view on citizenship gives us a baseline to start from: to understand citi-
zenship as a form of social relationship. However, as Bellamy (2008: 2) argues,
citizenship is a special form of a social relationship, namely one between an
individual and a state or a society. Firstly, it di fers from everyday social rela-
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tionships like friendships and family ties in as far as it is genuinely political.
Beyond this, it also diverges from other forms of political a filiation, such as
subjecthood in monarchies or dictatorships since it consists of civil and poli-
tical rights – especially participation in the political process – which are not
guaranteed in non-democracies. According to Marshall, citizenship thereby
represents a »status bestowed on those who are full members of a communi-
ty« with all bearers of the status being »equal with respect to the rights and
duties with which the status is endowed« (Marshall 1950: 28). Although Mar-
shall admits that there is no »universal principle that determines what those
rights and duties shall be« (1950: 29), he concludes from his historical analy-
sis in England that these rights and duties can be located in three di ferent
spheres. Individual civil rights, such as the freedom of the person, including
freedom of speech, opinion and religion, and the right to own property, we-
re granted by the state from the 18th century onwards. ese individual civil
rights were complemented by political rights, like the freedom of association
and the right to vote in the 19th century and, eventually, by social rights, for
example the right to economic welfare and social security in the 20th century (Tur-
ner 1986: 8).
Marshall’s conception was criticised for being evolutionistic since it
understands the development of citizenship rights as a historical progress
towards full citizenship. Furthermore, with its focus on the process of gran-
ting a formal status and corresponding rights by the state, Marshall’s theory
therefore can be labelled as one-dimensional (Giddens 1982: 108). It has also
been criticised for being unable to grasp the di ference between passive
(mere bearer of rights) and active citizen (Turner 1989; 1997) and for ignoring
»second-class« citizen such as women or homosexuals (Walby 1994; Turner
2009), thereby disguising or omitting existing inequalities. Additionally,
Mou fe (1992: 29) rightly argues that Marshall’s definition of citizenship as »a
set of rights that we hold against many others« is bound to a certain under-
standing of democracy, namely a liberal one. Authors from communitarian
and republican traditions therefore o ten argued that citizenship is not only
a legal status granted by the state, but also linked to an identity as citizen.
is identity is thought to be bound to a set of democratic values which are
quintessential for a democratic polity (Almond/Verba 1963; 1980).
erefore, more advanced conceptions of citizenship tend to go beyond
the narrow definition of citizenship, focussing on the legal status and the
social, political and civil rights which go along with it and also address as-
pects of belonging (identity) and participation (Bellamy 2008). Furthermore,
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most authors accommodate that citizenship is not a static institution, but
constantly »[mediates] rights between the subjects of politics and the polity
to which these subjects belong« (Isin/Nyers 2014: 1). To grasp the increasing
luidity and manifoldness of di ferent (non-)citizen statuses and the diversity
of rights associated with them, scholars began to understand citizenship in
terms of a social process, social practices or »enacted processes« which pro-
vided some stability and endurance to the concept and, at »the same time
opened to reinvention and contingent rearticulations« (Nyers 2017: 118). is
theoretical shi t was largely in luenced by the work of Bourdieu (1993) and his
concepts of habitus, field and social capital.
3. Status, habitus and practice
is very brief overview already illustrates that citizenship and in particu-
lar democratic citizenship is necessarily a concept in constant lux since the
notion of a) democracy and b) the perception of who should be entitled to
citizenship changes over time. erefore, democratic citizenship is a political
concept per se and as such always a matter of constant contestation. For a
working definition we are building upon the aforementioned classical con-
ception of citizenship, understanding it as a legal status which di ferentiates
members and non-members of a polity. is requires some supplementary
notes: First of all, we think it is important to mention the Janus face of citi-
zenship: While it represents a mechanism of inclusion and an entitlement to
certain rights on the one hand, it is at the same time also a mechanism of ex-
clusion and discrimination on the other. Furthermore, in face of roughly 200
nation states worldwide, the nation state is currently clearly the main polity
in terms of citizenship arrangements. However, in times of multilateralism
and global governance, it is not the only political authority.We therefore want
to follow Insin’s tripartition of citizenship, which complements the notion of
legal status with the aspects of acts and habitus of citizenship (2008; 2009).
Being intrigued by the various peculiarities of non-citizens in form of the
foreigner, the migrant, the illegal alien, the wanderer, refugee, or émigré, In-
sin assumes non-citizens can perform »acts of citizenship« to claim certain
rights they are formally not entitled to (2009: 383). is understanding brings
in all the aforementioned subjects and thus overcomes the narrow focus limit-
ing citizenship to citizens: Non-citizens can also claim rights, perform duties
or perceive themselves as citizens.
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Insin assumes that citizenship also comprises a certain habitus – a term
borrowed from Bourdieu – which indicates habits that have been formed
over a relatively long period to such an extent that they are taken for granted
and repeated without much thinking or questioning. Participate in elections
would be such a routine action explained by a habitus of citizenship. Toge-
ther with acts of citizenship, it is the active part of citizenship which Turner
(1997) demanded. us, a democratic habitus can be understood as a media-
ting element between the formal status and the singular act of citizenship.
As outlined in Figure 1 below and we assume that democratic citizenship is
coined by a status as citizen and a respective habitus. Furthermore, we as-
sume that this status is not only granted top-down but also claimed bottom-
up.
Figure 1: Ideal types of (democratic) citizenship
Source: Author’s own compilation.
We presume seven di ferent ideal types of democratic citizens that can be
derived from the di ferent combinations of status, habitus and actions. First,
we can distinguish three clear-cut types:
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• e passive (non-democratic) citizen who is entitled to civil, social and polit-
ical rights by his status as a citizen of a democratic state. However, (s)he
neither develops a democratic habitus to participate formally nor does
(s)he participates in any informal practices to develop, deepen or defend
democratic participation.
• Contrary, the democratic resident developed a democratic habitus. Without
a citizen status, however, (s)he is formally not allowed to (fully) partici-
pate in the country of residence. (S)he does not attempt to change the
situation.
• e citizen claimant di fers with regard to the last aspect. (S)he has not
developed a democratic habitus (yet), but is eager to achieve the status of
citizenship including the respective rights that come along with it.
In addition, there are four additional mixed types:
• e active democratic citizens, building the core of our concept, enjoys the
formal status of being a citizen and has developed a democratic habi-
tus. Additionally, deeply rooted democratic values are driving the active
democratic citizen to resort to non-formal civil acts to deepen and defend
democracy.
• e active democratic non-citizen exhibits a democratic habitus and partici-
pates democratically without enjoying the formal status of citizenship.
• e formally democratic citizen, in contrast, possesses the citizen status in
his/her country of residence. (S)he developed a certain habitus of demo-
cratic citizenship and is likely to take part in the routine actions of political
participation such as voting. However, her/his actions do not go beyond
formal avenues of participation.
• Last, but not least, the active (undemocratic) citizen enjoys all the rights that
come along with formal citizenship but has never developed a demo-
cratic habitus. Contrary to his/her passive counterpart, however, (s)he
uses his/her freedom to undermine the democratic system.
4. Political and social fragmentation
e purpose of this edited volume is not to rewrite or update the concept of
citizenship. Rather, we aim to (re)explore the challenges to democratic citi-
zenship in times of worldwide political and social fragmentation. e term
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»fragmentation« is used in a number of areas and academic disciplines, such
as political science, sociology, economics, history and law.However, it was the
international lawyer Jenks (1953: 403) who initially referred to two phenome-
na of fragmentation and its consequences: First, there is no general legisla-
tive body on the international level. Second, in the absence of such a world
legislature, »law-making treaties are tending to develop in a number of histo-
rical, functional and regional groups which are separate from each other and
whose mutual relationships are in some respects analogous to those of sepa-
rate systems of municipal law.« About 60 years later, the International Law
Commission (2006: 10) concluded: » ere is little to be added to that analysis
today.« Although the phenomenon of fragmentation has been a key concept in
international legal scholarship for the past decades, scholars have struggled
to agree on how to define the phenomenon in a way that accurately captures
their concerns (Megiddo 2018: 118).
As Peters points out, the term »fragmentation« is used to denote both a
process and a result. In fact, fragmentation is o ten used to capture such a
vast array of phenomena that all of international law’s development in the
past century seems to be enveloped in it (2016: 1012). Increasingly, scholars
of international relations and international economics also refer to the con-
cept of fragmentation (Benvenisti/Downs 2007; Zürn/Faude 2013). Some of
these authors conceptualise fragmentation in a broader socio-cultural sense,
namely as the opposite of globalisation (Clark 1997; Sur 1997; Menzel 1998).
However, fragmentation is not necessarily a negative development. Following
this view,Biermann et al. (2009) di ferentiate between three types of fragmen-
tation: synergistic fragmentation, cooperative fragmentation and con lictive
fragmentation. By illustrating these concepts in the field of global climate go-
vernance, they show that di ferent types of fragmentation are likely to have
di ferent degrees of performance. While cooperative forms of fragmentation
may entail both significant costs and benefits, only the absence of coordina-
tion may lead to additional undesirable outcomes.
In the previous section, citizenship was defined as a special form of a
social relationship between an individual and a state or a society. By and
large, citizenship is enormously a fected by the fragmentation of the three
entities that make up democratic citizenship: the state, the society and the
individuum. For centuries, democratic citizenship has been a distinct cha-
racteristic of the nation state only. However, the forces of political fragmen-
tation have transformed modern statehood tremendously. e European in-
tegration process has deeply a fected the relationship betweenmember states
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and their citizens. Today, concepts of local, national and the EU citizenship
exist side by side within the European Union. Consequently, this development
has made democratic citizenship in the EU amulti-layered phenomenon (van
Waarden/Seubert 2018: 5). On the other hand, the content of state sovereignty
and the modes of government are not only transforming in Western Europe
(Krasner 1999; Sørensen 2004). Worldwide, the paradigm of governance has
shed a new perspective on democratic citizenship (Carter 2001; Kostakopou-
lou 2008). During the last decades, international migration has increasingly
challenged the notion of citizenship as an exclusive national concept. So far,
current realities – like the growing numbers of citizens with multiple iden-
tities and citizen statuses or the globalisation of citizenship – have been re-
lected in concepts such as cosmopolitan (Hutchings/Dannreuther 1999), glo-
bal (O’Byrne), transnational (Bauböck 1994) or transborder citizenship (Glick
Schiller/Fouron 2001: 25).
Processes of fragmentation are also a fecting individuals and their social
communities around the world. Societies are becoming more and more com-
plex, dynamic, and diverse every day (Touraine 2003). Public organisations,
companies and individuals are experiencing that current challenges cannot be
resolved in the samemanner as they were in the past. Some argue that a »glo-
bal risk society« (Beck 2000) has emerged and new forms of non-hierarchical
relationships between state and non-state actors play a growing role. ese
new relationships reshape the social contract between the state and its citi-
zens and provide space for new global power structures. Extra-parliamentary
popular resistance, refusing to adhere to the politics of the count on the one
hand and populist movements disclosing their distrust against political elites
on the other, challenge the existing relations between representational demo-
cracy and its citizens. e »neurotic citizen« (Isin 2004) emerges, who governs
itself to responses to anxieties and uncertainties. In addition, the growing so-
cial mobilisation of individuals and intensified international migration have
produced new spaces of democracy (Pugh 2009). Recently, several countries
have been witnessing an era of political polarisation, thus indicating a possi-
ble crisis of representational democracy (Brennan 2017; Levitsky/Ziblatt 2018;
Mounk 2018). is raises fundamental questions about the very essence of
citizenship and gave the impulse to this edited volume.
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5. Structure and rationale of the volume
is volume analyses democratic citizenship in lux. It re lects on recent con-
ceptions of citizenship in the light of political and social fragmentation. e
volume aims to bring together insights from di ferent disciplines, such as
political science, sociology, law and history. However, the predominant rep-
resented discipline remains political science. Nevertheless, the choice of aut-
hors of the chapters responds to the aim to ensure a twofold overall balance:
First, a balance between di ferent methodological approaches. As such, a one-
sided perspective on citizenship generates a limited set of insights only. We
therefore strived for a diversification of research methods used in the contri-
butions to our volume. Authors use both qualitative and quantitative approa-
ches, which are both complementary to each other when studying democratic
citizenship. Second, there is a balance between female andmale scientists. Ar-
guably the most important measure to promote gender equality in science is
an open door for female scientists at all levels. Consequently, 50 percent of
the authors involved in this volume are female.
e chapters in this volume cover a variety of recent developments like the
emergence of a transnational citizenship within the European Union, asylum
and migration, the rise of populism, increasing polarisation and the challen-
ging of representative democracy in Western Europe. ese issues are exami-
ned in the context of di ferent formations of status, habitus and actions of
democratic citizenship.
e volume consists of three major parts. e first part investigates demo-
cratic citizenship in the European Union and starts with a historical
and institutionalist perspective to outline the evolution of modern citi-
zenship rights. is contribution by Christian Tischmeyer focuses in parti-
cular on the historical observation that citizenship has served as a method of
exclusion for themodern nation state. Tischmeyer argues that citizenship and
biopolitical selectivity are inimically tied up with notions of collective iden-
tity and chauvinistic nationalism. His chapter concludes with a re lection on
how to situate the institutional rationales of democratic citizenship within
nation states between the extreme points of safeguarding against discrimi-
nation, versus an exclusive set of state-granted privileges, perfectly suited for
discrimination on nationalistic grounds.
is institutionalist approach to citizenship is followed by a quantitative
empirical analysis of citizenship in a supranational organization, namely the
EU. In his chapter, Oliver Schwarz analyses the public perception of EU citi-
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zenship in its local setting and thereby tackles the problem of multiple and
competing forms of citizenship on di ferent levels. His main point of interest
is to explore the extent to which EU citizens’ knowledge about their rights is
accompanied by a positive public perception of European Union citizenship.
For this purpose, the chapter first explores the development of EU citizenship
and the relationship between citizenship and democracy in a European con-
text. en, the chapter presents findings of a face-to-face survey of 425 local
residents inDuisburg,Germany.On the basis of the analysis, hefinally formu-
lates specific policy recommendations about how to vitalise the link between
local citizens and the EU.
In a similar way, Aukje van Loon addresses the EU and the question to
what extent the national citizen can in luence his or her government position
within the superior supranational entity. Using the case of the introduction
of a European financial transaction tax, she applies a societal approach to go-
vernmental preference formation and analyses a broad range of stakeholders
potentially a fected by the introduction of such a tax (sectoral interest asso-
ciations, trade unions, voters and NGOs). Her qualitative analysis concludes
that the German government clearly followed dominant domestic ideas du-
ring the European debate.
Concluding the first part, Kathrin Behrens deals with the concept of for-
mal citizenship in its legal dimension through a constitutional analysis of 27
European member states. She discusses the inclusion and exclusion of people
in societal subsystems and the relevance of constitutional regulation of insi-
ders and outsiders based on the systems theory. By analysing constitutional
documents, her chapter shows that formalised membership via constitutio-
nally organised citizenship to a state does not follow uniform trends in all its
facets. Formal inclusion and exclusion are two dimensions that go hand in
hand. Citizenship seems to be a luid, dynamic political construction that is
surprisingly only minutely finalised in constitutions. e impression suggests
itself that citizenship is a very dynamic mechanism of inclusion and exclusi-
on, which is why constitutions serve as too stable constructs to capture this
important aspect of modern societies in its formal-legal dimension.
e second part of the book deals with the nexus between citizenship and
migration. In the first chapter of this part, Feyza Yildirim Sungur, together
with Oliver Schwarz, focuses in her analysis on the implications of dual ci-
tizenship in the context of political participation opportunities in more than
one country, namely dual citizenship for Turkish citizens living in Germany.
eir analysis focuses particularly on the German migration and integration
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policy and the diaspora engagement policy of Turkey. e main argument is
that transnational political involvement of Turkish migrants in Germany is
shaped by Germany’s late-coming self-definition as a country of immigrati-
on and by Turkey’s recent progressive diaspora policy. Based on the study of
the participation in German and Turkish polls, the authors conclude: Dual ci-
tizenship seems to be beneficial for the increase of the political participation
of people with a Turkish migration background in Germany.
orsten Schlee’s chapter deals with the di ferential inclusion of the asyl-
um seekers and refugees in Germany. Schlee exemplifies the concept of di fe-
rential inclusion in current changes in German asylum and immigration law
and thereby further disaggregates citizenship on the national level. Based on
case studies in German labour and public order administrations, the chapter
demonstrates that despite processes of Europeanisation, the German labour
market remains nationally bounded and regulated. e growing e forts inmi-
gration and integration management follow a logic of optimising the proces-
ses of the population. is kind of bio-political rationality aims at economic
benefits rather than democratic legitimation.
e chapter concludes with the contribution of Lea Rzadtki, who introdu-
ces a critical citizen’s perspective. Based on a constructivist grounded theory
exploration of immigrant rights activism in Hamburg, it aims at closing gaps
in the conceptualization of non-citizens’ struggles over citizenship. By rely-
ing on insights from feminist, post-colonial and black theories, the chapters
conclusions are twofold: First, in many groups, non-citizens struggle toge-
ther with citizens, creating new dimensions in conceptualizing citizenship.
Second, the general debate is rather focused on disruptive activities on the
one hand and pro-refugee volunteering on the other hand, while the multi-
tude of everyday politics within activist groups is not captured.
e third and final part of the book discusses individual perceptions of ci-
tizenship and how these e fects the democratic constitution of modern socie-
ties. Carsten Wegscheider and Rula Nezi examine European citizens’ notions
of national and EU citizenship and their political and societal implications.
In their analysis, they use data from the European Values Study covering 20
member states of the European Union. eir empirical results confirm the
importance of political identity in supporting restrictions on the conditions
for acquiring citizenship. While political identity determines the support or
rejection of national and European restrictions on citizenship, social liberal
values and anti-immigration attitudes are also very important factors. Fur-
thermore, the results suggest that both notions of European citizenship are
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comparatively more inclusive to their national counterparts, although the de-
gree of inclusiveness is based on the distinction between the ethnic and civic
dichotomy.
Last but not least,Merve Schmitz-Vardar explores socio-psychological de-
terminants of individual critical-liberal desire for democracy in 20 member
states of the European Union. e data for her analysis stem also from the
European Social Survey. e aim of her chapter is to answer the question
how including and excluding ideas of identity, trust and belonging a fect the
democratic value orientation of European citizens. Based on a series of OLS
regressions and on the theoretical foundations of social identity theory, soci-
al threat theory and group-based enmity, the results show that nationalism
does not favour democratic value orientation on its own. Particularly when
analysing the interplay of resentment towards immigrants, trust in suppo-
sed foreign groups and democratic value orientation, it becomes clear that,
depending on the national context, these can benefit each other. Here, other
marginalised groups are o ten used as a pretext for hostility towards others.
We, the editors, have dispensed with the usual practice of closing this
volume with an additional summary of the main findings. We believe that
each contribution stands for itself and speaks for itself.
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Exclusive citizenship as basis
for chauvinistic nationalism
A historical institutionalist perspective on
the ruling rationales of liberal regimes
Christian Tischmeyer
1. Introduction
»[I]f you believe you’re a citizen of the world, you’re a citizen of nowhere. You
don’t understand what the very word ›citizenship‹ means« (May 2016). With
the speech this quote is taken from (I became aware of it through the epony-
mous book byMarsili/Milanese 2018), then recent British PrimeMinister May
denounces »too many people in positions of power«, whom she finds too cos-
mopolitan, for a lack of national identification. She blames unpatriotic elites
to collaborate with foreigners, employing EU and other supra-national orga-
nisations for their egoistic schemes to avoid contributing to British society.
ereby they are betraying »the spirit of citizenship« and consequently the or-
dinary Brit. May promises to end this situation by strengthening government
intervention. She portrays state agency, equal citizenship and collective na-
tional identity as mutually dependent.
May’s speech mirrors the fashionable ›my country first‹ rhetoric and in-
creasing awareness of continuous migration and global connectivity, posited
against national interest. As she is PrimeMinister of theEuropean, liberal de-
mocracy, I consider her statement a very pointed illustration of the discourse
I want to analyse. Are we witnessing a turning point in the political discourse
on citizenship, a renunciation of an inclusive, liberal understanding, in favour
of an exclusive, nationalistic one?
Seen from a historical perspective, the answer is no. When looking at
genesis and development of modern citizenship, it becomes clear that citi-
zenship has always been exclusionary. e problem with this is mainly one
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of claim versus reality. e inclusion of a defined group through exclusion of
everybody else may be considered the basic function of all groups which or-
ganise beyond face-to-face level (Barth 1970). However, this does not sit well
with the emancipatory claims of liberal constitutions. Especially identitari-
an exaltations of citizenship (creating unity among citizens by denigrating
others) contradict an inclusive and liberating self-conception of modern so-
cieties, which is said to find its expression in the status of democratic ci-
tizenship (Linz/Stepan 1996: 28; Menke 2015: 35; Przeworski 1995: 34). So, in
this paper, I want to explicate the connection between those two elements of
citizenship. How does the potential for liberation and emancipation relate to
the instrument of exclusion?
e historical-institutional analysis shows that the contradiction between
inclusive claim and exclusionary reality is only superficial. Tracing the his-
torical development of modern citizenship clarifies its function for modern
political systems (cf. Menke 2015: 11; Migdal 2001). From this perspective, ci-
tizenship is an administrative status, a political institution of unmediated,
modern state rule. In this light, the current debate on legal inclusion and its
political implications is a continuation of one of the foundational discussions
on constitutional regimes in general, and democracies in particular (Linz/Ste-
pan 1996: 28).
I will argue that the formal status of citizen allows for nationalistic exalta-
tion of citizenship as primary identity. May’s initial quote invokes the idea
of citizenship as fateful belonging to a nation. In his chapter, Schlee (2020)
points out how non-citizens are subjected to biopolitical selectivity. But as ci-
tizens are much more vital for political institutions, one should expect them
to be accordingly more targeted by such biopolitical rationales (cf. Menke’s
2015: 287-95 reading of Foucault). rough my institutional analysis, I intend
to show to what extent exclusion is inherent to the dominating rationales of
liberal democracies. To do so, I will sketch the evolution ofmodern citizenship
rights. In the first part, I will brie ly elaborate on my approach, to then argue
for the function citizenship fulfils in electoral regimes. is will connect to the
general rationales of liberal rule, some of which shall be outlined using critical
theory of Foucault and Marx. A terwards, I will position nationalism within
these logics, leading to the final discussion of aspects of self-discipline within
liberal institutions. I argue that the biopolitical selectivity applied to non-ci-
tizens shapes the institution of citizenship insofar as it supports nationalistic
chauvinism.
Exclusive citizenship as basis for chauvinistic nationalism 25
Before going into the analysis, I will make a final remark on the theoreti-
cal position that I will take, in reference to Isin’s (2009) concept of citizenship,
which has a guiding function for this volume. To analyse the political design
of citizenship in liberal mass-democracies, I will focus on the legal, or admi-
nistrative, status of full citizenship.
2. A historically grounded perspective
What is citizenship? In his in luential lecture, Marshall (1950: 8) understands
citizenship as »full membership of a community«1. Przeworski (1995: 43) also
takes this point of departure and adds that »[m]odern citizenship entails a
bundle of predictable and enforceable rights and obligations for every mem-
ber of the political community«.Going one step further, Linz and Stepan (1996:
28) infer the political institution of the state in defining who is citizen. Almost
in line with the initial quote byMay, they argue: »Without a state, there can be
no citizenship; without citizenship, there can be no democracy« (Linz/Stepan
1996: 28). Empirical operationalisation of citizenship points into this direction
as well. Despite a variety of existing approaches, Pammett (2016: 1-2) finds the
three elements, »rights, identity and participation« as crucial dimensions of
citizenship. All three specify the relationship between the designated indivi-
dual (citizen) and the political community. While partially going beyond, all
aspects centre on the legal status2. In summary, it seems uncontroversial that
citizenship denotes the relationship of full membership that certain persons
(citizens) have in the political community. In modernity, this community is
framed by the state – typically called the nation. It is a status of accumulated,
specifiable rights which entail both negative protection from and participati-
1 Marshall (1950: 10) separates three dimensions of citizenship along a historical »evo-
lution« of the concept through »civil, political and social« rights. While it is clear that
notions of rights have expanded throughout the centuries, one can defer political and
social rights from the same basic ideas as civil rights – they are at least compatible,
if not already inherent (cf. Menke 2015: 222-25). Marshall (1950: 14) also suggests to
follow the separation of »three elements of citizenship« not too rigorously.
2 For example, they elaborate that identity means the »citizens‹ orientations and atti-
tudes as members of a political community« (Pammett 2016: 2), both towards o ficial
position-holders within the state apparatus and their fellow citizens. Thus, it presents
the overarching frame of that relationship
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on rights within a state. us, citizenship is most meaningful in an electoral
regime.
As mentioned in the introduction, Isin’s (2009) idea of citizenship is dis-
tinct from my theoretical position. To him, citizenship is a much broader
concept; anybody who claims rights in any community (thereby making state-
ments how one relates to members and non-members of that group) is enga-
ging in citizenship.While this is useful in other investigations on citizenship,
e.g. how non-citizens can overcome their principal exclusion (cf. Rzadtki’s
2020 chapter in this volume), I will use the concept narrowly, denoting the
relation that full members have towards the modern state.
A »historical institutionalist« approach (following Migdal 2001: 246-55)
can trace the origin of political practices, specifically the development of their
underlying rationales (cf. Tischmeyer 2018: 8-9). In this way, it is similar to a
Marxist notion of critique (cf. Menke 2015: 11; 170-171). Especially the histo-
rical institutionalist approach is based on the premise that political regimes
are shaped by specific histories which still frame present politics. Institutions,
broadly understood as continuous structuring patterns of routine behaviour,
are the very link between historical developments and individual behaviour
(Giddens 1985: 11-12; Migdal 2001: 246). While already pragmatic decisions of
individual actors lead to the routinisation of relations, it is especially orga-
nisations that purposefully pursue routine interaction in order to lower costs
of continuous relations. As expectations are specified and options narrowed
down, behaviour is increasingly predictable; order is installed. us, proces-
ses of institutionalisation are intimately linked to the establishment of con-
tinuous power relations (Giddens 1985: 11-12); even when not directly backed
by sanctions. At the very least, institutions serve as guidelines how to ima-
gine a normal course of action and what to imagine at all (Migdal 2001: 246).
While individual preferences how to act are massively shaped by institutions,
human actions determine institutions vice versa (Giddens 1985: 11-12; Migdal
2001: 246).
I take citizenship as a fundamental political institution of liberal, electo-
ral regimes. is institution was created through bourgeois revolutions (cf.
Menke 2015), namely in USA and France, and adapted in later constitutions
following these examples. Such institutions have a functional and a cultural
side (Migdal 2001: 255-62). By focussing on the former, I aim to show the con-
sequences on the latter. As has been mentioned introductorily, citizenship
is charged with dimensions of identity. Concomitant to this, the history of
achieving citizenship rights is also idealised. However, uncritically applau-
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ding past revolutions and constitutions means to outright deny the autho-
ritative positing of a specific order – especially the ignorance towards alter-
native options. is idealisation also has a certain kind of ›solemn‹ element
to it. A ter all, as even critics acknowledge (Marx 1976 [1843]: 356), bourgeois
constitutions do present crucial steps towards liberation from earlier, more
despotic regimes. However, as historians (Mann 1993), theoreticians of the
state (Giddens 1985, Migdal 2001), and political philosophers (Foucault 2008;
Menke 2015) agree, citizenship rights were gradually granted by the ones in
power – albeit under pressure ›from below‹. To understand citizenship rights
in their historical continuity means to see them as functional adaptations to
the ruling rationales of modernising regimes.
3. Citizenship as political institution, functional to state rule
To ground citizenship in historical perspective, one has to be aware that libe-
ral democracies are systems of rule. e claim to authority is no weaker than
in autocracies, it is just di ferent in its specifics. In this part, I will outline
some of these rationales, considering three interrelated aspects. I will struc-
ture the chapter roughly along the historical development of statehood during
the formative period of institutions of modern rule, i.e. rule in liberal mass-
democracies. Doing this, I will consider in luential criticisms of capitalistic
societies of mass-production and increasing mass-consumption by Marx and
Lenin. I will devote special attention to Foucault’s concept of biopolitics. Follo-
wingMenke (2015: 287-95), Marx and Foucault present very di ferent critiques
of liberal regimes.Marx’ critique is based on the de facto inequality of formal-
ly equal members of society, and consequently class-based exploitation. On
the other hand, Foucault’s critique targets the institutions of rule, specifically
how domination is installed through self-discipline when interacting with or
participating within authoritative institutions. I seek to combine those two
critiques.
In the process of political modernisation to unmediated, central state ru-
le, the populace was no longer just the object of rulers, but emerging to de-
mand participation. Modernising regimes successfully channelled the politi-
cal voices of the masses into national representative institutions (Mann 1993:
252; Marsili/Milanese 2018: 48). Its sta fing was decided on in public elections,
with su frage continuously expanding, until it comprised the vast majority of
the population (Hobsbawm 2000: 83; Marshall 1950: 20). is is only consis-
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tent with themove to direct rule.Historical accounts show that representative
institutions have already been critical to pre-modern regimes to foster com-
pliance within the groups they depended upon (Giddens 1985; Mann 1993). As
modern states depend on mass-compliance, broad segments of the populati-
on are now integrated into the representation mechanisms.
As Giddens (1985: 206) puts it, rights were granted as concessions to com-
pensate for deeper intrusion of the state into societal life. As the Ancient Ré-
gime first incorporated the grand bourgeoisie, property guarantees were co-
dified before the protection of liberty (Mann 1993: 247-52). Gradually those
protection and participation rights were expanded in substance and reach to
compose the contemporary ›bundle‹ of citizenship rights (cf. Marshall 1950).
In line with continuous extension of su frage, universal civil liberties might
also be seen as gradually in lated rights of the grand bourgeoisie (Williams
1984: 126). From this perspective, mass-democracy can be regarded rather as
quantitative expansion of the citizen group than the new quality of a consti-
tutional state.
Menke (2015) also sees the seminal codification of property rights as pre-
cedent for all modern rights, including citizenship rights. ese subjective
rights are framed as »natural or pre-political« (Menke 2015: 210; my translati-
on). He recapitulates John Locke, who frames property as continuation of the
free will of the individual. Hence, any regulation of property is understood as
intrusion into the personal sphere (Menke 2015: 213). As Foucault (2008) ar-
gues, this aversion to directly intervene into individual a fairs, however, did
not mean that political authorities reduced their activities. On the contrary,
under the banner of a lean or »frugal« state, government activity was ever
increasing. According to Foucault, this is because liberal government con-
cerns itself with the welfare of the people. is general orientation, as well as
the more specific rationales applied by political actors to that end, are what
he calls biopolitics. At the same time stands the realisation that government
cannot directly produce societal wealth, but has to rely on the market to drive
its production.
us, a successful government e fectively creates the conditions under
which the population thrives – measured by a range of pre-determined indi-
cators. is means to enable the individuals who compose the population to
utilise the granted freedoms (e.g. those of the market, but also political free-
doms of discussion and expression; Foucault 2008: 63). In practice, however,
this enablement requires to respond to all kinds of threats to the foundational
freedom of liberal regimes. Foucault (2008: 66) deduces that in liberalism,
Exclusive citizenship as basis for chauvinistic nationalism 29
»individuals are constantly exposed to danger, or rather, they are conditioned
to experience their situation, their life, their present, and their future as
containing danger«. us, liberal government not only becomes immensely
active, but also engages in a paradox (or dialectical) relationship to freedom.
It attempts to enable individual freedom by limiting the general decision
space (Foucault 2008: 64)3. In other words, it is generally acknowledged that
free agency may well constitute a threat to the freedom of others. erefore,
to become a subject in (or of) a liberal order means to waive political agency4.
Marx (1976 [1843]) also criticises the authoritative positing of a specific
order in and through liberalism. To him (Marx 1976 [1843]: 366), the very pro-
cess of the declaration of rights is opposed to collective political action. He
considers it ba ling that at the very moment of successful collective political
(bourgeois) revolution, the principle of individual, private enclosure is solem-
nly endorsed. Even more so, the revolution is declared to serve this very indi-
vidualistic aim. e reason is a decision to establish the societal model of the
bourgeois state as absolute5. e bourgeoisie de-politicises the preconditions
of their rule by denying that those are consciously set conditions (Marx 1976
[1843]: 354). is does not only mean to avoid political regulation of the bases
of their power – property, education etc.6 – but also to pronounce di ference
instead of community within non-national characteristics, e.g. religion (Marx
1976 [1843]: 356). Only in this fashion may the national state establish itself as
the general or common characteristic, while all other dimensions of social li-
fe are regarded as individual traits. To Marx, the result of this is a societal
development shaped by commodification and estrangement.
Summarising the two critiques, both qualify idealistic claims of bourgeois
emancipation, but Foucault and Marx o fer di ferent readings of the limits of
3 One of Foucault’s (2008) examples are policies to protect the domestic economy from
free trade via tari fs, so that it can develop ›freely‹.
4 While I put this here in definite, abstract terms, Foucault (2008: 313) clarifies that the-
re is a constant process of weighing di ferent interests at play – a process known as
politics.
5 Menke (2015: 8-10) finds this too simple and delivers a ›critique of rights‹ based on real-
existing liberal regimes‹ ignorance towards the continuous process of codifying rights
out of acclaimed ›natural‹ or non-legal matter. While very rich in theoretical references,
his argument emphasises the dialectics of freedom mentioned in the paragraph above,
with reference to Foucault (2008: 64).
6 Thereby, bourgeois regimes rely on private governance of such goods, however criti-
cal they are deemed for the e fective exercise of citizenship, as Przeworski (1995: 43)
argues.
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citizenship in liberal regimes. Foucault analyses that and how the subject of
liberalism is dominated by the political order. Marx, on the other hand, states
that the order is designed in order to allow for ›pre-political‹ privilege of pro-
perty and education to manifest. Rights are stylised as personal possessions,
because they have been designed as additional asset of the bourgeoisie. In or-
der to sustain this class rule, nationality is posited as the dividing line between
people (of e.g. same class or religion; Marx 1976 [1843]: 354). To clarify matters,
in this context Marx criticises national entitlement, not citizenship – seeing
that in his days only a minority of nationals were citizens. I will clarify the
connection of nationality and citizenship subsequently.
4. Equal citizens, unequal humans
e concessions to an empowered mass as described above have one major
implication: the citizenship status becomes much more meaningful (Noiriel
1994: 83, 306; Torpey 2000: 121). Simply put, in electoral polities the question
arises: Who is part of the citizenry? Who possesses the citizenship rights to
participate in the state’s decision-making? e nation is the abstract answer to
this question. In this chapter, I will first deliver a terminological clarification
of the term nation and then relate it to citizenship. I will outline the exclusive
and o ten violent history of establishing citizenship in the modern nation-
state before pointing out its relevance for contemporary democracies.
e historical context of nationalism – promoting a nation – also lies
in expanded state activity and the consequent political modernisation
(Tischmeyer 2018: Chapter 4). rough unmediated rule, inhabitants needed
to comply directly with central state institutions via taxation, military ser-
vice, and later schooling (Giddens 1985; Mann 1993). Being in need of mass-
compliance without comprehensive local knowledge, rulers promoted the
political culture of nationalism.
Nations are, borrowing Anderson’s (1991 [1983]) famous term, »imagined
communities«. at means they are too large for any member to know all co-
members. us, their characteristics are also never completely known, and
consequently object of continuous political struggle (Migdal 2001: 14-15, 259f).
Being in the best position to do so, state rulers promote their interpretation
of national culture. rough national narratives, the display of symbols, pu-
blic holidays etc. (Anderson 1991), they attempt to make the nation a lived
experience, to embed a diversity of cultural experiences in one over-arching
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framework of a common, national culture (Migdal 2001). Nationality is aimed
to be a primary and »natural« source of identification (Giddens 1985: 221; cf.
also Marx 1976 [1843]: 354), so that those in government of the state can use it
tomobilise for their own ends.However, due to the political nature of who and
what best represents national interests, governments are o ten challenged by
other nationalistic actors, promoting their own ideas, typically presentedwith
chauvinism, i.e. degrading the non-national.
Infamously, Schmitt (1996 [1923]: 14-15) argued that in order to ensure de-
mocratic equality of nationals, all real-existing democracies relied on the ex-
clusion of those groups of the populationwhowere perceived to ultimately not
fit in. Analyses of historical cases support this controversial author’s claim.
Mann (2005) suggests that exclusive settler democracies acted significantly
more violent than their authoritarian equivalents against local – non-citizen
– populations. In addition to this, the frequent mass-deportations in 20th
century Europe since the Balkan Wars had been commonly welcomed by lea-
ding politicians of democracies as ameans to achieve the desired ›congruence
of nation and state‹ (cf. Schwartz 2013). Finally, already the earliest modern
nationalisms in revolutionary USA and France were immediately followed by
widespread persecution of non-republicans, or aristocrats respectively – the
rhetoric about human rights notwithstanding (Schwartz 2013: 10). In prac-
tice, privileging part of the population with citizen entitlements meant to
subject other parts to severe violations of their human rights, through expul-
sion, forced labour, or even ethnic cleansing. Establishingmodern citizenship
rested on active, partially massively violent exclusion – at least in the past.
Now, to what extent does this relate to the rationales of citizenship, whe-
reas not, e.g. of the nation? In historical practice, these two ideas are not
distinct, but rather inseparable aspects of the same political modernisation
leading to the democratic nation-state. According to Schnabel-Schüle (2004:
55-56) citizen was originally used to signify a carrier of rights, while nationals
denote those of common origin. However, from the later 19th century on-
wards, the concepts of citizen and national weremeant to coincide (Schnabel-
Schüle 2004: 56-57). Also Noiriel (1994: 73-75) and Torpey (2000: 107-110) argue
that in modernity these two aspects are not clearly separable. In the modern
nation-state, the rights and obligations of citizenship are an expression of na-
tional in- and exclusion. Torpey’s (2000) investigation of modern citizenship
centres on identity papers – since there simply is no other way to know a per-
son’s nationality. is trivial recognition points out, how nationality typically
has been a top-down ascription by state administrations. In the United States,
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for example, »those held to be unworthy of admission into citizenship« com-
prised »a variety of groups regarded as impure, unclean, idiotic, non-white,
or incapable of understanding the principles of republicanism« (Torpey 2000:
102). Identification papers are not a casual side-e fect of modern states, but
imperative for the protection of one’s rights, e.g. as visible during First World
War, when imprisonment was the normal way to treat nationals of enemy sta-
tes. As soon as most of a country’s inhabitants receive the status of citizens,
the separation of nationality and citizenship becomesmeaningless7. us, the
above-mentioned human rights violations can be equally attributed to both
nationalisation – designing one national culture out of a diverse population
– as well as liberal emancipation – privileging citizens over ›foreigners‹.
And this is why, for modernity, I find Isin’s (2009: 376) terminological se-
paration invalid, which states that nationality is tied to origin (or ethnicity),
while citizenship is tied to claiming rights. is means to deny the common,
top-down practices of granting rights. While these typically were concessions
from governments being confronted with demands by their populations, this
process must not be confused with casting idealistic notions of liberal eman-
cipation into political reality.
How exactly is this history of exclusive citizenship present in contempora-
ry democracies? Przeworski (1995: 43), in discussing the challenges of »new
democracies«, makes the point that »[c]itizenship can be universally exercis-
ed only when« certain, e.g. »social and economic perquisites« are met (cf. also
Pammett 2014: 2). Hence, early liberal regimes set a ›property qualification‹
on citizenship, granting full participatory privileges only to those who were
(economically) able to fulfil their obligations (Przeworski 1995: 43). Now, in the
era of almost universal citizenship, political inequality results from states not
promoting citizenship in all classes and throughout the whole country.
Viewed from this perspective, today’s situation seems civil and inclusive,
at least in established democracies. Lenin (1957 [1916]) famously argued that
economically powerful nations bribe ›their‹ masses at the expense of workers
abroad, in order to keep the exploitative system running. In this line of argu-
ment, liberal constitutions o fer privileges for those parts of the population
considered more critical to the functioning of the global economic system.
7 This is not to deny discrimination between formally equal citizens. However, in princi-
pal, this discrimination cannot be based on nationality, as this quality of a person is
invisible (cf. Torpey 2000).
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However, this domestic social pacification is consciously built on the inequa-
lity of others. While this initially a fected most of the populations of the ›de-
mocracies‹, non-propertied men, women, and non-whites were gradually in-
cluded (cf.Williams 1984: 126). A ter incorporatingmost of a state’s permanent
population into the political regime, most disadvantaged are those subjected
to a state’s control without being considered as citizens. Today, this applies
mainly to refugees (Noiriel 1994: 83-86), but also resident non-citizens in ge-
neral. Even if granted protection, they always depend on the voluntary, hence
precarious benevolence of the state8. Since the claim to full political privilege
in the form of legal rights is no longer based on minority qualities like pro-
perty plus masculinity, citizenship is e fectively based on nationality. While
the ideational bases of citizenship and nationality used to be separated (as
also Isin 2009 points out), in modernity they denote a practically inseparable
compound – full membership in the political community plus organisation
called the nation-state. e imagined community of the nation finds its legal
expression in full citizenship rights.
5. Citizenship as disciplining institution
While the above argument delineates how the principal distinction between
privileged citizens and precarious non-citizens has been set up, this chap-
ter will discuss some e fects that its exclusivity has on both the institution of
citizenship and the citizens. Linking to the critiques presented above, the par-
ticipatory element of democratic citizenship has to be qualified. e voices of
themasses are channelled into representative institutions, while the (material
and social) bases of e fective participation are depoliticised. Instead, politics
is concerned with regulating the biosocial qualities of the population, attemp-
ting to shape the conditions conducive to society’s welfare (Foucault 2008).
However, this is accompanied by the heightened awareness to the dangers
such liberties bring. Being a citizen in a liberal society does not only mean to
succumb to a ruling order. Participation under these conditions entails self-
8 As Depelchin (2008: 28) points out, it is common only in cases of such underprivile-
ged people to speak about violations of human rights. Contrary to the full entitlement
expressed by citizenship, human rights are minimum criteria for underprivileged in-
habitants of a state. Marx (1976 [1843]: 363) also sees human rights as the negative
bourgeois rights of individualist separation. Human rights are individual and negati-
ve, whereas citizenship rights are political and participatory.
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discipline to adhere to the ruling rationales as codified within political insti-
tutions. Subsequently, I will elaborate on this aspect of self-discipline.
e attempt to discipline certain groups within the citizenry was part of
the speech delivered by eresa May, as quoted initially. As Menke (2015:74-
82) states, self-discipline has been part and parcel of liberal thought from the
start. He refers to omas Hobbes’ idea to relinquish some ›natural liberty‹ in
order to receive security. Hobbes argues that the o ficial religious confession
of a person may, or even has to be, subordinate to the common good of civil
peace, while (only) the inner creed remains free. us, in order to be free, one
has to behave in a certain way. A common contemporary manifestation is the
duty of citizens to stick to designated participation channels. Citizens who,
for example, fail to transform their political opinion into a vote can be easily
disregarded. Teenagers, who deliberately refuse to go to school as they feel
their future is ultimately challenged, are being denounced as absentees. Not
sticking to institutionalised ways of actionmeans being exposed to sanctions.
In liberal democracies, these reach from comparatively benign ones, like being
misunderstood or ignored, up to being banned from certain institutions, or
even criminalised (e.g. for civil disobedience)9.
Building on the logic of self-discipline, Foucault (2008: 226) argues that
under the biopolitical rationales of liberal societies, every member of society
is seen as »entrepreneur of himself«. Competition becomes a main regula-
ting rationale in all spheres of society (Foucault: 148-149), and human capital
investment is seen as the main driver of market success (Foucault: 230-32).
Consequently, the »migrant is an investor. He is an entrepreneur of hims-
elf who incurs expenses by investing to obtain some kind of improvement«
(Foucault 2008: 230). In order to stimulate that entrepreneurial spirit, go-
9 This coarse argument can do with two qualifications. First, my assessment of institutio-
nally prescribed action and individual deviance is very one-sided. In reality, those ac-
ting within institutions do shape them, if only by reproducing original rationales, but
more commonly by gradually shi ting the recommended courses of action. Additio-
nally, as Isin (2009: 382) argues, institutions can be changed by those acting explicitly
outside of them. Second and relatedly, liberal regimes may be especially accommo-
dative to such ›unconventional participation‹ in that, for instance, greater importance
is attached to freedom of expression than to regulatory law. Nonetheless, instituti-
ons equipped with authority do sanction what they consider to be deviant behaviour.
Then, the decision whether to sanction rests on the political distinctions between civil
disobedience and crime, or unconventional as opposed to deviant behavior.
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vernments (and other political actors) design institutions that are being re-
sponsive to such individual e fort.
Ong (2006) analyses the situation in East Asia’s special economic zones
where states, in competition for transnational investment, bargainwith rights
of the workforce to supply the right combination of highly trained experts
and exploitable ›migrant‹ workers. is behaviour clearly shows the nature
of citizenship as accumulated »bundle« of rights (Przeworski 1995: 43), which
may be disaggregated and separately granted or withheld, depending on cost-
benefit calculations of state administrations.
While Ong’s examples are non-democracies, her argument can be trans-
ferred to the West. Administrations inside the EU also di ferentiate between
desired non-citizens and foreigners who are tolerated at best, as Schlee’s
chapter in this volume shows. Inter alia, the handling of working permits and
residency status show highly unequal treatment, depending on the rationales
of the receiving society. To signify that the migrant is not a full member of
society, she or he is lacking in legal status. e way out of mere toleration is
open only for those who performwell along the standards set for immigrants.
As Schlee (2020; in this volume) analyses, in Germany this means language
proficiency, specific job skills, and acceptance of some di fuse social norms.
Consequently, it can be stated that even liberal democracies resort to a
regime of di ferential inclusion of non-citizens. In other words, only ›good‹
foreigners may become equal citizens.
Coming to my final and main argument, this has certain e fects on the
natural(ised) population10. Under the demand of a lexible workforce, citi-
zens compete withmigrants (who are perceived as economic chance-seekers).
Additionally, migration is problematized, as certain immigrants are said to
endanger society (criminals, terrorists, welfare cheaters etc.; cf. Götz 2011:
146). is leads to the logic of selectivity, as societies should neither accept
everybody, nor anybody: immigrants need to prove their value for societies.
Borders are defined as instruments enabling this selection. An e ficient bor-
der regime promises control and knowledge (and even truth, as can be seen
by the ›threat‹ Sans-Papiers are posing). Again, this connects to the dangers
10 Maybe it is necessary to spell out that my argument does not depend on how one defi-
nes national belonging (e.g. communitarian vs. libertarian). The relevant institutional
logics are based solely on the dichotomous status of citizens vis-à-vis non-citizens –
irrelevant of individuals receiving this status through birth, naturalisation or other cir-
cumstances.
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inherent to freedom, the fear of losing control as one becomes more aware of
global connectivity. It is a small step for an anxious workforce, stimulated by
nationalistic chauvinism, to demand that chance-seeking migrants not only
fit labour market and administrative demands, but also o fer a ›cultural fit‹.
Bassam Tibi (2017), one of the seminal voices in the German debate pro-
moting a ›guiding culture‹ (Leitkultur)11 when dealing esp. with Muslim im-
migrants, provides an illustrative argument to this cultural fit. His point of
departure is that governments should regulate migration, i.e. decide on the
demand for foreigners (Tibi 2017). While explicitly rejecting any ethno-na-
tionalistic or religious interpretation of national culture, and making rather
general and probably widely accepted suggestions12, he nonetheless proposes
a set of values which only non-citizens have to abide to, in order to be granted
a mere chance of becoming full members of society. It becomes clear that ci-
tizens are in a privileged position compared to non-citizens. Tibi’s points are
an illustration of what has been stated about national culture; who ever at-
tempts to describe such a culture is actually attempting to define it (Götz 2011:
81). And due to their agenda setting, legislative and implementation powers,
governments are in the best position to do so – in fact, Tibi explicitly calls for
government action.
Governments postulate nationalism for their own ends, but cannot stay
on top of the forces they unleash. is perception of national distinctiveness,
economic competition and outside dangers supports aggressive, chauvinistic
nationalism – especially in combination with the shortcomings of capitalistic
(commodification, estrangement) and national integration (limits of partici-
pation).Hence, the ruling rationales of liberal societies depend on and thereby
reproduce the separation between citizen and non-citizen, and consequently
the exclusion of non-citizens. Interestingly, this refers back to how rationa-
les of the creation of nations were theorised by Carl Schmitt (1996 [1923]) the
borders of the nation are defined by those who are considered equals.
11 Cf. Götz (2011: 14; 145-47) for an ideational contextualisation of the Leitkultur debate.
12 His European ›guiding culture‹ includes: 1. primacy of reason over religious dogma, 2.
individual as opposed to group rights (esp. freedom of religion), 3. secular democracy
and 4. pluralism including tolerance as basis for a rational way of dealing with cultural
di ference (Tibi 2017).
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6. Conclusion
is paper understood citizenship as a functional adaptation to the ruling
rationales of liberal regimes. Citizenship has been defined as a status of ac-
cumulated specifiable rights, meaningful mainly in relation to a democratic
nation-state. Having historically started as a privilege for a few, citizenship
now o fers protection and participation rights for most inhabitants within li-
beral democracies. e lip side of the coin, however, is that this citizenship
overlaps with categories of national belonging.
While nationalism is also supposed to be functional for state rule, it en-
ables challengers of both government and state on this very ground. Chauvi-
nistic nationalism is not only a function of nationalistic challengers, but alrea-
dy inherent to the institution of citizenship. e structural inequality between
citizens and non-citizens is a legal signifier for national distinctiveness and
the formal basis for processes of socio-cultural (de-)grading. Liberal subjects
are trained to see themselves in constant competition and exposed to dangers
resulting from the freedom of others. At the same time, political participation
rights of citizens are limited by two domination rationales. For one, freedom
of expression is subject to self-discipline, as the voices of themasses are chan-
nelled into representative institutions. Secondly, thematerial and social bases
of actual participation are de-politicised.
Towhat extent, then, is the institution of citizenship »in lux«?WhileMar-
shall (1950) seminally described the qualitative expansion of the concept in
early modernity, historical accounts (e.g. Mann 1993) describe the quantitati-
ve enlargement of the citizen group. However, the general pattern remained
unchanged. While some are privileged, most do not benefit from the pro-
tection and participation rights thus codified. Acknowledging that identity
papers are a sine-qua-non to those ends, the e fects of this legal exclusion
must not be underestimated. Citizenship has been designed to serve as an
exclusion instrument – although awareness of this is low when social chan-
ge is little problematized. In this chapter, I explicated how the emancipatory
and the exclusionary aspects of citizenship are related. To this extend, na-
tionalistic interpretations of liberal institutions, as they are being put on the
agenda by right-wing populists more recently, do not present a departure or
re-definition.
Admittedly, the approach in the abstract way I applied it here is rather co-
arse and I shall discuss some consequences of my theoretical choices in brief.
Specifically, I narrowed down the concept of citizenship to a formal institu-
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tion in relation to the modern nation-state, more specifically liberal demo-
cracies. Focussing on ruling rationales embedded in institutions, I ignored
how those very institutions develop and may transform through the actions
›under their roof‹ – and even explicitly outside their boundaries (exactly Isin’s
2009 focus). Hence, alternative concepts take citizenship as a continuum.No-
tably, Isin (2009) understands it as a kind of audacious behaviour by anybo-
dy claiming political agency, even where it is o ficially and explicitly proscri-
bed. However, to be e fective in political practice, such e forts have to be met
with acquiescence, at least. As historical cases show, democracies do not ne-
cessarily welcome ›unconventional‹ participation either. Hence, I deliberately
chose my approach to highlight major rationales shaping the institution of
citizenship and allowing for identitarian interpretation.
Still, democratic states of law usually not only acknowledge the validity
of human rights, they o fer certain juridical and constitutional safeguards
against arbitrary administrative decisions, also for non-citizens. As alrea-
dy mentioned, Marx (1976 [1843]) also struggled to understand the duality
of emancipation and exclusion in liberal regimes. In a recent analysis, Isin
(2009: 369) states that citizenship always entails both domination and em-
powerment.While democratic citizenship is virtually synonymous to the sub-
jects’ eligibility to question and potentially alter a state’s political institutions,
this ability rests on the entitlement of some, typically granted in a top-down
fashion. So, what does follow frommy critical approach to citizenship? I think
the core insight is to acknowledge that the status of citizen is mainly a one-
sided dependency of the citizen on the state. Real existing, representative
democracy is characterised by restrained institutional in luence, even of citi-
zens. us, a reform of the citizenship regimewould benefit both non-citizens
and citizens.
As we can conclude that citizenship is insu ficient to safeguard protection
and participation, what other bases can be thought of to secure rights bey-
ond nationality? Are other institutions able to provide such safeguards? e
transnational discourse on human rights seems very fitting here, as it scales
up the narrow notion of state-sanctioned individual privileges. e legitima-
cy and capabilities to enforce such rights, however, is simply non-existing.
To enable such competencies beyond the nation-state would not only require
fundamental restructuring of political authority, but their desirability is also
questionable (as this simply means to shi t principal and to date unresolved
issues onto a di ferent level). e most feasible solution then, appears to lie in
smaller, legal adaptations of citizenship within the nation-state framework.
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ese could allow for more acknowledgement of the continued reality of mi-
gration. ere are examples, in which certain electoral rights are based on
residency rather than nationality (e.g. in Germany the Ausländerbeiräte). Such
›best practices‹ may be expanded and disseminated by international and su-
pranational (EU) organisations. is, however, could provide only a very un-
reliable solution, given the severity of a precarious, permanent non-citizen
status.
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Public perception of European Union citizenship
at the local level
Oliver Schwarz
1. Introduction
European Union (EU) citizenship and the rights included in it are one of the
major cornerstones of the European integration process. e creation of EU
citizenship goes back to the Maastricht Treaty, which entered into force on 1
November 1993. Since then, every national citizen of a member state is also
a citizen of the Union. e ultimate goal of this initiative was to encourage a
sense of identification with and belonging to the European Union and thereby
foster a common European identity.While certain rights, like the right of free
movement and residence, are firmly anchored in European primary law and
have undergone considerable developments in secondary legislation during
the last decades, a significant gap remains between the content of the legal
norms of EU citizenship and the civic realities of everyday life. is pheno-
menon is well known. Every three years since 1993, the European Commission
reports on the progress towards e fective EU citizenship. e Standard Euro-
barometer, published twice a year, regularly examines people’s perception of
EU citizenship. In addition, two specific Eurobarometer surveys were carried
out in view of the 2017 EU citizenship report. Academic literature has stressed
the importance of knowledge for a positive perception of the EU (Gabel 1998;
Hooghe/Marks 2005). It is expected that themore familiar people get with Eu-
ropean institutions and politics and the better knowledge they have about EU
policies, the stronger becomes their identification with the European Union.
However, what is missing is a local perspective on this cognitive path between
knowledge about and perception of EU citizenship. erefore, the aim of this
chapter is to examine the extent to which EU citizens’ knowledge about their
rights is accompanied by a positive perception of EuropeanUnion citizenship.
For this purpose, the chapter first explores the development of EU citizenship
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and the relationship between citizenship and democracy on the European le-
vel. en the chapter presents findings of a face-to-face survey of 425 local
residents in Duisburg, Germany. Finally, the analysis of these findings will be
used to formulate concrete policy recommendations about how to vitalise the
link between local citizens and the EU.
2. From »market citizenship« to »Union citizenship«
e concept of EU citizenship has been evolving highly dynamically over
the past six decades of European integration. Since the foundation of the
European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in the 1950s, the rights of the
»market citizen« (Ipsen/Nicolaysen 1964: 340) have been gradually extended
by the subsequent treaties and secondary legislation. Already in 1957, the
Treaty of Rome, establishing the European Economic Community (EEC),
explicitly mentioned the people in addition to the member states in its
preamble. is was the very first sign that European integration not only
directly a fected the member states but also each individual citizen. As a
result, market citizens, namely workers, businessmen and consumers, where
the first beneficiaries of the internal market with the establishment of the
four European freedoms (capital, goods, people and services). ese four
freedoms, formally contained in the treaties, were dynamically developed by
the European Court of Justice (ECJ) and shaped the relationship of individual
citizens with the community, based on the core norm of non-discrimination.
However, the 1980s witnessed a renewed interest in the issue of European
identity and, as a result, the concept of citizenship started to develop as a
boost to the political legitimacy of European integration (Isin/Wood 1999). In
1984, the European Parliament adopted a Dra t Treaty establishing the Eu-
ropean Union, whose Article 3 recommended the formal establishment of a
»citizenship of the Union«. Only one year later, the Adonnino report proposed
the development of »special rights of citizens« (Adonnio 1985: 7), in particular
local electoral rights and voting rights in European Parliament elections in
the according member state of residence. Nevertheless, the European Parlia-
ment’s dra t proposal was not accepted by themember states and the Adonnio
report did not show a direct result.
A crucial catalyst in the development of EU citizenship was the o ten un-
derestimated Single European Act (SEA) in 1986 (Warleigh 1998: 116). e SEA
provided important innovations which prepared the ground for the ratifica-
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tion of the Maastricht Treaty in 1992. With entry into force of the Treaty of
the European Union (TEU) on 1 November 1993, the EU legally established the
institution of Union citizenship stating that »every person holding the natio-
nality of a Member State is a citizen of the Union« (Article 8(1) TEU). One of
the Treaty’s main objectives was »to strengthen the protection of the rights
and interests of the nationals of its Member States through the creation of a
citizenship of the Union« (Article B TEU). To reach this objective, the Maas-
tricht Treaty added three additional rights to the existing free movement and
residence rights of the classic market citizen: the right to vote and to stand as
a candidate both in municipal and European Parliament elections„ the right
of consular or diplomatic protection by member state authorities when tra-
velling abroad and the right to petition the European Parliament or to apply
to the Ombudsman. As a result, the Treaty of Maastricht legally established a
political relation between the EU and its citizens which goes beyond the legal
and economical relation of market citizenship.
As Kostakopoulou (2013: 24) points out, the potential of EU citizenship to
strengthen citizens’ rights and enhance democratic practices at all levels of
governance was not su ficiently appreciated by policy makers and academics
at the time. Initially, even the ECJ adopted a cautious approach. is resis-
tance changed in 1998 with the Martínez Sala case where the ECJ gave a big
impetus to the concept of European citizenship. In that case, the refusal of
the authorities to grant an economically inactive Spanish citizen who lived in
Germany certain social benefits was dismissed by the ECJ. e next important
step was theGrzelczyk case in 2001, where the ECJ was asked whether a French
student could claim social assistance benefits in Belgium (Cornelissen 2009).
ese two decisions could be interpreted as the ECJ developing a general right
to non-discrimination for EU citizens, independent of the performance of any
economic activity.
e Treaty of Amsterdam in 1997 did not substantially modify the con-
cept of Union citizenship introduced by Maastricht. Only some additional
rights were included, such as the right to write directly to any of the insti-
tutions or bodies of the EU, the right to be replied to in any o ficial language
represented in the Treaty or the right of access to any of the documents of
the European institutions and bodies. However, in Article 8(1) TEU it clari-
fied that »citizenship of the Union shall complement and not replace national
citizenship«. According to Barber (2002: 1), this provision is »an expression
of both European ambition and Member State conservatism«. It was rooted
in the so-called Edinburgh Agreement, which was made in the a termath of
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the negative Danish referendum of the Maastricht Treaty. In that agreement,
the Council (1992: 53) underlined that provisions of the Treaty »do not in any
way take the place of national citizenship. e question whether an individual
possesses the nationality of a Member State will be settled solely by reference
to the national law of the Member State concerned.« By making national citi-
zenship a prerequisite for European citizenship, it is plausible to say that the
EU did not create a system of double citizenship, but a system of dual citi-
zenship (Saputelli 2018: 263). Double citizenship is characterised by the fact
that a citizen can hold two (or more) citizenships which are independent and
separated from each other and are not linked as in the European citizenship.
For more discussion on the concept of dual citizenship, see Yildirim Sungur’s
and Schwarz’ contribution to this volume (2020).
e next important boost to EU citizenship was the proclamation of the
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union in 2000. Although it
did not become legally binding until the entry into force of the Lisbon Trea-
ty in 2009, the document underlined the EU’s ambition »to adopt its own
Bill of Rights« (de Búrca 2013: 172). e Charter contains inalienable rights,
principles and values that all EU citizens are entitled to and all European ac-
tors must comply with when implementing European law. In this sense, the
text has brought a new impetus to the EU’s human rights framework (von
Bogdandy: 2000). e Charter contains a preamble and 54 articles divided
into VII chapters and some general rules. Chapter V lays down the rights at-
tached to the status of EU citizenship. ese rights include the right to vote
and stand as a candidate at the elections to the European Parliament and at
municipal elections, the right to good administration, the right to petition at
the European Parliament, the freedom of movement and residence and the
diplomatic and consular protection.
Scholars have praised the Charter for establishing »a direct link between
the European institutions and citizenship« (Balaguer 2013: 233). In parallel,
the Charter has attained considerable recognition through European juris-
prudence (Sarmiento 2013). In 2011, the Zambrano case attracted wide atten-
tion (van Eijken/de Vries 2011; Hailbronner/Iglesias Sánchez 2011). is case
dealt with the issue whether a residence permit should be given to two Co-
lombian citizens who were parents of two Belgian children. e ECJ a firmed
that such derivative rights exist for parents from third countries if EU mem-
ber states have previously granted citizenship to their children. Moreover, in
her opinion, the ECJ’s Advocate General Eleanor Sharpston called for a recon-
sideration of the bonds between the EU citizen and the EU. is could only
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be implemented through a more extensive protection of human rights and
fundamental rights for EU citizens. e ECJ (2011) followed by deciding that
Member States could no longer deprive Union citizens of the »genuine en-
joyment of the substance of the rights conferred by virtue of their status as
citizens of the Union«.
3. European Union citizenship at the local level
Today, EU citizenship can best be described as a kind of federal citizenship
(van den Brink 2019: 33). A federal citizen possesses »membership in two po-
litical communities within the same state« (Carens 2000: 164). She or he is a
member of the federation as a whole as well as of one of the federation’s con-
stituent states. EU citizens, according to today’s Article 20 TFEU, enjoy this
kind of federal membership as well: »every person holding the nationality of
a Member State shall be a citizen of the Union«. As a result, EU citizenship,
like other forms of federal citizenship, is characterised by a horizontal and
a vertical dimension. e horizontal dimension allows the federal citizen to
move and reside freely within the EU and not to be discriminated on grounds
of national citizenship. e vertical dimension represents the core of EU citi-
zenship as it represents a direct link between the Union and its citizens.
As outlined in the introductory chapter of this volume (Bayer et al. 2020:
7-22), there are generally three di ferent aspects of citizenship: one focusing
on the legal status granted by a political community, one relating a certain
identity to a community and one highlighting social practice of democratic
participation. Concerning status, van den Brink (2019: 33) resumes that »EU
citizenship may indeed look rather meagre when considering solely its ver-
tical dimension«. But how about practice and identity? e turnouts of the
elections to the European Parliament indicate that the public does not see its
EU citizenship as its most important status. is immediately leads to the
even more puzzling question: Are Europeans really passive (non-democratic)
citizens? One factor that may explain passivity in terms of participation is
the extent to which individuals know their legal rights. Public knowledge of
rights has been a subject of a number of empirical enquiries over the last
decade (Denvir/Balmer/Pleasence 2013). Delli Carpini and Keeter (1996: 1), for
instance, state that »Democracy functions best when its citizens are politically
informed.«
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e importance of political knowledge for the development of support for
a European community was confirmed by Inglehart (1970). However, the aut-
hor acknowledged cognitive mobilization and education as a necessary con-
dition only but not as a su ficient one: »One must become aware of it befo-
re one can develop a sense of commitment« (Inglehart 1970: 47). is argu-
ment was empirically supported by Díez Medrano and Gutiérrez (2012) who
measured the degree of cognitive mobilisation by evaluating the consumpti-
on of international news in newspapers. e authors’ results were confirmed
by Scharkow and Vogelsang (2009). Furthermore, there is evidence from re-
search on EU support that possessing knowledge of European institutions
a fects support for EU authority in areas involving cross-border political is-
sues (Clark/Hellwig 2012). Faas (2007) nuances these results. In a comparison
study, he shows that a positive relationship of citizens towards the EU can on-
ly be expected in countries with strong European agendas and where Europe
is conceptualised as an inclusive multi-ethnic concept. is view is confirmed
by orpe (2008), whose work shows that social groups who stand little or
nothing to gain from identifying with Europe are highly unlikely to do so.
Verhaegen, Hooghe and Dejaeghere (2015) also nuance the relationship
between knowledge about Europe and identity. In a comparative analysis
among adolescents in 21 EU member states, they show that knowledge about
the EU has a significant but still limited e fect on European identity.
e European Union argues similarly. In its programme Europe for Citi-
zens (2007-2013), the EU argues that promoting knowledge about European
citizenship rights will lead to the strengthening and safeguarding of the in-
tegration process (European Commission 2011: 4). 2013, the year that marked
the twentieth anniversary of the entry into force of the Maastricht Treaty, was
even designated as the »European Year of Citizens« by the European Commis-
sion. is initiative aimed at promoting the visibility and accessibility of EU
citizenship. e European Year of Citizens also formed one of the main ra-
tionales for the research activities behind this chapter. »20 years of European
citizenship. Progress and challenges« was a one-year project (September 2013
– September 2014) funded by the Sti tung Mercator. e project’s main goal
was to gather information on the knowledge of Duisburg inhabitants about
their rights as citizens of the EU and to ask them about their opinions and
ideas in regard to the future of the EU. Specifically, the project pursued a
three-pronged strategy: (1) implementation of a comparative survey in selec-
ted districts of Duisburg, (2) analysis of the survey results and (3) presentation
of the survey outcomes to the public through dialogue forums. All activities of
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the project were part of the academic course »Practical application of research
methods« at the Institute of Political Science at the University of Duisburg-
Essen. e project was carried out in close cooperation with the O fice of Elec-
tions, European A fairs and Information Logistics of the City of Duisburg.1
is chapter summarises the main findings of the project outlined above.
Accordingly, the rest of this chapter is organised as follows: In section 4, an
overview of the survey is given. Section 5 presents the survey results. Lastly,
section 6 o fers concluding remarks and practical recommendations about
how to vitalise EU citizenship on a local level.
4. Survey overview
e questionnaire of the survey contained 39 questions which were grouped
into seven sections from A to G. Section A contained 2 filter questions to
select only respondents who live in Duisburg and have EU citizenship. Sec-
tion B entailed three questions to consider whether respondents are aware of
their status as a citizen of the EU. Section C covered 9 questions related to
the EU citizens’ rights of participation in local and European elections. Sec-
tions D entailed 9 questions about the right of free movement within the EU.
Section E (four questions) aimed to gather information on the respondents’
perception of the EU. Section F (5 questions) asked for demographic details
such as gender, age, income and professional status. Finally, section G contai-
ned seven questions for the interviewers on the credibility of the respondent
and the quality of the obtained information. e questionnaire contained a
mixture of closed and open questions. e formal survey was conducted by
students based on the guidance of the lecturer. e interviews were conduc-
ted in October/December 2013 and April 2014. In the end, 425 questionnaires
were usable. All interviews were conducted face-to-face and on the street in
central locations of Duisburg and other parts of the city. e average inter-
view duration was intended to be no longer than 20 minutes. Interviewers
aimed to achieve a reasonably representative sample by age and gender. A
comparison of the survey data with the demographics of the city of Duisburg
is provided in Table 1 below.
1 For more information, please visit the project’s website at www.uni-due.de/unionsbue-
rger/
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Female 178 41.5 49
Male 251 58.5 51
Age
<18 23 5.4 16.6
18-24 106 24.9 8.4
25-64 238 56 54.2
≥65 56 13.6 20.8
5. Survey ndings
e results of the survey are not representative. us, the collected informati-
on is best thought of as representing a picture of opinion and mood in the se-
ven months from October 2013 and April 2014 in Duisburg. Nevertheless, the
findings can contribute to an increased understanding of public perception
of EU citizenship on the local level. e results that follow pertain to selected
questions of the survey questionnaire and in this way represent a part of the
survey and the statistical analysis that was carried out.
5.1. Familiarity with the term »citizen of the European Union«
efirst section of the questionnaire was concernedwith the familiarity of the
respondents with the term »citizen of the European Union«. Asked »Are you
familiar with the term ›citizen of the European Union‹?«, the respondents we-
re able to ascertain their knowledge in the range from »Yes, and I know what
it means«, to »Yes, I have heard about it, but I am not sure what it means«
and »No, I have never heard the term ›citizen of the European Union‹«. Al-
most three-quarters of the respondents (74.5 %) said they were familiar with
the concept of EU citizenship. However, awareness of the term does not ne-
cessarily mean that it is also understood in terms of content. More than 42 %
of the respondents said they had heard the term before, but could not say
Source: Data obtained from the city of Duisburg (Stadt Duisburg 2018).
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exactly what it stands for. About a third of the respondents (31.9 %) was fami-
liar with the concept of EU citizenship and knew its meaning. Nearly 26 % of
the respondents were unacquainted with the concept of EU citizenship and
had never heard of it.
Figure 1: Are you familiar with the term »citizen of the European Union«?
Source: Own compilation.
5.2. Perception of EU citizenship
e respondents’ perception of EU citizenship was obtained by asking them
»What does EU citizenship mean to you? What do you associate with it?« To
code the answers to this open question, a coding systemwas used on the same
lines as the one used by the European Commission (2012: 35). is system had
six categories: »Sense of belonging to the EU«, »Common values and common
history«, »Additional rights«, »Participating in community/civic life«, »Parti-
cipating in political life« and »Other«. To more than 30 % of the respondents,
EU citizenship meant a sense of belonging to the European Union. Slight-
ly fewer respondents associated EU citizenship with common values and a
common history (29.5 %). e item »Additional rights« came in at third place
as a response to this question. is was followed by »Participating in poli-
tical life« with 9.9 % and »Participating in community/civic life« with 9.2 %
of the answers. It should be highlighted that only a minor proportion of the
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respondents (4.8 %) had a negative perception on EU citizenship which was
coded as »Other«.
Figure 2: What does EU citizenship mean to you? What do you associate with it?
Source: Own compilation.
5.3. Awareness of EU citizens’ rights
e next part of the questionnaire was designed to test the respondents’ awa-
reness of some of the most important rights they hold as EU citizens. To this
end, the students carrying out the survey explained to the respondents that
since 1993 all citizens of the EU member states are »citizens of the European
Union«. Five statements describing EU rights were then read out and the re-
spondents were asked which of these rights an EU citizen has. When asked
about the possibility of residing in another EU country, the vast majority of
all respondents indicated that they knew they were entitled to this right. e
right of free movement was familiar to 91.4 % of the respondents. Around
eight in ten respondents also knew that an EU citizen, when abroad, has the
right to seek help from an embassy of any other EU member state if the own
country does not have an embassy in the according country. In total, 85.2 % of
the respondents were aware of this right to seek help from other EU embas-
sies. e right to participate in an EU Citizens’ Initiative was also known to
most of the respondents. With over 70 % of the respondents, a clear majority
knew about this right. e opportunity to participate in local elections when
EU citizens reside in another EU member state is an important opportunity
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to participate in the political decision-making process and in luence local po-
litics. However, less than half of the respondents (43.5 %) were informed that
they have the right to vote or even stand as a candidate in local elections in
another EU country while they residing there. e last question in regard to
the rights of EU citizens was the only question that constituted a right which
is not given to EU citizens. ere is no right to participate in national general
elections as an EU citizen if you live in the concerned country. e majority
of respondents were aware that participation in national elections is not an
EU citizen’s right. 72.1 % of respondents in Duisburg knew that they are not
entitled to this right.
Figure 3: In your opinion, which rights does a citizen of the Union have?
Source: Own compilation.
5.4. Knowing what to do when rights are not respected
Being asked »How well-informed do you feel about what you can do if your
rights as an EU citizen are not respected?«, respondents could rate their sub-
jectively perceived level of information on a scale from »very well informed« to
»fairly well informed«, »not very well informed« or »not informed at all«. Only
6.4 % of the respondents said that they felt very well informed. A ter all, just
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under a fi th of those surveyed sample (19.9 %) stated that they feel fairly well-
informed, so that the sum for the positive values was only about one quarter
of the sample (26.3 %). Conversely, this means that nearly three-quarters of
respondents (73.7 %) had no or no good level of information. Almost half of
the respondents (49.2 %) said they were not very well informed, while almost
a quarter (24.1 %) did not feel informed at all.
Figure 4: How well do you feel informed about what you can do when your rights as
an EU citizen are not respected?
Source: Own compilation.
6. Conclusion
is chapter has presented the results of a survey on the public perception
of European Union citizenship on a local level. For this purpose, firstly, the
development of EU citizenship and the relationship between citizenship and
democracy was explored in a European context. en an overview on the sur-
vey questions and a summary of selected results were given. In a nutshell,
the vast majority of respondents said they were familiar with the term ›ci-
tizen of the European Union‹ (74.5 %). Respondents were most familiar with
their right of free movement: 91.4 % were aware that an EU citizen has the
right to reside in any member state of the EU. 85.2 % knew that, when out-
side the EU, a European citizen has the right to ask for help at embassies of
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other EU Member States if her or his country does not have an embassy the-
re. More than three-quarters of the respondents (78.9 %) were also aware of
the right to participate in a Citizens’ Initiative. e least known right was the
right to vote or to stand as a candidate in municipal elections: Just over half
of the respondents (56.5 %) correctly identified this right. In addition, a size-
able number of respondents (27.9 %) incorrectly thought that a non-national
citizen of the EU living in their country has the right to vote or stand as a can-
didate in national elections. Just over one quarter of the respondents (26.3 %)
said they feel informed (either »very well informed« or »fairly well informed«)
about what they can do when their rights as an EU citizen are not respected.
Finally, to more than 30 % of the respondents, EU citizenship meant a sense
of belonging to the EU. Almost the same number of respondents associated
EU citizenship with common values and a common history (29.5 %).
Although the results of the survey are not representative, they nonetheless
demonstrate that Duisburg citizens are very well aware of their status as EU
citizens and have developed a sense of belonging to the EU. Interestingly, the
di ferences between the socio-demographic categories on the sense of Eu-
ropean citizenship are limited. However, the concrete knowledge on certain
rights varies considerably between the generations. Younger respondents and
students in particular know their rights better than the older or less educated
respondents. In addition, respondents who place themselves at the top of the
social scale are better informed than those who place themselves at the bot-
tom of the social scale. It is therefore encouraging that a huge majority of re-
spondents, regardless of their socio-demographic background,wants to know
more about their EU citizenship rights and about what to do if their rights are
not respected. As outlined above, the survey was conducted in the years 2013
and 2014. Since then, some important developments have taken place. Mo-
re than 9 million Europeans have already spoken up through the European
Citizens’ Initiative. As of 2020, new rules on the European Citizens’ Initiati-
ve will apply. ese rules should make the European Citizens’ Initiative more
accessible, less burdensome and easier to use for organisers and supporters
and therewith »facilitate the participation of as many citizens as possible in
the democratic decision-making process of the Union« (Publications O fice
2019: 55). In addition, throughout the EU, people have engaged themselves
in pro-European grassroots movements like »Pulse of Europe« or »Stand Up
for Europe«. Last but not least, two European elections have taken place. e
turnout for the European elections in 2019 was the highest since 1979. A total
of 50.6 % of EU citizens voted in the elections this year. In the previous Eu-
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ropean elections five years ago, the turnout was only 42.6 % (Schwarz/Stark
2019).
To conclude, EU citizenship as a legal, practical and habitual form of
membership plays a distinct role in the European Union. However, in times
with populist and Eurosceptic forces on the rise, there is an urgent need to
foster the citizens’ trust in the European integration project and remove all
remaining obstacles standing in the way of the citizens’ enjoyment of their
rights (ECAS 2017). Brexit is an exemplary showcase that the construction
of democratic citizenship on a European level is not only still in lux but that
changes are reversible (Schwarz 2017). e EU citizenship report 2017 lists nu-
merous practical proposals to improve the value of EU citizenship (European
Commission 2017). Some of these proposals have been implemented yet while
others have not. It is therefore key that the newCommission under Ursula von
der Leyen takes further steps to deepen the democratic life in the EU. ese
steps should revolve around the following key issues:
1. In many cases, member states are the best channel to inform citizens
about their rights as citizens of the EU.Accordingly,member states should
be further encouraged and financially supported to adopt a more proac-
tive approach in raising awareness about the EU and its activities. Europe
Direct Information Centres (EDIC) represent one of the main channels of
information for EU citizens. e latest funding period was launched on 1
January 2018 and will run for three years (Nokes 2018). Unfortunately, the
last Commission under Jean-Claude Juncker has decided to shut down a
considerable number of EDICs. In Germany, the network has been cut
down from 54 to 41 EDICs. North Rhine-Westphalia, the most populated
federal state in Germany, was particularly e fected: Only five of eleven
EDICs were allowed to continue their work (Aachen, Duisburg, Essen,
Gütersloh and Steinfurt), while only one new centre was opened in Düs-
seldorf (Europa-Union Deutschland 2018). is approach is short-sighted
at best and should be reversed as soon as possible.
2. e elections to the European Parliament are the most visible expression
of democratic EU citizenship.However, the European Parliament still suf-
fers from problems of democratic representativeness due to the diver-
sity of national electoral rules (Costa 2016: 53). European elections remain
second-order elections (Träger/Anders 2020). Accordingly, the European
dimension of EU elections should be strengthened. e introduction of
transnational lists has repeatedly been proposed as oneway tomake Euro-
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pean elections even more European and more democratic (Anastassopou-
los 1998; Du f/Pukelsheim/Oelbermann 2009; Du f 2011, 2012). e latest
attempt to allow transnational lists at European elections was made by
the European Parliament rapporteurs Danuta Maria Hübner and Pedro
Silva Pereira (2018). e proposal mentioned keeping 46 of the 79 seats
vacated by the United Kingdom for a transnational list. e additional
seats would have been redistributed to under-represented member states
in the Parliament. In February 2018, the European Parliament unfortu-
nately rejected the idea of a transnational list for the 2019 European elec-
tions, though MEPs agreed to change the composition of the Parliament
in light of Brexit (Schwarz 2020). is decision is regrettable and should
be re-examined.
3. e 2014 European elections could be characterised as the first ever »Eu-
ropeanised elections«, because with the introduction of the Spitzenkandi-
daten system, a truly European political space and a Europe-wide pub-
lic debate emerged (Koller 2017: 169). Unfortunately, in July 2019, none of
the Spitzenkandidaten, including the EPP’s Manfred Weber and the S&D’s
Frans Timmermans, was elected as the next President of the European
Commission. Instead, the German defence minister was the choice of the
European Council and the European Parliament. is is a huge setback
in the constitutional development of the European Union and a massive
disappointment of thousands of European voters. Although some have ar-
gued that the Spitzenkandidaten process is »even more dead than the par-
rot in the Monty Python sketch« (Legutko 2019), it is worth to work on a
democratic reform of the election process. erefore, it is a good sign that
the political guidelines for the next European Commission acknowledge
the need »to rebuild trust and confidence« and Ursula von der Leyen has
proposed herself as a broker for the discussions between the European
Parliament and the European Council (von der Leyen 2019: 20).
Last but not least, there is one underlying condition for any EU citizen to truly
assert her or his democratic right: the primacy of the rule of law. e current
EU lacks adequate mechanisms to monitor and deal e fectively with violati-
ons of the rule of law in its member states. Recent democratic backsliding in
Hungary, Poland and Romania has underlined this. As a matter of fact, the
EU faces a »Copenhagen dilemma« (Reding 2013) and its long inaction poses
a serious and alarming threat to the credibility of the European integration
project as a whole. e central assumption of this chapter is that a truly demo-
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cratic EU citizenship cannot emerge without serious attention to democracy
and the rule of law across all EU member states. erefore, it is an urgent
matter that the next European Commission and Parliament credibly protect
and enforce the rule of law and democracy as a backbone of the EU.
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Political contestation and domestic politics
in EU nancial regulation
Aukje van Loon
1. Introduction and puzzle
e Euro crisis revealed the incompleteness of the Economic and Monetary
Union’s (EMU) governance framework, prompting the promotion of multiple
reform packages and proposals. is induced con lict between EU member
states on the design of these reforms. Whereas contemporary literature has
put member states’ positions at centre stage (Degner/Leu fen 2019a; Schoeller
2018), the research gap on how and why European member governments advo-
cate the adopted positions in reconstructing the EMU is still broad (Van Loon
2020). is chapter1 builds on and contributes to this nascent literature by
echoing that Euro crisis management has not resulted in the European Uni-
on (EU) being confronted with a democratic deficit at the national level, but
has led to a strengthening of democratic citizenship and responsiveness at
the level of domestic preference formation. In line with Valelly (2011), demo-
cratic citizenship is viewed as »membership in a political democracy«, with
the nation-state as the »unit of analysis« and the role of government viewed
as an »accountable representative performed by elected (…) o ficials« within
the supranational order of the EU. With democracy’s key component being
»the continued responsiveness of the government to the preferences of the
people« (Dahl 1971: 1), this chapter deals with mapping political contestation
within one member state, Germany. It focuses specifically on domestic prefe-
rence formation, where democratic citizenship is sought to have shaped the
1 The author is grateful for valuable assistance from André van Loon and helpful
comments from the volume’s editors and anonymous reviewers. Financial support
from the RUB Research School PLUS (DFG GSC 98/3) is acknowledged.
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government’s position during negotiations of the European financial transac-
tion tax (FTT) proposal. Democratic citizenship is viewed as encompassing a
broad range of domestic stakeholders a fected instantly by the crisis: sectoral
interest associations, trade unions, voters and NGOs. It provides an answer
to the research question: which of these domestic actors were more preva-
lent in shaping the German government’s preference formation during the
European FTT debate?
A comprehensive account of the German government’s responsiveness is
provided by applying the societal approach to governmental preference for-
mation (Schirm 2011, 2013, 2018, 2020). is has been considerably conduci-
ve in directing attention to the role of two explanatory variables, domestic
interests and ideas, in shaping the divergent positions of governments in
the global financial and Euro crises. is study illustrates their role played
in shaping the government’s position, since cost-benefit analyses from secto-
ral interest associations and trade unions, and expectations from voters and
NGOs towards tightening financial market regulation were of significance.
Assuming that the German government’s position re lects these societal dy-
namics, this contribution aims to account for (1) when these mattered, (2)
how they interacted and (3) which of these prevailed in shaping the German
government’s FTT position.
e chapter’s next section provides an overview of the post-crisis literatu-
re, reading a certain dissent between a decrease versus an increase in demo-
cratic citizenship and governments’ responsiveness during EU reform nego-
tiations in general, and the FTT in specific. is is followed by introducing the
societal approach to governmental preference formation. A discussion of its
development of domestic politics theories’ core variants subsequently pres-
ents innovative elements and a formulation of core hypotheses. e proposed
reform of the FTT Directive is brie ly presented, leading to an in-depth ca-
se study of domestic preference formation, analysing the societal dynamics,
interests and ideas to which the German government is assumed to be re-
sponsive. e chapter ends with a summary of the empirical results.
2. European nancial governance, democratic citizenship
and governments’ responsiveness
Contemporary post-crisis European financial governance literature deliber-
ates reform initiatives to typically fall short of democratic legitimacy. Views
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that crisis management solutions were criteria of output rather than input
legitimacy (Kreuder-Sonnen 2016) are prominent. is imbalance is derived
from the Euro crisis, which generated a situation involving a substantive ur-
gency, uncertainty of a threat and subsequently unknown consequences of
decision-making (Boin et al. 2005). Having to act promptly and decisively,
a specific »hour of the executive« (Lodge/Wegrich 2012: 1) and a subsequent
democratic deficit seemed to be the result. Kreuder-Sonnen (2018: 962) states:
»crises typically do imply a broader than usual menu of feasible policy op-
tions (…) as a critical threat to a referent community opens the way for policy-
makers to employ extraordinary means to cope with the situation, because
the sense of crisis induces public deference to claims of political necessity.«
e new European financial governance setting and dynamics regarding the
relations between the national and supranational levels, and their reverbera-
tions for legitimacy and accountability in the EU, are echoed in recent litera-
ture. It is argued that post-crisis European financial governance has gained
a stronger supranational character in empowering EU institutions, e.g. the
European Commission, in the implementation and application of governan-
ce rules (Bauer/Becker 2014). Schmidt (2015) argues that these institutions’
failure to achieve results during the Euro crisis, without much public input in
reforms, has deteriorated democratic legitimacy. Conversely, the new inter-
governmentalism literature argues that crisis management has inclined the
Commission to partly depart from the Community method, empowering »de
novo bodies« instead (Bickerton et al. 2015: 705). Although intergovernmental
coordination within the European Council framework became more promi-
nent during and a ter the crisis, Smeets and Beach (2019: 2) argue that its
»informal and isolated character« marginalised member governments’ con-
trol and »created more instead of less dependence on EU institutions.« ese
studies primarily encompass the increase of the EU’s long-standing democra-
tic deficit problem. Other literature illustrates the crisis’ a firmative impact
on explicit aspects of democracy. According to Kriesi (2018), the citizens’ dis-
satisfaction with their countries’ economic performance during the crisis led
to the strengthening of democratic principles on the national level. e na-
tional economies’ discontent nevertheless led to bailouts having an impact on
citizens’ support of democratic values (Cordero/Simón 2016). In sum, while
some research illustrates crisis reactions having negatively a fected European
financial governance’s democratic accountability, other academic discourse
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views crisis-induced actions on the national levels as indicators for an impro-
vement of democratic principles.
is chapter aligns with the latter strand of literature, challenging the
assertion that »when failure hits as in the Euro crisis, […] all sources of le-
gitimacy suddenly, simultaneously collapse« (Weiler 2012: 837). In fact, the
Euro crisis may genuinely have enhanced the legitimacy of governments’ po-
sition taking, particularly during the first phase of European integration, go-
vernmental preference formation (Degner/Leu fen 2019b). Pursuing the line
of reasoning that the urgent, uncertain threatening crisis situation advan-
ced political contestation, a so-called politicisation (De Wilde et al. 2016), it
created a particular environment of democratic citizenship in lux. is mir-
rors a process leading away »from permissive consensus towards constraining
dissensus«, while spilling »beyond interest group bargaining into the public
sphere« (Hooghe/Marks 2009: 5). Considering that governments’ responsi-
veness relates to decision-makers prioritising di ferent domestic actors with
wide-ranging issues, especially during a time of crisis, which actors’ demands
did they respond to and why?
Involving salient issues and unknown consequences, citizens were well-
informed during these hard times, having concerns about their respective
governments’ positions in EU reform negotiations. When political contesta-
tion is intense, governments are expected to have a greater impulse to fol-
low public opinion (Hobolt/Klemmensen 2008: 310). According to Culpepper
(2012), the change from quiet to noisy politics induces (1) an increase of gov-
ernments’ responsiveness to citizens’ demands, which simultaneously leads
to (2) a decrease of interest groups’ ability to shape a government’s position.
Hooghe and Marks (2009: 18) equally argue that »mass politics trump interest
group politics when both come into play«. is contradicts traditional political
economy literature, underlining the impact of interest group politics in do-
mestic preference formation (Grossman/Helpman 1994). Additionally, it con-
trasts with liberal intergovernmentalism (Moravcsik 1993): domestically well-
organised and well-endowed interest groups enjoy privileged institutional ac-
cess to o fice-seeking/retaining governments, serving as conveyers in defend-
ing their demands. With established information channels and large exper-
tise of the issue concerned, governments tend to be biased towards domestic
interest groups. Kalaitzake (2017) and Kastner (2017) emphasise that finan-
cial interest associations secured their preferences by delaying and watering
down the FTT proposal in most EU member states. ese actors are consid-
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ered more important in shaping governments’ positions than national elec-
torates. Sanders and Toka (2013: 22) argue the following:
»[i]n sum, in determining their own stances towards the EU, political elites
appear to place more weight on the views of the economically rich and pow-
erful [interest groups] than they do on the views of their own constituents.«
Summing up, literature underlines the importance of both domestic sectoral
associations and citizens’ opinions as the crisis instantly a fected both actor
types, generating political contestation over revamping the EMU framework.
Governments under scrutiny of a broad range of domestic stakeholders had
strong incentives to align their positions according to these actors’ demands.
us, the puzzle of which domestic actors ultimately shaped the German go-
vernment’s FTT position and why is of importance.
3. The societal approach to governmental preference formation
In analysing which domestic actors encompassing democratic citizenship, in-
terest associations, trade unions, voters and NGOs, were more prevalent in
shaping the German government’s preference formation during the FTT de-
bate, the societal approach to governmental preference formation is employ-
ed. is rests on domestic politics and liberal theories of IR and concentrates
on endogenous domestic variables such as interest groups (Milner 1997; Mo-
ravcsik 1997) and ideas (Goldstein/Keohane 1993). Similar to these approaches,
the assumption is that, in democratic political systems, o fice-seeking/retai-
ning governments are likely to be responsive to domestic interest and ideas,
prior to inter-state and international negotiations (Schirm 2013: 690). Contra-
ry to these, instead of scholars’ traditional employment of one or two varia-
bles exclusively, the imperative innovative elements of the societal approach
are its inclusion of both variables, as well as its subsequent conceptualisati-
on of hypotheses on the conditions for their prevalence vis-à-vis each other
in shaping governments’ positions. By addressing the question of when eit-
her interests or ideas matter in shaping governments’ positions, it is a novel
»complementary approach« (Schirm 2020: 5). In line with this, domestic in-
terests are material considerations of German sectoral interest associations,
whose short-term cost-benefit calculations tend to alter instantly in response
to the proposed FTT due to subsequent potential changed market conditi-
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ons. Domestic ideas are collective value-based expectations of German voters
about the apt government’s role in steering the economy. Rooted in the past,
ideas cannot alter instantly in response to changed market conditions.
Two aspects are of relevance: (1) by refraining from a comparative analysis
of divergent governments’ FTT positions (Van Loon 2020), this study (2) con-
tributes to research by analysing a broader range of stakeholders potentially
a fected by FTT introduction. e societal approach’s relevant domestic actors
sectoral interest associations are complemented by trade unions as sources
for domestic interests, and voters are complemented by NGOs as domestic
idea sources (Van Loon 2018). In an additional embracement of the socie-
tal approach, it is important to explain that the two explanatory variables
can (1) concur and reinforce each other, or (2) di fer and collide, and equal-
ly, (3) compete while shaping governments’ positions (Schirm 2013: 690). is
mutual complying or competing between and amongst the variables leads to
a significant advancement of the to-date cogent aspect neglected by scho-
lars applying domestic politics theories: to inquire into the circumstances
for the prevalence of either interests or ideas. While the distinctive varia-
ble definitions serve the purpose of analysing when each prevails and why
in shaping the German government’s FTT position, three core hypotheses
of the societal approach (Schirm 2020: 9) sum up the expectations on go-
vernment’s responsiveness during domestic preference formation. e first
expects interest groups and trade unions to prevail in shaping the German
government’s FTT position: if tightening EU financial regulation directly af-
fects specific German economic sectors and implies potential cost-benefit cal-
culations, then domestic interests are more likely to prevail in shaping the
government’s position, because vocal lobbying e forts dominate preference
formation. e second hypothesis outlines voters’ and NGOs’ predomination
in the government’s preference formation: if tightening EU financial regula-
tion involves fundamental and salient long-term societal expectations on an
apt government’s role in steering the economy, then domestic ideas are more
likely to prevail in shaping the government’s position. ese two hypotheses
indicate that the explanatory variables can compete. In combination with the
reinforcement/competing aspect, a third hypothesis accounts for their inter-
play: if tightening EU financial regulation raises both potential cost-benefit
calculations for specific economic sectors and fundamental and salient long-
term societal expectations on the apt government’s role in steering the econo-
my, the variables compete or reinforce each other in shaping the government’s
FTT position.
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4. Operationalisation
In testing German government’s responsiveness towards domestic interests
or ideas, or both, the empirical analysis applies a qualitative case study that
relies on a document analysis tracing relevant interest and ideational-related
indicators of the government’s preference formation during the 2011-2013 FTT
debate. is encompasses the time period of the proposed FTT Directive and
the subsequent introduction of the enhanced cooperation mechanism. Do-
cument analysis is viewed as an adequate approach to a systematic in-depth
investigation of a small-n study of German government’s preference forma-
tion. As a key EU member state, Germany is chosen due to the substantive
important role it played in accelerating the proposed FTT reform through the
enhanced cooperation mechanism (Van Loon 2020).
e analysis examines whether the government’s FTT position, expressed
in statements of responsible elected politicians (finance minister and head of
government), correlated with either (1) interest-related indicators articulated
by sectoral interest associations’ and trade union’s demands in the form of
position papers and representatives’ statements, or to (2) ideational-related
indicators such as voters’ and NGOs’ attitudes as indicated by public opini-
on polls and positions papers, or if in fact, (3) a correlation occurred bet-
ween interest and ideational-related indicators. Concerning public opinion
surveys, societal attitudes from the Eurobarometer are highlighted as well as
two dyads of value-based ideas from the World Values Survey (WVS) on the
role of the government in steering the economy: trust in government’s regu-
lation versus trust in market forces as well as individual responsibility versus
collective solidarity (Schirm 2011: 50). Specialised media reports are applied
to underline empirical evidence.
5. The proposed European FTT
A ter the failure of the 2010 G20 Toronto Summit in reaching agreement on
globally coordinated action to tax the financial sector, the President of the
Commission, José Barroso, proposed a Directive in September 2011 to create
a harmonised broad-based FTT in response to the global financial and Euro
crises. To serve as an example of potential global implementation, the FTTwas
to be installed by member states. is tax was »to make the financial sector
pay its fair share [and] to reduce competitive distortions in the single market,
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discourage risky trading activities and complement regulatory measures ai-
med at avoiding future crises« (European Commission 2011). Many member
states contested the FTT mainly due to the risks of hindering growth and fi-
nancial sector relocation. Once reaching the required unanimity to pass the
proposal proved di ficult, the most reluctant governments such as Sweden,
the Netherlands and the UK were bypassed primarily by Germany, in reques-
ting the Commission to introduce the enhanced cooperationmechanism (Van
Loon 2020). is would permit those favourable FTT member states to par-
ticipate in implementing the tax. e mechanism was supported by 11 EU
member states2 representing more than 90 % of Eurozone GDP and was ap-
proved by the European Parliament in December 2012 and the Council of the
EU in January 2013.
Whereas earlier statements suggested FTT introduction by January 2014,
the plan to have a legal basis was delayed until the end of 2014 with plans of
implementation by 2016. Support has been waning since, with Estonia for-
mally pulling out in 2016, Belgium blocking negotiations in 2017 (Barbière
2017), the Italian government revoking its wish to participate, and the UK’s
Brexit vote. FTT introduction still lingers in uncertainty. Statements of sup-
port mainly come from Germany, which is regularly putting the FTT on the
ECOFIN agenda to advance the issue and renew the political commitment of
the remaining member states.
6. Domestic interests
German sectoral interest associations voiced distinct opposition to tighten-
ing financial regulation in form of the FTT. In a joint position paper, eight
associations stated their doubts whether the tax could fulfill its objectives.
Assuming it would negatively impact the financial sector as well as the eco-
nomy as a whole, the general fear was that it would (1) have negative e fects on
companies and employees, (2) burden the economy, in particular in terms of
credit supply, and (3) turn financial operations into poorly regulated markets
– with consequences for market stability – if it were not introduced globally,
or at least EU-wide (DIHK et al. 2011: 2). In the period to the Commission’s
2 Austria, Belgium, Estonia, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia
and Spain.
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proposal for the FTT under enhanced cooperation, Germany’s interest asso-
ciations, the BDI, the BDB and the DIHK shared concerns over its negative
impact on Germany’s real economy and private actors. e potential migrati-
on of financial institutions, banks and investment funds, to jurisdictions not
taxing transactions were main concerns, followed by the predicament of Ger-
man enterprises borrowingmoney and expectations of stagnating growth and
employment. Goals of the FTT inmaking the financial sector contribute to the
cost of economic recovery but also the precautionary measure of potential fu-
ture costs of crisis-ridden developments in the financial sector, and creating
disincentives for speculative trading, were viewed critically. In a 2011 public
hearing of the German parliament’s finance committee, the ZK, the German
banking industry association, rejected these objectives and feared negative ef-
fects on the economy by stating that »[e]ven the EU Commission expects the
gross domestic product to su fer a loss of 1.76 percent with an EU-wide tax of
0.1 percent on equities (0.01 percent on derivatives)« (Deutscher Bundestag
2011). e FTT would not only a fect financial institutions, but all purchasers
of financial products including small savers. e BDI, the German industry
association, additionally believed that the FTT would a fect »those bearing
the cost of the EU estimated tax revenue of 57 billion euro (…) will be citizens
and the real economy« (Deutscher Bundestag 2011). A study commissioned by
Germany’s equities institute estimated the burden on private households and
companies to amount between 5.0 and 7.3 billion Euro annually (DAI 2013: 5).
e BVI, the investment fund association, stated that »mainly long-term and
retirement savings« would su fer (Deutscher Bundestag 2011). is was re lec-
ted by the BDB, the association of German banks, stating that particularly the
German ›Mittelstand‹, the export industry as well as the citizens would su fer
significantly: »(t)he stupid one is the small investor in Germany, who cannot
move abroad« (Bankenverband 2013).
On the contrary, the DGB, the trade union confederation, welcomed the
Directive and advocated a broad-based FTT. Since the global financial and
Euro crises had resulted in rising unemployment, it was wary of the social
and political consequences with citizens having lost trust in themarkets (DGB
20011a: 3). Its position was that although it was »financial market players that
were chie ly responsible for the biggest financial and economic crisis of the
past 80 years [yet] solely the taxpayers and workers (…) have borne the chief
burden of overcoming the crisis« (DGB 2013: 9). e misguided strategies of
the banks and growing inequality had triggered financial speculation, result-
ing in the primary problem of a lack of control over market actors, thus im-
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plying the necessity of stronger governmental intervention. In February 2011,
it called for political stability, economic prosperity and social security:
»[f]inancial markets must not only be monitored, but also e fectively regu-
lated. (…) Those who cause the crisis must be asked to pay. That is why we
need a financial transaction tax (…). Furthermore, all financial market prod-
ucts must be audited for their economic benefit (…). The same regulatory
rules must apply for all financial market players« (DGB 2011a: 7).
Claus Matecki, DGB board member, stated the urgency of FTT implementa-
tion on the national level: »if the desired introduction of the tax on an inter-
national or European level does not seem feasible in the short term, Germany
(…) must send a clear signal to the other EU member states« (DGB 2011b). e
DGB proposed a »Marshall Plan for economic stimulus, investment and de-
velopment« and suggested the FTT to generate revenue which would benefit
employees, the environment, countries and the real economy (DGB 2013: 10).
7. Domestic ideas
To illustrate the increased issue salience, the importance German citizens at-
tached to the FTT reform proposal and its subsequent politicisation, media
analyses fromKastner (2017) and Degner and Leu fen (2019b) confirm that pu-
blic attention increased instantly, particularly during the years 2011 to 2013.
Additionally, findings from the 2011 and 2012 Eurobarometer show that 79 %
and 80 % of German respondents were in favour of »the introduction of a
tax on financial transactions«. ey were equally in favour of the principle of
a tax on financial transactions, either on the global level or, failing that, on
EU level initially (both 79 %) (Eurobarometer 2011, 15; 2012, T147). Concerning
the question of an apt government’s role in steering the economy and trust
in government’s regulation versus trust in market forces, as indicated by da-
ta from the 2013 WVS, 65.8 % of the respondents supported the statement
»governments should take more responsibility« versus 33.8 % agreeing with
»people should take more responsibility« (WVS 2013: V98). e indicators re-
lated to individual responsibility versus collective solidarity reveal that 76 %
agreed that incomes should be made more equal as opposed to 22.7 % of the
respondents who believed that large income divides are required (WVS 2013:
V96). Beyond this, the fact that governments should tax the rich and subsi-
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dise the poor is considered an essential part of democracy by 68,9 % of the
respondents (WVS 2013: V131).
e debate on the broad-based FTT was subject of a vocal campaign by
German NGOs favouring it. Under the slogan »Steuer gegen Armut« (tax
against poverty), tax campaigns focused mainly on the argument of tax
justice and the attraction of potential revenue. e FTT could (1) serve to
burden the costs of combatting the financial crisis primarily by the financial
industry, not by the taxpayer, and furthermore, (2) the tax’s progressive
e fect, primarily a fecting high-income earners, would potentially reduce
increasing inequalities in income distribution, thus serving as development
aid in combatting national and international poverty. Referred to as a ›Robin
Hood Tax‹ (Van Loon forthcoming), 32 signatories sparked this campaign
by issuing an open letter to the newly elected German government. is
emphasised the FTT advantages: (1) it decelerates and regulates financial
transactions on financial markets, (2) it includes all speculation-relevant
financial transactions, (3) short-term transactions are made less profitable,
whereas medium and long-term investments face a low tax rate between
0.1 and 0.01 %, and (4) revenues are used for the implementation of the
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and for development measures, the
fight against poverty, and climate and environment protection (Alt 2011).
Successful in gathering widespread public support, the campaign achieved
a considerably broad membership in the first half of 2011 with trade unions
(including the DGB) joining religious, development and environmental or-
ganisations in campaigning for the tightening of financial regulation. When
prospects for a global and EU-wide transaction tax faded, strong support
for the FTT via the enhanced cooperation mechanism commenced (Wahl
2014: 6). Campaign demands were issued in the form of a petition signed
by 66,000 supporters within four weeks (Alt 2011). e German campaign
leader, Peter Wahl, stated that »for civil society the process is a great success«
due to the »Steuer gegen Armut« campaign, having established informal
and formal permanent contacts with decision-makers and having mobilised
public opinion by (1) organising public events to which decision-makers were
invited, (2) organising formal petitions and collecting signatures, (3) writing
letters, thereby (4) creating transparency and accountability of lobbying
activities using traditional print media and the internet (Wahl 2014: 14-15).
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8. The german government’s FTT position
e German government supported a broad-based FTT and when consen-
sus on this was reached in 2010 (Tagesschau 2013), Germany was the main
driver behind requesting the Commission to implement the enhanced coop-
eration mechanism (Bundesregierung 2014). In November 2011 Germany’s fi-
nance minister, Wolfgang Schäuble, dismissed opposing arguments:
»The objections made by some who claim it would mean a substantial drop
in employment and in the economy generally seem to rest on exaggerated
(…) projections and, more important, ignore the potential of such a tax to
stabilize currency markets in a way to boost rather than damage the real
economy« (Winnet et al. 2011).
By summing up the aims of the tax, Schäuble listed the following arguments:
(1) the financial sector needs to contribute to the crisis’ costs, (2) substantial
tax revenue would be raised, and (3) financial markets’ actions would be li-
mited. e FTT’s rationale was »not only a question of the economy and the
budget but of democratic legitimacy«, and potentially raising 2 billion Euro a
year for Germany, Schäuble stated »I’d prefer to have it in my budget but it’s
better to have it for climate change or development aid than to have nothing«
( e Guardian 2011).
Without unanimous agreement, the German government accelerated the
process by applying for FTT introduction through enhanced cooperation. At
an ECOFIN meeting, Schäuble announced Germany’s advancement with a
smaller group of states (FAZ 2012) stating that even without this mechanism,
it would »endeavour to achieve taxation in as manymember states as possible
within the framework of intergovernmental cooperation« (Bundesregierung
2012: 2). e German Chancellor Angela Merkel underlined the government’s
strong commitment, particularly a ter having gained support from the SPD
and the Greens (Handelsblatt 2012):
»We support the introduction of a financial transaction tax, because the peo-
ple in our countries still have the impression (…) that the financial sector
must make an appropriate contribution to managing the costs of the finan-
cial crisis, and the financial transaction tax will be levied precisely for this
purpose« (Bundesregierung 2014).
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In 2013, the FTT was included in the programme of the German grand coaliti-
on. By particularly stressing »[n]o financial market, no financial product, no
financial market player without supervision«, focus was on a broad-based FTT
within the EU framework of enhanced cooperation. is was to be implemen-
ted swi tly to strengthen the financial sector’s participation in contributing to
the costs of the crisis by including all financial instruments: equities, bonds,
investment shares, foreign exchange transactions and derivative contracts. By
designing the tax, the government stated the importance to assess the tax’s
impact on »pension instruments, small investors and the real economy (…)
while at the same time reducing unwanted forms of financial transactions«
(Koalitionsvertrag 2013: 46).
9. Conclusion
rough application of the societal approach to governmental preference for-
mation, this chapter examined which domestic actors, forming democratic
citizenship as defined above, were more prevalent in shaping the German go-
vernment’s FTT position. By analysing a broad range of stakeholders potenti-
ally a fected by FTT introduction, sectoral interest associations, trade unions,
voters and NGOs, this study illustrates that the government clearly followed
dominant domestic ideas. With the financial sector viewed as responsible for
causing the crisis and the FTT’s objective for making them contribute to its
costs, sectoral interest associations had lost privileged weight in shaping the
German preference formation despite potential high cost-benefit calculations
and vocal lobbying against the FTT. Additionally, the increased issue salience
of financial regulation reform severely reduced government’s representatives
to respond to sectoral interest associations’ demands, resulting in these ac-
tors’ inability to shape the position of the government.
is simultaneously created an opportunity for other domestic actors to
gain access to decision-makers, resulting in the government’s responsiveness
to pro-reform demands from NGOs. e German FTT campaign established
good access opportunities and its intensive campaigning, including the sup-
port ofmost German voters and the trade unions’ alignment of their concerns,
led to the government’s endorsement of the FTT. Whereas both domestic in-
terests and ideas were thus directly a fected by a tightening of financial regu-
lation, the former (sectoral interests associations and trade unions) compe-
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ted, while the latter (voters and NGOs) reinforced each other in shaping the
favourable government’s position.
e urgent, threatening crisis situation resulted in a particular environ-
ment of democratic citizenship in lux, from rejecting the sectoral interest
associations’ political contestation to public sphere’s advancement in favou-
ring the FTT, leading to a genuine enhancement of democratic legitimacy of
the German government’s FTT’s position taking.
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Formal citizenship in European constitutions
Kathrin Behrens
1. Introduction
»Citizenship of the Union is hereby established. Every person holding the na-
tionality of a Member State shall be a citizen of the Union« (European Union
1992: 15, art. 8 [1]). With this paragraph, the European Union expresses in the
1992 Maastricht Treaty1 (European Union 1992) »EU’s experiment with a form
of supranational citizenship« (Shaw 2019: 2). In the 1997 Amsterdam Treaty,
however, this experiment was toned down by adding that »Citizenship of the
Union shall complement and not replace national citizenship« (EuropeanUni-
on 1997: 27, art. 2 [9])2. e European Union’s attempt to contest and hence
to restructure the traditional concept of national citizenship is one of many
examples of citizenship in lux. Nevertheless, even today European citizenship
is still complementary to national citizenship and not a substitute on a su-
pranational level. More clearly: the opportunities and benefits o fered by an
EU-citizenship (for instance freedom of movement, settlement and employ-
ment) inevitably depend on the membership to a European member state (for
example Shaw 2019: 1).
e membership to a nation-state as a political community refers to
citizenship as status, one of the two traditional lines of theories on citizenship.
is contrasts with the second classical approach, which broadly refers
to citizenship as activity (for instance Isin 2009. While the first narrative
precisely defines the belonging to a political community, the second focuses
on the function of political and social participation in that specific political
1 Origins can already be found in the first treaties of the European Economic Community
of 1957, but not as explicit regulation of European citizenship. Further information can
be found, for instance, in Jacobs (2007).
2 There has been no change in the concept of European citizenship as complementary
to the national citizenship in the Lisbon Treaty of 2009.
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community (Kymlicka and Norman 1994: 353-54). Belonging to a nation-
state is established by formal membership, represented by legally determined
formal citizenship. Consequently, formal citizenship as a legal status includes
people to a political community on a formal level, which is necessary in order
to have at least the chance of political and social participation in the society
of a nation3. Both, citizenship as activity and citizenship as status were
challenged in the last decades, for instance in discourses on migration(see
for instance Bauböck 2019) and globalization (exemplary Staeheli 1999). ?.
Yet despite these modern attempts to define and secure citizenship on a
global (here: European) level, citizenship on the national level still seems to
be indispensable.
is sociological contribution examines the concept of formal citizenship as
status in its legal dimension through an analysis of European member sta-
tes’ constitutions. On the national level, constitutions are the most basic legal
document, and hence they have the potential to legally define the conditions
for formal membership, realized as citizenship regulations (Blaustein 1994: 3).
Constitutionally regulated formal membership is tied to the privilege of cer-
tain (constitutionally secured) rights. ese rights, for example in the form of
the right to vote or the right to be elected into certain state institutions, con-
tribute significantly to the formal inclusion4 in the community – or the exclusion
in case of its denial. In this sense and a sociological perspective, constitutions
are highly important legal institutions revealing mechanisms of formal inclusion or ex-
clusion by setting the conditions for formal membership due to citizenship regulations.
In other words, the legal system (potentially) addresses people as citizens and
thus formally includes them into a specific social and political community
(Luhmann 1995).
3 As Schinkel (2010), for example, rightly observes, nation-state and society are not ne-
cessarily the same thing. The same applies to their memberships. Whenever formal
membership is mentioned in this article, it is always a question of legal belonging to a
nation-state qua formal status as a citizen. The possibility of political and social parti-
cipation and the associated societal belonging results (among other things) from the
legally defined rights and duties that go hand in hand with this status. For reasons of
space, no further attention can be paid to these consequences in detail.
4 Since this contribution is devoted exclusively to the legal and thus formal construct
of citizenship, inclusion/exclusion can only be considered on the formal level. Formal
inclusion is achieved through formal membership but does not allow any statements
about actual social integration.
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Due to the increasing tendency of nation-states to standardize constitu-
tions in terms of content and form (cf. Blaustein 1994) , the question arises as
to whether formal citizenship and thus legally defined formal inclusion/ex-
clusion follows standardized paths or country-specific patterns – especially
in the case of the European Union, in which the need for national regulations
is articulated on a supranational level. To sociologically address the topic of
citizenship in lux5, the main argument of this paper is as follows: if the for-
mal dimension of citizenship is legally secured on a national level, it could
be regulated in national constitutions. Since constitutions are comparatively
stable constructs (cf. Elkins, Ginsburg and Melton 2009), the concept of for-
mal citizenship is limited in its dynamic if it is regulated in these documents.
Constitutions could thus be interpreted as the ›corset‹ for formal citizenship.
Consequently, it can be assumed that formal inclusion/exclusion has a low po-
tential for change. So, the main questions are: is formal citizenship regulated
in European constitutions? If so, which dimensions are part of the constitu-
tional regulations? By answering these questions, it can be analyzed if formal
citizenship in particular has the potential to lux dynamically.
To outline the legal foundation of formal citizenship, this contribution
gives insights into citizenship regulations in constitutional documents on
a descriptive level, structured as follows: Firstly, it illustrates a sociological
perspective on system-theoretical inclusion/exclusion (Luhmann 1995) to un-
derline its relevance for social order. Secondly, it translates these ideas into
the analytical dimensions of formal citizenship in constitutions. Furthermo-
re, the dimensions of formal membership are reconstructed by primary da-
ta of a quantitative content analysis of constitutional documents. us, this
contribution o fers an innovative and distinct sociological perspective that
provides an understanding of the multidimensional and -faceted concept of
citizenship in its explicitly formal expression.
5 To answer the question of how constitutionally anchored citizenship regulations have
changed over time, an intra-national comparison of various constitutional versions
would be required. The current research design of this study does not accommodate
the vast complexity needed to internationally compare intra-national constitutional
change over time. Instead, the focus is on the international (here European) compa-
rison of formalized citizenship regulations, which is an important aspect for further
discussions in the volume.
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2. Inclusion and exclusion by formal citizenship
Generally speaking, we can describe inclusion as the multidimensional invol-
vement of people in a community, while exclusion means the opposite; hence,
they are complementary concepts. Inclusion into a social and political com-
munity in a formal dimension is guaranteed by the legally granted status as citi-
zen. Fahrmeier (2007) describes the formal dimension of citizenship as »the legal
definition of a close relationship between individuals and one state, usually
documented in passports or other citizenship certificates. Formal citizenship
[is] […] a way of defining groups entitled to particular rights […]« (Fahrmeir
2007: 2). us, constitutionally regulated citizenship legally determines for-
mal inclusion that represents the translation of formal citizenship into (the
possibility of) active participation in the social and political arena, which is
crucial for the social and political integration of individuals into society.
One sociological perspective on inclusion is given by Systems eory, the
best-known representatives of which are Parsons (1964) and Luhmann (1995).
While Parsons uses the term integration to describe the relationship between
the units of a societal subsystem that ensure its stability and prevent its disin-
tegration (Parsons 1964), Luhmann focuses on the di ferentiation of inclusion
and exclusion (Luhmann 1995).He dissociates himself from the concept of in-
tegration as he generally assumes that, on the one hand, the full integration
of individuals into the functionally di ferentiated societies in modernity is
impossible. On the other hand, he explains that multiple inclusions into one or
more subsystems is possible; which means a simultaneous exclusion from other
subsystems due to the impossibility of full societal inclusion. In this sense,
inclusion refers to the inner side of the system, while exclusion consequently
refers to the outer side (Luhmann 1995: 241). Luhmann does not understand
inclusion as the entire ›incorporation‹ of individual actors6 into the societal
system, but rather as »the way […] in which, in the context of communicati-
on7, people are described, and thus regarded as relevant,« that is, »the way in
which they are treated as ›persons‹« [translated by author; emphasis in ori-
ginal] (Luhmann 1995: 241). is idea is analogous to Fahrmeier’s expression
6 Luhmann (1995) does not actually refer to ›individuals‹ or ›individual actors‹ in the ter-
minology of his systems theory. He rather uses concepts such as ›psychic systems‹ to
address what, in other theories, are the units on the individual level of society.
7 In this context, communication means the final element or specific operation of a so-
cietal system (Baraldi, Corsi and Esposito 1997:89).
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of »defining groups« (Fahrmeir 2007: 2) that are entitled to a set of rights
associated with the status as citizen.
Consequently, with Luhmann’s perspective, exclusion from a societal sub-
system means that the actor is not a relevant person for the subsystem. In mo-
dern, functionally di ferentiated societies, exclusion from one subsystem of-
ten results in the exclusion from multiple subsystems: losing one’s job can
result in losing one’s lat, which can endanger one’s connection to other so-
cial institutions (Baraldi, Corsi and Esposito 1997: 81). As Luhmann himself
exemplifies, the lack of an identity card is cause to be excluded from soci-
al benefits, such as voting and legal marriage (Luhmann 1995: 259-260). e
depth of the implications of exclusion can lead to individuals being regarded
less and less as persons and as possible communication partners, but only as
bodies for which di ferent social conditions apply (Luhmann 1995: 262).
Although this article is explicitly not a system-theoretical examination of
citizenship in constitutions, this theoretical excursus serves to clarify the so-
ciological constraints of this article. e question remains, how formal inclu-
sion/exclusion is legally organized. It seems obvious that the rights and du-
ties regarding active participation are crucial for social and political inclusion,
and, furthermore, the refusal of such rights leads to exclusion from subsys-
tems such as the economic, judicial or educational systems (and vice versa).
Referring again to Luhmann, citizenship (codified by the identity card) is one
key mechanism for the claim on social benefits, the right to vote, to be eligi-
ble for political o fice and so on (Luhmann 1995: 259-60), making it plausible
to examine citizenship regulations to answer the questions on formal inclu-
sion. Rather than focusing on the political realization of rights indicative of
social and political inclusion, this paper seeks to analyze the legal and thus
formal dimension of citizenship and hence formal inclusion/exclusion. Since
the formally defined citizenship regulations are the legal translation of formal inclusi-
on, the most important determinant seems to be the granting or denial of citizen status
in constitutional documents.
Following these ideas, the importance of the relationship between the le-
gal definition of formal citizenship in national constitutions and formal in-
clusion can be summarized as follows: According to Luhmann’s ideas, the le-
gal subsystem addresses the relevant persons by constitutional regulation, especially by
formal citizenship as dimension of formal membership. erefore, constitutional docu-
ments can be interpreted as genuine sociological material: they establish social order by
mechanisms of inclusion/exclusion and stabilize it over time. As a result, the consti-
tutional documents seem to be a meaningful empirical basis for the exami-
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nation of citizenship, since they represent the basis of any legal organization
of nation-states. us, national constitutions provide an insight into the legal
manifestation of how modern nation-states regulate the inclusion of people
as legal persons.
3. Constitutional regulation of formal citizenship
Constitutions as formalized certificates are »the final triumph […] as a solemn
result of democratic constitutionalism« [translation by author] (Loewenstein
1969: 137), resulting from the American and French Revolutions. ey are the
most fundamental written document, legally organizing the social arenas of
societies (Grey 1984; Loewenstein 1969; Tschentscher 2011): by regulating the
governmental arrangements and thereby setting the frame for political pro-
cesses, constitutions are highly in luential instruments of modern nation-
states. Even if there are supranational institutions, for instance the European
Union, which provide (at least partially) legally binding laws and treaties, con-
stitutions on the national level still seem to be highly relevant institutions for
modern nation-states. is is exemplarily indicated by the fact that the vast
majority of countries has a constitution, despite the lack of obligation to have
one (Go 2003: 71). Compared to administrative law, they have a special cha-
racter. Go (2003) for instance states: »Not only are they all packed in a single
document, they all specify in one way or another the organisation of political
power, the division of governmental labour, the major principles and goals of
governance« (2003: 72). Additionally, they are »meant to express an arrange-
ment vastly more complex than those underlying most legal documents: the
web of society’s basic institutions and ideals« (Grey 1984: 16). In other words,
constitutions represent common beliefs and recognized behaviors of a speci-
fic community (Loewenstein 1969: 127) as a »system of fundamental norms«
[translated by author] (Loewenstein 1969: 129).
Additionally, as constitutions are »not an ex nihilo creation« [emphasis in
original] (Grey 1984: 16), they can be interpreted as the result of societal nego-
tiation processes as well as the catalyst for future social endeavors, making
them both a result of and a condition for social change. Here it becomes clear once
again why constitutions are relevant empirical data when it comes to formal
citizenship: On the one hand, the regulations of formal citizenship contained
therein are the result of certain social negotiation processes. us, the speci-
fic regulations of citizenship are the formalized outcome of social and poli-
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tical discourses about membership. On the other hand, they in luence, limit
and enable social change by legally setting rules and frames for governmen-
tal arrangements and thereby determine the social order of society. ey set
the legal basis for the (passive) status as citizen, which is connected to cer-
tain rights and duties for individuals. ese in turn form the foundation for
the active habitus of citizens. By that, constitutions contribute to the formal
inclusion of the members of a specific social and political community and
simultaneously foster the social exclusion of foreigners. ese mechanisms
of formal inclusion and exclusion through the constitutional provision of for-
mal membership are subject to constant negotiation processes. erefore, the
concept of formal citizenship itself is result of societal change and at the same
time one of its determinants.
Focusing again on the question of citizenship in lux, some expectations8
regarding the forthcoming presentation and discussion of results can be ex-
pressed: e ability of constitutions to establish social orders and to stabilize
them for a comparatively long period of time determines the potential for lux
in the concept of formal citizenship. us, if these documents contain very specific
regulations on formalmembership, a tight legal corset and thus a low potenti-
al for change can be assumed. If, though, formal citizenship is not regulated
on the constitutional level, a capacity for dynamic change can be assumed,
without, indeed, being able to say more precisely at this point whether and
to what extent this takes place or has taken place.
4. The data on constitutional citizenship regulation
e following analysis focuses on primary data resulting from a sub-project
of the ›OnBound-Project‹ (#316798296 in the DFG database), which aims at an
international comparison of religious and national identities. e subproject
deals with the significance of religious and national identities in constitutions
around the world and was guided by similar approaches that examined di fe-
rent constitutional contents (for instance Fox 2011; Heintz and Schnabel 2006;
Schnabel, Behrens and Grötsch 2017). e current study uses the most recent
8 These expectations should not be interpreted as research hypotheses that would have
to be tested within a statistical analysis.
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constitutions available in English language9, which allows the international
comparison of constitutions. However, using translated documents has the
disadvantage of potential language distortion: certain formulations, words
or semantic details that could be of great interest for the textual analysis of
country-specific documents may get lost during the translation process. Due
to the aforementioned assumptions, the analysis includes 27 countries that
were members of the European Union in September 201710. Four di ferent
coders examined the corresponding constitutional documents under the gui-
dance of a codebook developed for this purpose. is codebook mainly con-
tains variables on religion and national identity in constitutional documents,
as well as variables on macro information (such as the year of constitutional
enactment).
e variables on formal citizenship stem from the block on national iden-
tity. According to the basic principles of citizenship (for instance Isin 2009;
Shachar 2012), the analysis includes variables on citizenship by birth, by an-
cestry and by naturalization. ese aspects aim at the acquisition of citizenship.
In addition, the regulation of dual citizenship, the revoking of citizenship and
the possibility of extradition operationalize the stability of citizenship. us, the
concept of constitutionally regulated, formal citizenship consists of regula-
tions on acquisition and stability of citizenship. All variables are nominally
scaled with the values (0) ›no regulation/no reference‹, (1) ›reference to regu-
lations external law‹, (2) ›not possible‹ and (3) ›possible/possible under certain
conditions‹.
Before focusing on the results, it should be explicitly emphasized that the
generation and analysis of the constitutional data is a strictly text-based so-
9 The online platform of the Comparative Constitute Project (Elkins, Melton and Gins-
burg 2010) is the resource for all constitutional documents in English translation. The
data were extracted from the constitutions from September 2017 onwards. All con-
stitutional documents were downloaded as pdf files at one point in time, so the docu-
ment version provided by the Comparative Constitute Project at that time is the respec-
tive working version for the analysis. In some cases, there may have been constitutional
amendments that were not yet processed by the Comparative Constitute Project at the
time of document collection and thus were not yet included in the version used.
10 Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Fin-
land, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg,
Malta, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain and Sweden.
Great Britain is not included, as it does not have a codified constitution.
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ciological perspective11 on constitutional regulations as social phenomenon
(Cotterrell 1998). It is therefore explicitly not a matter of a jurisprudential understan-
ding and interpretation of the constitutional contents. A jurisprudential interpreta-
tion of the constitutions with respect to their regulations of formal citizenship
may lead to di ferent results due to di ferent approaches, di ferent perspec-
tives and di ferent focuses. e aim is a sociological examination of constitutions
as empirical data under the essential assumption that the constitutional con-
tent and nature of the formulations provide information about the normative
framework of societies and their resulting social order – in this case about the
mechanisms of formal inclusion and exclusion. Moreover, the analysis of the
formal dimension of constitutional content does not allow conclusions to be drawn
about its ontological qualities (Loewenstein 1969:154). e aspects of formal citi-
zenship presented here therefore do not provide any information about the
implementation in ›reality‹ by the political processes, focusing instead on its
formal dimension to describe if and how the legal systems address people as
citizens.
5. Results
e variables relating to formal citizenship are distributed very di ferently
in the examined constitutions, as shown by the number of constitutions that
contain the di ferent dimensions of constitutional citizenship regulations (see
Table 1). e table shows the counting of the di ferent forms of constitutional
regulations (no regulations/external law/not possible/possible) across the dif-
ferent dimensions of citizenship (by birth/by ancestors/by naturalization/du-
al/revoking/extradition).
11 Although a multidimensional analytical approach such as that developed and applied
by Witte/Bucholc (2017) is highly plausible and the combination of a legal and cultural-
sociological approach can, for instance, provide insights into the relationship between
constitutional content and constitutional reality, such an approach would go beyond
the scope of this work if all EU member states were to be compared.
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by birth 16 5 1 5
by ancestors 20 0 0 7
by naturali-
zation
22 4 0 1
dual 20 4 1 2
revoking 9 8 1 9
extradition 7 6 1 13
One obvious result seems to be that – on the one hand – European consti-
tutions do not provide citizenship regulations self-evidently: many constitu-
tions (up to 22 for »citizenship by naturalization«) contain no reference to the
relevant citizenship dimension. In addition, a considerable proportion (up to
8 for the dimension of »revoking citizenship«) of constitutions refers to regu-
lations in external law. Since the present study cannot consider the content
and details how external law organizes citizenship in these cases, this does
not mean, of course, that those countries do not regulate formal membership
at all. It only shows that the di ferent forms of citizenship regulations are not
constitutionally regulated by default.
e second fundamental finding is that, on the other hand, European con-
stitutions address all the dimension mentioned before at least partially. e
strongest contrast can be observed in the explicit constitutional regulation of
citizenship by naturalization and the (im)possible extradition from state ter-
ritory: while the former is regulated in only one of the constitutions examined
here, the regulation of extradition is explicitly formulated in 14 constitutions
(impossible and possible).
e country-specific proportions of the constitutional forms of citi-
zenship arrangements (»no arrangement«, »external law«, »not possible«,
»possible«) di fer to such an extent that it is hardly possible to systematically
describe meaningful groups of countries with regard to the constitutional
Source: Own compilation.
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arrangement of citizenship12. Nevertheless, a rough descriptive classification
helps to depict the countries studied, supported by examples of wording
from the constitutions.
e large number of constitutions without any references to the various
citizenship regulations culminates in those cases which do not have any con-
stitutional reference to citizenship at all. For the European context, it con-
cerns Denmark, France and Luxembourg.
Austria, Belgium, Germany, Greece and the Netherlands contain either
no regulation for some of the discussed citizenship dimensions or refer to
regulations in external law. For instance, the Dutch Constitution expresses
that »Dutch nationality«, the »admission and expulsion of aliens« and »extra-
dition« are regulated »by Act of Parliament« (Netherland’s Constitution, 1815
[rev. 2008], art. 2). Here, one can exemplarily see the reference to some citi-
zenship regulations, but without being able to evaluate the content since it is
laid down in separate laws.
Estonia, Finland,Malta, Portugal, Romania and Spain have some additio-
nal constitutional formulations which allow certain citizenship regulations,
partly under certain conditions. e Finnish Constitution is an illustrative
example of generally allowing citizenship by birth and prohibiting the release
of Finnish citizenship, while simultaneously referring to external law provi-
ding details and conditions: »A child acquires Finnish citizenship at birth and
through the citizenship of its parents, as provided inmore detail by an Act. Ci-
tizenship may also be granted upon notification or application, subject to the
criteria determined by an Act. No one can be divested of or released from his
or her Finnish citizenship except on grounds determined by an Act and only
if he or she is in possession of or will be granted the citizenship of another
State« (Finland’s Constitution, 1999 [rev. 2011], art. 5).
Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Poland, Slovakia
and Slovenia do regulate some of the relevant dimensions of citizenship, but
without referring to details in external law.
Ireland and Lithuania are the only countries in Europe o fering all forms
of citizenship regulations: they do not regulate all dimensions of citizenship
examined in this study, but do have references to external law, enabling some
citizenship regulations and additionally have provisions for impossibilities.
12 Table 2 8 in the Appendix gives an overview about the country specific distribution of
the di ferent forms of citizenship regulations in European constitutions.
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For instance, the Irish Constitution generally provides regulations for citi-
zenship by birth, but also contains formulations restricting this dimension:
»Notwithstanding any other provision of this Constitution, a person born in
the island of Ireland, which includes its islands and seas, who does not have,
at the time of the birth of that person, at least one parent who is an Irish
citizen or entitled to be an Irish citizen is not entitled to Irish citizenship
or nationality, unless provided for by law« (Ireland’s Constitution, 1937 [rev.
2015], art. 9.2).
e Bulgarian and the Swedish cases are exceptional within the scope of
this investigation: Bulgaria as it refers to every analyzed dimension of citi-
zenship in its constitution – either by relating to external law or by immedia-
tely regulating it. On the other hand, the Swedish Constitution only contains
negative regulations concerning the deprivation of citizenship and the extra-
dition of citizens: »No Swedish citizenmay be deported from or refused entry
into the Realm. No Swedish citizen who is domiciled in the Realm or who has
previously been domiciled in the Realm may be deprived of his or her citi-
zenship. (…)« (Sweden’s Constitution, 1974 [rev. 2012], ch.2, part2, art. 7).
Discussing the results and considering Luhmann’s ideas on the concept
of inclusion again, it can be stated that on the national level, only few cases
across Europe constitutionally address people as citizens by and for the le-
gal system. In cases where either no reference at all is made on citizenship
regulations or only reference is just to regulations or regulatory details in ex-
ternal law, nothing can be said about the country-specific concept of formal
inclusion of persons as citizens. ose countries which constitutionally ad-
dress people as citizens in and by their legal systems, do have a comparatively
stable concept of formal inclusion since constitutions are stabilized and stabi-
lizing institutions on the national level. Nevertheless, if one recalls the overall
impression of the ›regulatory intensity‹ of the analyzed dimensions of citi-
zenship, the impression remains that formal inclusion by the constitutional
addressing of people as citizens is not self-evident for European countries.
Constitutionally guaranteed formal inclusion as citizen is the exception, not
the rule. is has far-reaching consequences for the individual actor: speaking
with Luhmann (1995), the very cautiously formalized inclusion into the legal
systemon the national level indicates that inclusion into other dependent sub-
systems of society is only (conditionally) guaranteed in very few cases. Hence,
on individual level, social and political participation is not automatically de-
termined by the constitutional regulation of formal membership. One reason
for these findings might be that constitutions are more stable concepts than
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other acts and laws of subordinate character. Considering that citizenship is in
lux in content and over time, constitutions might not be the best instituti-
on to capture the necessary dynamics of this concept. erefore, it is ques-
tionable how secure the concept of citizenship is on the constitutional level.
Nevertheless, the formal dimension of citizenship is still one important di-
mension of many, and constitutions are highly relevant legal institutions that
are comparable in the international context. us, the formal dimension of
citizenship illustrated by this contribution could serve as a starting point for
further perspectives on the concept of citizenship, its critique and analysis.
6. Conclusion
Citizenship in lux – this idea a fects many di ferent dimensions of a highly
complex concept. One dimension is the possible shi t from a national to an
international or transnational citizenship, considering for instance the aspi-
rations towards European citizenship. However, even this format refers to the
nation-state, as can be seen from the formulation in the Amsterdam Treaty
(see introduction). A fecting the formal level of citizenship, the focus on the
nation-state remains indispensable. us, this article deals with the question
of the constitutional regulation of formal citizenship on the national level.
Luhmann’s systems-theoretical perspective on inclusion/exclusion serves
as a theoretical introduction. For the conceptualization of formal citizenship,
the legal system constitutionally addresses persons as relevant. By an explo-
rative, quantitative content analysis of constitutional documents across the
European member states, the formal dimensions of citizenship are illustra-
ted. However, the constitutional analysis reconstructing formal citizenship
presents one of several fundamental pillars of the multidimensional concept of
citizenship. Of course, the focus on formal citizenship goes hand in hand with
the limitation of the perspective on the legal status as a citizen and ignores
other dimensions for analytical purposes, such as acts and habitus of citizens
(Isin 2009). It is also strictly limited to the abstract level of constitutional law
and cannot take into account the constitutional reality: whether the consti-
tutionally formulated inclusion by granting formal citizenship status leads to
the enabling of the associated rights (and duties) in political realities remains
outside the scope of this analysis. At the same time, the study of formal citi-
zenship status on the constitutional level contributes to setting the framework
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for di ferentiating between di ferent ideal-types13 of democratic citizen(ship)
on the individual level. Consequently, they are highly relevant social instituti-
ons for the analysis of the foundation for social and political fragmentation.
Overall, the results can be summarized as follows: First, based on the con-
stitutional data, it can be shown that formalized membership via constitutio-
nally organized citizenship to a state does not follow uniform trends in all
its facets. Second, formal inclusion and exclusion are – also on constitutio-
nal level – two dimensions that go hand in hand. ird, citizenship seems to
be a luid, dynamic political construction that is only rarely finalized in con-
stitutions. e impression suggests itself that citizenship is a very dynamic
mechanism of inclusion and exclusion,which is why constitutions serve as too
stable constructs to capture this important aspect of modern societies in its
formal-legal dimension. Nevertheless, constitutions are important empirical
data when it comes on the regulations of formal membership on the national
level: they show that the legal (here: constitutional) regulation of citizenship
seems to be a highly complex process, even for modern societies.
e results of this contribution can be followed up by various discussions.
First of all, the question arises almost automatically as to the possible im-
plications for political and social science research on democracy and globali-
zation. What does it mean for the democratic process of modern societies if
citizenship on the nation-state level is a dynamic construct? Is citizenship still
a promising factor for the future in times of globalizing societies? Is an inter-
national concept of citizenship suitable for intrastate political processes? e
question of the rights and duties associated with constitutionally regulated
citizenship is also relevant regarding the perspective of constructing socie-
ties. Last but not least, the formal and thus legal dimension of citizenship
can be complemented, challenged and criticized by other highly relevant di-
mensions, as for instance the acts and habitus of citizenship (Isin 2009). is
volume provides answers to some of the questions finally raised here. In ad-
dition, however, it becomes apparent that citizenship as a political and social
concept is not only a historical variable but continues to be not uniformly
organized in international comparison, which means that questions of the
domestic and international organization of formal membership will continue
to arise in the future.
13 The assumed ideal-types of democratic citizen(ship) are to be found in the introduction
of this volume.
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Appendix













Austria 5 1 0 0
Belgium 5 1 0 0
Bulgaria 0 1 0 5
Croatia 4 0 0 2
Cyprus 4 0 0 2
Czech Republic 5 0 0 1
Denmark 6 0 0 0
Estonia 1 3 0 2
Finland 1 2 0 3
France 6 0 0 0
Germany 2 4 0 0
Greece 2 4 0 0
Hungary 2 0 0 4
Ireland 2 2 1 1
Italy 4 0 0 2
Latvia 4 0 0 2
Lithuania 2 2 1 1
Luxembourg 6 0 0 0
Malta 1 2 0 3
Netherlands 5 1 0 0
Poland 3 0 0 3
Portugal 4 1 0 1
Romania 3 2 0 1
Slovakia 5 0 0 1
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Slovenia 5 0 0 1
Spain 3 1 0 2
Sweden 4 0 2 0
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Citizenship regimes and diaspora politics:
The case of politically involved Turkish migrants
in Germany
Feyza Yildirim-Sungur and Oliver Schwarz
1. Introduction
It has been almost 60 years since workers from Turkey first moved to Ger-
many as part of the labour recruitment agreement between both states.What
was planned as a temporary stay of guest workers developed into a perma-
nent settlement of foreigners and changed the country entirely. Whereas the
economic integration of Turkish guest workers was successfully realised in a
short space of time, their exclusion from political processes has raised ques-
tions about membership in political communities of democratic countries
(Blatter 2009). Furthermore, the topic of citizenship, especially the expansion
of political participation in host country processes, has caused new topics for
investigation (Bauböck 2007).
More recently, in 2017, the attendance of Turkish migrants in the Turkish
constitutional referendum has led to a considerable discussion about their
loyalty to the free democratic basic order of Germany. On the other hand, the
call of the Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan on Turks inGermany to not
vote for »Turkey’s enemies« in the German federal elections 2017 have caused
a heated discussion about the political preferences of Turkish migrants and
was perceived as an intervention in Germany’s internal a fairs. e right to
vote depends directly on having the citizenship of the related country. Howe-
ver, as in the case of Turkish migrants residing in Germany, the concept of
citizenship (and dual citizenship) has undergone a transformation. is evo-
lution includes both opportunities and challenges (Schmid 2019: 1). In the ca-
se of Turkish migrants in Germany, their transnational linkages are perceived
as a hindrance for their integration process in Germany. Although some stu-
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dies show that transmigrants who aremore involved in cross-border activities
are more likely to participate in the host countries’ societal processes (Glick-
Schiller 2003; Guarnizo/Portes/Haller 2003; Waldinger 2008), the homeland-
related ties of Turkish citizens – especially political ones – are perceived ne-
gatively in the German discourse (Faist 1994).
Against this background, our chapter explores the notion of dual citi-
zenship in the context of political participation in more than one country.
To accomplish this goal, we follow a qualitative research design based on a
single-case study. By analysing the case of Turkish migrants living in Germa-
ny, we find that transnational political engagement of migrants is in luenced
both by the citizenship regime of the receiving country and the diaspora po-
licy of the sending country. With the aim to illustrate the factors in luencing
the transnational political actions of Turkish diasporamembers, a special em-
phasis is given will be given to institutional and legal regulations of home and
host countries. Our main conclusion is that peoples’ ties to their home coun-
try and interest in what is happening in their country of origin should not
be dismissed as a refusal to integrate or as a sign of a lack of loyalty to their
county of residence, but should be recognised as a genuine transnational ori-
entation expressed by dual citizenship. e chapter is organised as follows:
A ter a concise literature review in the next section, in section 3 we describe
the citizenship regime and integration policy in Germany, before we turn to
Turkey’s policy towards its citizens abroad in section 4.
2. Dual citizenship and political participation:
A short literature review
Citizenship used to be a unitary concept. Still in the nineteenth century, the
idea that a person could be a citizen of two or more states was seen as »an
o fense to nature, an abomination on the order of bigamy« (Spiro 2016: 3).
However, in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, the view of citizenship
as an expression of loyalty, identity, and territorial authority underwent a sub-
stantial change. is was especially the case on the European continent. Ter-
ritorially, the peace treaties that brought the World Wars I and II to an end
changed the borders of many countries.With the collapse of the Soviet Union
and the disintegration of Yugoslavia, the European landscape changed again.
New states emerged and others disappeared. Millions of people were forced
to emigrate and/or found themselves as minorities in the territories of new-
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ly formed states. In many states, naturalisation was introduced for residents
whowere not born in the country and an increasing number ofmigrants could
obtain dual citizenship.Others, however, were denied citizenship in their new
countries of residence. ese developments have promoted a remodelling of
the classical concept of unitary citizenship, originated from the sovereign na-
tion state with a well-mappable territory drawn by precisely defined borders
(as outlined by Bayer/Schwarz/Stark 2020 in the introduction of this volume).
Legally, the European Convention on Nationality, adopted in 1997, was a
major breakthrough for the acceptance of dual citizenship in the international
community. e convention explicitly allows for dual or multiple nationality
and leaves it to each individual state to grant such a status via national law
(Pilgram2011: 7).Given the importance of nationality as an anchor point for ci-
tizenship, this represents an important change in the view of dual citizenship:
from strong rejection, via being conceived as an oddity, to general acceptan-
ce and even active legal encouragement of the status today (Midtbøen 2019:
296). According to Triadafilopoulos (2007: 35), the principal norm driving the
convention is inclusion: »Whereas immigration drove the development of ex-
clusionary citizenship laws at the turn of the twentieth century, it is helping
drive the formation of more expansive membership regimes today.« Indeed,
in several cases, the convention had a direct e fect on the reform of domestic
citizenship law. e 2001 Swedish Citizenship Act can be seen as an explicit
response to the changing view on multiple nationalities in international law
(Howard 2009: 74). Many other European countries also reformed and libe-
ralised their citizenship laws in the late 1990s and early 2000s (de Hart/van
Oers 2006: 336-340). According to Sejersen (2008: 553), 61 % of the countries in
Europe tolerated dual citizenship in 2005. Since then, the numbers have in-
creased further (Spiro 2016). By 2018, 75 % of all states in the world accept dual
citizenship (Vink et al. 2019: 362-363). At the same time, the establishment of
EU citizenship has fundamentally changed and contested the classical notion
of citizenship (for a further exploration of the concept of EU citizenship, see
Schwarz 2020 in this volume).
As o ten the case in social science, the findings in respect to the impact of
dual citizenship on political participation are not clear-cut. Following Verba
and Nie (1972), political participation covers four modes, namely voting, cam-
paigning, community-related activities and individual contacts to a public of-
ficial to achieve a personal goal. Yet, as introduced by Barnes and Kaase (1979),
political participation also includes unconventional forms, namely participa-
ting in demonstrations, public sit-ins or discussions and the signing of peti-
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tions (Stark 2019). In his study on democratic participation among first- and
second-generation immigrants in the United States, Ramakrishnan (2005: 6)
shows that »immigrants from countries that allow for dual citizenship actual-
ly have a higher level of participation than do immigrants from other coun-
tries.« However, according to an analysis by Cain and Doherty (2006), U.S.
citizens with dual nationality are significantly less likely to register and to vo-
te in comparison to their unitary citizenship counterparts. In accordance to
this, the research by Staton, Jackson and Canache (2007a) suggests that dual
nationality likely disconnects immigrants from the American political system.
However, as the authors reveal in another study, this e fect seems to be large-
ly restricted to the first generation of immigrants (Staton/Jackson/Canache
2007b).
Literature on Canadian citizenship has come to di ferent results. For
example, Wong (2008) analysed civic participation of transnationals (most of
whom are immigrants) and their civic participation in societal organisations.
He sees no relationship between transnationalism and active citizenship and
further suggests »that far from hindering adaptation to American society,
dual citizenship may actually facilitate the cultural and political incorpora-
tion of new immigrants who would otherwise fail to naturalise and would
remain politically and culturally isolated« (Wong 2008: 95). Mügge (2012)
argues in the same way in her study on migrant groups in the Netherlands.
She concludes that those migrants with dual nationality are more likely to
participate in their host country’s political life than those who only have
Dutch nationality. An interesting insight is her conclusion that transnational
political orientations are o ten responses to exclusionary citizenship regimes
in sending countries – an aspect that has not gained considerable research.
In this respect, Østergaard-Nielsen (2003a: 6) has already argued for a »re-
consideration of the role of sending countries in international migration
that includes but does not overestimate their role in creating transnational
economic, social, and political spaces and in turning emigrants and diasporas
into a part of national development and democratisation.« Her edited volume
o fers a comparative study of the policies of sending countries (and home-
lands) towards their nationals abroad and provides a pioneering study of
Turkey’s policy towards Turkish citizens abroad (Østergaard-Nielsen 2003b).
By using the Turkish and Kurdish communities in Germany as a case study,
the author concludes: »Turkey wants its citizens abroad not to assimilate into
their receiving countries, but to settle as Turks« (Østergaard-Nielsen 2003b:
77). Among the reasons for this is that a settled community of »Euro-Turks«
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constitutes an important economic and political resource for the Turkish
state. In her case study, Østergaard-Nielsen elaborates a range of measures
which are employed to strengthen the economic, political and cultural ties
between Turkey and its citizens abroad.
Since then, the focus on diaspora policy has been significantly advanced
(Cohen 2008). However, it is di ficult to determine the real impact of these
policies on the immigrants’ political participation in their countries of settle-
ment. In this respect, Østergaard-Nielsen (2016) notes in a more recent publi-
cation that diasporasmay not automatically respond to the sending countries’
outreach. According to her, immigrants are very much aware of the motives
and credibility of these e forts and the extent to which they are sensitive to
their specific needs. Moreover, she observes, their response depends on the
extent to which the political actors of their residence countries »are moving
away from the zero-sumdebate and the securitization optic onmigrant trans-
nationality« (Østergaard-Nielsen 2016: 162).
Drawing on this concise literature review, we now turn to the case of poli-
tically involved Turkish migrants in Germany. Generally, case studies provide
us with a deep understanding about specific instances (Mabry 2008: 216). Re-
calling that a single case study is analogue to a single experiment, a single
case can be used to confirm, challenge, or extend the theory (Yin 2008: 40).
In the following section, we exemplify the German-Turkish case as a critical
case. According to Patton (2008: 236), critical cases are cases »that can make
a point quite dramatically or are, for some reason, particularly important in
the scheme of things«. In other words: »If it happens there, it will happen
anywhere,« or, vice, versa, »if it doesn’t happen there, it won’t happen any-
where« (Patton 2008: 236). It is also important to note that our study only
covers one particular form of political participation, namely the participation
in elections.
3. The German-Turkish case: From guest workers to
transnational diaspora members
Germany signed its first labour recruitment agreement with Italy in 1955. La-
ter on, the German state authorities set up labour recruitment agreements
with Greece (1960), Spain (1961) and Turkey (1961). Similar agreements would
then be made with Morocco (1963), Portugal (1964), Tunisia (1965) and Yugo-
slavia (1968). Only 10 years a ter the agreement with Turkey, the number of
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Turkish workers in Germany was already well over half a million and excee-
ded the one million mark in 1974 (see Figure 1). Because of the law on the
recruitment ban passed in 1973, which was intended to prevent the in lux of
further immigrants, many Turkish migrants brought their families to Ger-
many. ey feared that this would not be possible later on. is changed the
social structure of the immigrants, which until then had been an almost pu-
re working population. e Turkish resident population rose to just over two
million in 1995. In 2000, 28.2 percent of all foreigners living in Germany were
Turkish citizens. e proportion of Turks has since fallen by more than half,
while the proportion of foreigners from Eastern Europe and the Arab world
has risen. By the end of 2019, 13.1 percent (around 1.5 million) of all foreigners
are Turkish citizens.
Figure 1: Number of foreigners in Germany
Source: Own compilation based on data from Statistical O fice (Destatis 2020a).
However, a decreasing number of statistically recorded Turks is no pro-
of of the decrease in the number of people of Turkish origin in Germany. It
is therefore helpful to di ferentiate between people with and without a mi-
gration background. In general, the definition of migration background in-
cludes all immigrant foreigners, naturalised persons, (late) resettlers and the
descendants of these groups born as Germans (Will 2019: 547). Since 2005,
the German Microcensus also distinguishes between the population with and
without a migrant background and currently defines this term as follows: »A
person has a migrant background if he or she or at least one parent does not
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possess German citizenship by birth« (Destatis 2019a: 4). According to this
definition, 13.3 percent of all people with a migration background living in
Germany belong to the Turkish community (see figure 2). Although the pro-
portion of Turks among all migrants living in Germany has slightly fallen in
the last few years, Turkish migrants are still representing the second largest
group of people in Germany, a ter the ethnic Germans. Just over half of the-
se people (1.5 million) were born in Germany. Today, the fourth generation
of Turkish migrants is growing up in Germany. Despite this, »the integrati-
on of Turkish migrants« is still shaping the political discourse in Germany
(Berlingho f 2018).
Figure 2: Number of people with migration background in Germany
Source: Own compilation based on data from Statistical O fice (Destatis 2020b).
From a scientific point of view, the transnational migration paradigm
has challenged the concepts of immigration and assimilation (Glick-Schiller
2012: 32). Central to this development was the simple observation that more
people are migrating from more places to more destinations. However, mi-
grants do not automatically become »uprooted« from those they »le t behind«
(Toyota/Yeoh/Nguyen 2007). Transnationalism identifies a multiplicity of mi-
grant networks and communities that transcend received national bounda-
ries (Kivisto 2003). In this respect, the term »diaspora« is central to the study
of transnationalism (Tölölyan 1991: 1). In articulating transnational diaspora
members, it is no longer assumed that emigrants sever their ties with their
countries of origin. Instead, they keep and reconstitute those ties, creating
a political dynamic in which both the countries of origin and the countries
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of residence are becoming mutually in luential (Escobar 2004: 66). It is here
where dual citizenship relates to the political participation of transnational
diaspora members in both political communities, which sheds light not on-
ly on multiple memberships but also on multiple loyalties: to the country of
residence, the homeland and the transnational community itself. As a conse-
quence, and in thewords of Kastoryano (2005: 694), »dual citizenship becomes
the institutional expression of and the basis for transnationalism.«
erefore, it is not surprising, that the issue of dual citizenship plays a
major role in the discourse about the integration regime in Germany (Worbs
2008: 24).However, there are no reliable data on howmany people in total hold
two or more passports. e 2011 Census shows the number of persons with
dual citizenship in Germany at 4.26 million (Destatis 2019b). In contrast, the
2018 Microcensus lists 1.87 million persons only. In a breakdown of persons
with a migrant background by country of origin, Turkish citizens take the
second place with 240.000 behind Poland with 244.000 (Destatis 2019a: 165-
168).
Based on the theoretical literature, we expect an increasing political par-
ticipation of Turkish migrants with dual citizenship both in their country of
residence and in their country of origin. However, as our literature review has
also revealed, transnational political participation of Turkish migrants seems
to be in luenced by the citizenship regime of the receiving country and the
diaspora policy of the sending country. We therefore start our analysis by de-
scribing the citizenship regime and integration policy in Germany, before we
turn to Turkey’s policy towards its citizens abroad.
4. Citizenship regime and integration policy in Germany
From 1913 until January 2000, Germany attributed formal citizenship to the
principle of ius sanguinis. is means German citizenship can be held through
blood descent only (Klopp 2002: 41). Attributing citizenship holding to birth
by descent illustrates the opposite of ius soli, which contains having the citi-
zenship through birth in the country.Due tomigration, the need for a legal re-
orientation of the German citizenship regimewas evident for decades, but the
political arena was full of divergent opinions concerning how this reformula-
tion should be realised (Brubaker 1992). In 1998, the formation of the German
citizenship law gained support by the new red-green government coalition,
but main parts of the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) wanted to prevent a
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reform for reasons of basic reservations. A heated debate was sparked by the
intent of the red-green-coalition to introduce dual citizenship. e first dra t
of the reform of the German citizenship law envisaged the introduction of a
dual citizenship, but this attempt failed due to the instrumentalisation of the
citizenship issue and the use of this tactic for party-political success.
A prominent reason for this was the success of the signature campaign
against the double citizenship of Roland Koch, the CDU’s candidate for Mi-
nister President in Hessen (Schäfer 1999). At the end, a di ferent version of
the dual citizenship emerged, namely the so-called option model (Options-
modell). e option-model allowed children born of foreign parents to hold
dual citizenship until adulthood. However, before they reached the age of 23,
they have to choose the one or the other citizenship (Ennigkeit 2008: 94-95).
Ever since its introduction, the option-model has been a point of discussion,
dividing the conservative CDU and the Social Democratic Party (SPD). e-
refore, when both parties came together in a grand coalition in the run-up of
the parliamentary elections in 2013, the option model was largely abandoned.
e result was a new law in 2014 which accepts dual citizenship only for those
children, who either have lived in Germany for at least eight years prior the
age of 21 and who have attended school in the country for six years or have a
German school graduation or completed a vocational training in the country
(Worbs 2014: 326-327).
Nevertheless, the year 2000 can be referred to as a fundamental turning
point for the integration regime in Germany. is can be seen in the realign-
ment of integration politics; for instance, the initiation of the German Islam
Conference in 2006, the National Integration Summit 2007, or the National
Integration Plan 2007. However, these positive developments experienced a
setback when ilo Sarrazin, a former SPD-politician, published the book
»Germany Abolishes Itself« (Deutschland scha t sich ab). e book deals with
the alleged negative e fects on Germany which, according to Sarrazin, will
result from the combination of declining birth rates, a growing underclass
and immigration from predominantly Muslim countries. e book topped the
German bestseller list for 21 weeks in 2010 and 2011. With his book, Sarazzin
stimulated a huge political debate in Germany, targeting foreigners andMus-
lims (Kelek 2011). In the end, however, the integration of Turks and Muslims
was on the public agenda again.
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4.1. The Turkish diaspora in Germany: Politically excluded migrants?
As the foreign population with the highest proportion in Germany, the Tur-
kish guest workers were the main group to be a fected by the integration po-
licies and the reformation of the German citizenship law. According to the
Federal Statistical O fice (Destatis 2020: 170-171), since the introduction of the
new citizenship law in 2000,more than 2.2 million people have been naturali-
sed in Germany as of the end of 2018. e most common country of origin for
naturalisation is Turkey. Between 2000 and 2018, more than 388.000 Turks
got the German citizenship, accounting for more than 17 percent of all natu-
ralisations during that period. However, the number in this group has been
falling sharply since 2000. Whereas the number of naturalisations was over
80.000 in the year 2000, it dropped to only 7.000 in 2018. In addition to this,
current numbers show that 97.8 percent of Turkish citizens in Germany meet
the requirement of becoming a German citizen (i.e. living in Germany for at
least 10 years), but they do not apply for naturalisation (Deutsche Welle 2019).
esefigures raise the question regarding the identification of the Turkish
diaspora in Germany. ere are some studies which show that the majority of
people with a Turkish migration background feel attached to both their coun-
try of residence and origin. Based on structured interviews with 1,065 Tur-
kish migrants in Germany, Kaya and Kentel (2005: 42) show that the so-called
»Euro-Turks« see various advantages and disadvantages both in their coun-
try of origin and in their country of residence. When asked to which country
they feel more a filiated, approximatively 49 % a filiatemore with Turkey, 22 %
with Germany and 27 % with both countries. In the authors’ interpretation,
the last number indicates that »Turks no longer essentialise their homeland
and they actually challenge the gurbetçi discourse common among the Turks
in Turkey. ey are no longer gurbetçi; they have already become active social
agents in their new countries. ey have actually accommodated themselves
in the transnational space bridging the two countries, homeland and host-
land« (Kaya/Kertel 2005: 42). A more recent study by the Centre for Studies
on Turkey and Integration Research (ZfTI) based on computer assisted tele-
phone interviewing (CATI) comes to similar results. e representative data
show that more than 35 % of the Turkish migrants in North-RhineWestphalia
(NRW), where nearly 500.000 people with Turkish citizenship live, find the
German and Turkish way of life easy to reconcile (Sauer 2018: 38). However,
an earlier study by Özcan (2004), building on data from the German Socio-
Economic Panel (GSOEP) and the Microcensus for NRW, has revealed that
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a majority of both the first and second generation of Turks orient themsel-
ves towards permanent residence in Germany. ese results have been con-
firmed by the representative survey »Selected Migrant Groups in Germany
2015« (RAM) of the Federal O fice for Migration and Refugees (BAMF). e
attachment of Turkish migrants to Germany was higher than the attachment
to Turkey in all groups of the survey (Schührer 2018: 6).
However,while the empirical knowledge on the political attachment of the
Turkish diaspora in Germany is relatively well-developed, its political parti-
cipation remains largely under-explored (Schönwälder 2009: 832). One of the
first studies that deals with this issue comes from Wüst (2004). For his ana-
lysis of the 2002 parliamentary elections in Germany, he took advantage of
the monthly Politbarometer surveys. e study shows a slightly lower electo-
ral participation of naturalised Turks (78 %) in comparison to their German-
born counterparts (87 %). Formerly Turkish citizens also prefer the SPD more
frequently than any other naturalised citizen’s group (Wüst 2004: 348-351). A
comprehensive study on migrants’ political participation has been published
by Müssig and Worbs (2012) on behalf of the BAMF. e study’s data on the
2002 and 2005 parliamentary elections stem from the European Social Survey
(ESS). In addition, the authors use data from the German Longitudinal Elec-
tion Study (GLES) for the 2009 parliamentary elections. Müssig and Worbs
(2012) reveal only minor di ferences in electoral form of participation bet-
ween persons without and with a migration background of the first genera-
tion. However, these di ferences could no longer be observed for the second
generation born in Germany if they were migrants with German citizenship.
e extent of their participation in political life in Germany is comparable
to that of persons without a migration background (Müssig/Worbs 2012: 41).
Other survey projects allow at least an analysis of partial aspects of migrants’
political participation (Wüst/Faas 2018: 10). However, due to the small num-
ber of cases, these studies could hardly make reliable statements about the
voting behaviour of Turkish migrants in Germany.
ankfully, this situation has changed with the Immigrant German Elec-
tion Study (IMGES). For the study, nearly 500 Germans of Turkish origin we-
re randomly selected and interviewed to explain immigrant voter turnout in
the 2017 German parliamentary elections. e study shows the voter turnout
among Turkish migrants (61 %) was lower than among Germans without a
migrant background (76.2 %). 35 % of the Turkish migrants voted for the SPD.
Interestingly, in the first generation of Turkish migrants there is a signifi-
cant correlation between their length of stay in Germany (in years) and their
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participation in elections: For every ten years of stay, the probability of vo-
ting increases by about 10 percentage points. In addition, the study reveals
that the voter turnout is almost four percentage points higher for persons
with dual citizenship (Goerres/Spies/Mayer 2018: 5). In other words, dual ci-
tizenship seems to be beneficial for the increase of the political participation
of people with a Turkish migration background in Germany, but how about
the political participation of the Turkish diaspora in Turkish elections? Before
we turn to this question, we will have a look at the bilateral relations of the
home and the host country of Turkish migrants.
4.2. German-Turkish relations
Since the year 2016, several developments generated political and diploma-
tic tensions between Germany and Turkey (Eppel 2017). One can say that the
first incident was in March 2016, when the German NDR television aired a
video with heavy criticism of the Turkish President Erdoğan. As a direct con-
sequence, Ankara summoned the German Ambassador in Turkey,Martin Erd-
mann, to the Ministry of Foreign A fairs. Shortly a terwards, a second crisis
came up because Martin Erdmann attended the first hearing of Cumhuriyet
Newspaper’s Editor-in-Chief Can Dündar at the Istanbul courthouse, from
where he shared posts with the accused on social media. Dündar was ar-
rested on charges of espionage and was found guilty of publishing state se-
crets. However, Dündar lodged an appeal and the judgement was not final.
When the exit ban against Dündar was li ted, he le t Turkey for Germany in
July 2016, where he has lived and worked in exile ever since. Another ma-
jor breaking point occurred when the German Bundestag passed a resolution
in June 2016, recognizing the Armenian genocide. Shortly a terwards, Tur-
key denied a German delegation access to the airbase İncirlik, where German
troops were stationed as a contribution to the fight against ISIS. e tensi-
ons between Ankara and Berlin were taken to a new stage in the run-up to
the Turkish constitutional referendum in April 2017. Initially, some campaign
rallies by Turkish o ficials in Germany were allowed.However, German autho-
rities banned Erdoğan from addressing a rally in Cologne via video call with
reference to health and safety concerns. e meeting was organized with the
aim to protest the coup attempt in July 15.
While the German government initially condemned the coup attempt
and expressed its support for democracy in Turkey, these declarations were
quickly overlaid by articulated concern and criticism due to the Turkish go-
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vernment’s post-coup crackdown. In this context, Ankara criticized Germany
for granting asylum to two high-ranking Turkish generals who were wanted
by Turkey for their alleged involvement in the coup attempt. In the a termath
of the coup attempt, the Turkish government declared a state of emergency
and jailed, dismissed and/or suspended thousands of soldiers, public o fici-
als, police o ficers, teachers, judges and prosecutors. However, the crackdown
was also extended to the pro-Kurdish opposition Peoples’ Democratic Party’s
(HDP) and critical media and journalists (HRW 2017: 600). When Ayşenur
Bahçekapılı, the AK Party deputy and Parliament Speaker, went to Germany
for a visit in December 2016 and was detained at Cologne Airport because she
had lost her passport and could only submit a temporary one, further tension
came up. is was followed by another crisis. is time, in February 2017,
imams of the Turkish-Islamic Union for Religious A fairs (DITIB) in Germany
were in the focus of the tension. German authorities claimed that Turkish
imams spied on opponents of Turkish President Erdoğan in Germany. is
caused a stir about the in luence of Ankara on Germany’s internal a fairs (Ma-
ritato 2018: 10). Finally, the crisis reached its peak when German authorities
banned the election campaigns of Turkish politicians on German territory
during the Turkish constitutional referendum in 2017 and presidential or
general elections in 2018. Although a normalisation process started in 2019,
the past three years in the German-Turkish relations can be referred to as a
period marked by several crises which, in the end, had a pronounced impact
on the situation of Turkish migrants in Germany (Baser/Ozturk 2019).
5. Turkey’s policy towards citizens abroad
According to the Presidency for Turks Abroad and Related Communities (YTB
2018), the number of the Turkish diaspora currently exceeds 6.5million people
worldwide. In the first 20 years of the migration of guest workers,most of the
activities which were realised through the Turkish state were about consul-
ting activities. Here, social attaches in the Turkish consulates gave advice for
guest workers, especially focusing on issues like social rights. At that time, the
economic perspective and its advantages for the state were in the foreground
of attention. Moreover, this was also the time when Turkish politicians reali-
sed that these guest workers would stay abroad since most of them got their
families through the family unification process. Additionally, politicians also
realised that through the transfer of foreign currency into the Turkish eco-
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nomy, these guest workers would contribute to the Turkish prosperity. eir
stay abroad was more beneficial for Turkey than their return (Aydin 2014: 8).
As a consequence of the mentioned perception of Turkish politicians, one of
the most important steps to in luence the Turks living abroad was taken in
1982. In the new constitution of 1982, the nationality legislation was amen-
ded and dual citizenship was facilitated for Turkish citizens. Furthermore,
the 1982 constitution emphasized the duties of the Turkish state to guarantee
that Turkishmigrants foster stronger ties to their homeland (Ünver 2013: 184).
e next major development within the policies towards citizens abroad
was the establishment of the Turkish-Islamic Union of the Religious A fairs
(DITIB) in Germany in 1985. DITIB was under the auspices of the Presidency
of Religious A fairs (Ünver 2013: 185). e establishment of a religious organi-
sation was an important step to show that the presence of its citizens abroad
was appreciated by the Turkish authorities in the long run. One other signifi-
cant step was taken at the end of the 1990s. In 1998, two institutions engaging
in the topic of Turks abroad, namely the Advisory Committee for Turkish Ci-
tizens Living Abroad and the High Committee for Turkish Citizens Living
Abroad were founded by the Prime Ministry (Aksel 2013).
5.1. The new diaspora policy under the AKP era
With the takeover of the conservative Justice and Development Party (AKP) in
2002, Turkey’s outreach to its citizens abroad was further intensified.Moreo-
ver, the political language towards its citizens changed from gurbetçi/yurtdışı
işçi (guest worker/worker abroad) to yurtdışı vatandaşlar (citizens living abroad)
and finally to »Turkish diaspora«. According to Ünver, until the AKP period,
Turkishmigrants living outside Turkey had never been referred to as diaspora
(Ünver 2013: 185). e major policy transformation implemented by the AKP
government and targeting the Turkish diaspora can be dissected under two
di ferent categories. Firstly, the institutional setting, consisting of new sta-
te-led coordination mechanisms for its diaspora and, secondly, the electoral
setting, like external voting rights. Aydin underlines that three developments
are showing this »new« diaspora policy of Turkey. ese are: (1) the explicit
designation of people abroad who originated from Turkey as a diaspora; (2)
that a policy relating to them is embedded in a strategy of public diplomacy
being a core element of the present proactive foreign policy; and (3) the con-
nection of this policy with a new view of the nation, compatible with multiple
Muslim identities (Aydin 2014: 13).
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Although some state-led initiatives and coordinationmechanisms dealing
with the issues of the Turkish diaspora had been founded in the past, they
reached a peak with the creation of the Presidency for Turks Abroad and Re-
lated Communities in 2010 (Öktem 2014: 6). A ter its establishment, Turkey’s
relations with its citizens living in di ferent parts of the world were firmly ba-
sed on amore institutional foundation. YTB’s responsibilities include defining
strategies to meet the needs of the Turkish diaspora and implementing steps
in accordance with the planned strategies (Yurtnaç 2012: 4-5). At its founda-
tion, YTB was a filiated to the Turkish Prime Minister. Since Turkey’s con-
troversial transition into a presidential government system, the institution is
located under the Ministry of Culture and Tourism. Since 2010 it has initia-
ted various activities, mostly with the aim to improve political consciousness,
which in turn will enhance political participation, simultaneously contribu-
ting to the political, cultural, economic and social life. Finally, the initiatives’
goal was to foster closer relations between the diaspora and Turkey on the
one hand and between Turkey and the host countries on the other (Ünver
2013: 186).
Another institutional innovation followed with the foundation of the Yu-
nus Emre Institute for Turkish Cultural Diplomacy. e institute is a public
institution founded by law in 2007. Its goal is to preserve the Turkish cul-
tural heritage, to promote cultural exchange, to provide educational services
on Turkish language and culture and on the country’s arts (Aydin 2014: 16).
e Yunus Emre Institute can be regarded as an equivalent to the German
Goethe Institute or the British Council. Whereas teaching Turkish to the co-
ming generations of Turkish diaspora members seems to be one of the most
important priorities, it also aims to build bridges to the Turkish diasporic for-
mations in the receiving countries (Ünver 2013: 187).Whereas the institutional
regulations lead to a structural renewal, the AKP has also used several strate-
gies for supporting and strengthening Turkish civil society organisations in
Europe and especially in Germany, for example, like the Union of European
Turkish Democrats UETD (new name: UID). e reason for these activities is
the formation of a pro-government lobby in EUmember-states in general and
in Germany in particular (Østergaard-Nielsen 2003b: 91). Indeed, mobilizing
Turkish migrants through civil society organisations turns out to be success-
ful. UID was one of the main actors in organizing and managing the electoral
campaigns abroad (Kuru 2019: 194).
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5.2. External voting rights for the Turkish diaspora
One, if not the most decisive, innovation, which was initiated by the AKP go-
vernment, was the voting right for non-resident Turkish citizens. Turkish na-
tionals living abroad gained the right to vote for the first time in 1987 through
amendments to the law on elections and voter registers (Resmî Gazete 1979).
However, according to these amendments, citizens were only allowed to cast
their votes at border gates and therefore had to enter Turkish territory in
order to vote. us, it cannot be referred to as an external voting right. In
2008, the election and registration act was once again amended and finally
allowed Turkish citizens living abroad the access to voting rights in the coun-
try’s general elections, presidential elections and referendums (Resmî Gazete
2008). Within this scope, four di ferent options were granted to external vo-
ters. ese were: (1) by post, (2) border gates, (3) embassies/consulates, and (4)
electronically. However, due to the fact that the method of voting by post was
perceived as a threat to election security, the Turkish Constitutional Court an-
nulled it. Following this development, the electoral board adopted a resolution
in 2011, stating that because of the lack of su ficient infrastructure for voting
abroad, non-residents were excluded from the elections in Turkey. Finally, in
May 2012, the election law was amended again. is amendment paved the
way for the political participation of diaspora members in those countries
which are their place of residence (Abadan-Unat et al. 2014).
Turkish diaspora members practiced the out-of-the-country vo-
ting for the first time in 2014 during the presidential elections (Köşer-
Akçapınar/Bayraktar-Aksel 2017: 148). A look at the numbers and voting
preferences of Turkish diaspora members shows a continuous increase of
electoral participation since that point of time. Furthermore, their votes were
cast mainly in favour of the governing AKP (see Table 1). While it was initially
mandatory to arrange an appointment with a consulate or embassy in the
country of residence to vote, such appointments were no longer necessary
in the 2015 parliamentary elections. However, Turkish citizens abroad still
had to travel to a consulate or an embassy closest to their registered inter-
national address in order to vote. By 2017, registered expatriates could vote
at any embassy or consulate as well as at border polling stations (Sevi et al.
2020: 2). Accordingly, more than 660,000 expatriate voters took part in the
referendum, a participation that was achieved again in the 2018 elections.
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Table 1: Turkish election results in Germany
Date Type Voters Turnout in % Winner in %
24.06.2018 Parliamentary 659.132 45,7 55,7 (AKP)
24.06.2018 Presidential 660.341 45,7 64,8 (Erdoğan)
16.04.2017 Referendum 660.666 46,2 63,1 (YES)
01.11.2015 Parliamentary 575.564 40,8 59,7 (AKP)
07.06.2015 Parliamentary 482.753 34,4 53,7 (AKP)
10.08.2014 Presidential 112.705 8,2 68,6 (Erdoğan)
To sum it up, initiating external voting rights to a huge number of non-
resident citizens appears to be a success story for the AKP. However, it should
not be overlooked that voting patterns in Germany remain diverse (Adar 2019:
19). e numbers of the Turkish authorities do not di fer between Turks with
single and dual citizenship, or Alevis and Kurds. In the IMGES, for example,
less than 42 % of the interviewees with dual citizenship said they had voted.
Of these, 78 % percent said they had voted against the constitutional reform.
Among those who only had the German citizenship, the overall proportion
was just 16 percent in favour of the constitutional reform. e lowest approval
was 3 % among the group of Alevis, while still 12 % of the Kurds were in favour
of the reform (Goerres/Spies/Mayer 2018: 8).
6. Conclusion
is chapter used the case of Turkish migrants in Germany to illustrate that
transnational political engagement of migrants is in luenced both by the citi-
zenship regime of the receiving country and the diaspora policy of the sending
country. Although the migration process of Turks cannot only be reduced to
sending guest workers to foreign countries, the labour migration beginning
with the 1960s can be designated as themain factor in luencing the creation of
the Turkish diaspora today. With more than 6 million diaspora members ab-
road, the Turkish state began to activelymobilise these people, especially since
2002 with the coming into power of the AKP government. e most decisive
change in Turkey’s outreach to its diaspora was the granting of voting rights
to non-resident citizens. Whereas Germany’s opportunity structures for po-
Source: Own compilation based on data from HaberTurk (2014) and Yeni Şafak (2018).
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litical participation had been closed for Turkish migrants for a long time, the
introduction of the option-model represented a fundamental turning point.
However, the discussion about dual citizenship and transnational participa-
tion still continues today. Moreover, since 2016, there have been several bila-
teral crises between Germany and Turkey which obviously gave the Turkish
diaspora policy an additional impetus. Our study has contributed to the dis-
cussion of dual citizenship and the political participation of Turkish migrants
by demonstrating that persons who have strong ties to their homeland do not
necessarily have to be perceived as having lower ties to their country of re-
sidence. It should be highlighted that members of the Turkish diaspora can
also have dual loyalties feeding each other. In contrast to the o ten-negative
connotations that go along with a homeland-orientated diaspora, this paints
a far more positive picture of the future political involvement of Turkish mi-
grants in Germany. Moreover, the case of Turkish migrants in Germany also
suggests that rather than debating the »trouble« of transnational bonds, crea-
ting and adjusting the opportunity structures of migrant-receiving societies
seems to be a more plausible strategy.
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Borders of Citizenship? Biopolitics and differential
inclusion in local elds of labor and asylum
Thorsten Schlee
1. Introduction
In 2018, 22.3 million third-country nationals resided within the European
Union and 17.6 million persons lived in one of the EU member states on 1 Ja-
nuary 2018 with the citizenship of another EU Member State (Eurostat 2019).
At the same time, 10.9 million foreigners (third-country nationals and Union
citizens) were staying in the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) (Statistisches
Bundesamt 2019: 19). Contrary to natural born citizens, migrants can have a
variety of legal statuses depending on how they are classified by immigrati-
on law. is classification constitutes a system of civic stratification (Morris
2010) that determines the access to social benefits and social services, such as
education and qualification measures and health care, and regulates foreig-
ner’s legal access to labor markets. Social policy research brought this system
in contact with di ferent welfare state regimes and showed a growing di fe-
rentiation in immigrants’ social rights based on entry categories (Sainsburry
2012). ereby, limited access to social benefits and services are considered to
be a nation state’s internal instrument of migration control (Bommes/ rän-
hardt 2010; Atac/Rosenberg 2019). Regardless of the welfare type, nowadays
a growing pluralization and di ferentiation of legal status positioning can be
observed in di ferent European Union Member States. is concerns EU ci-
tizens’ cross-border social rights, the social rights of third country nationals
coming to Europe for professional or educational reasons as well as refugees.
Increasing border crossing mobility raises questions of inclusion and ex-
clusion of non-citizens into the social systems, such as the legal system, the
political, economic or educational system. Still, it is mainly the national state
moderating the access to labor market and social services.
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How can we depict the various forms of di ferential inclusion (Mezza-
dra/Neilson 2013) in social and legal systems within the FRG? How can we
grasp the simultaneousness of restrictive border practices and the selective
liberalization of immigration law and the coincident growing embracement
of the migrant population throughout integration policies? Classical concepts
of citizenship refer to the state, on a national or nowadays on a European le-
vel. While they overestimate the political capacity to integrate society; at the
same time they underestimate the power of political rationalities shaping the
current migration and membership policies.
In contrast, this contribution argues that recent developments in immi-
gration policies and immigration law can and should not be approached from
the point of view of state institutions such as citizenship. It outlines the ex-
tensive proliferation of status di ferentiation of migrants into the social sys-
tems as an outcome of biopolitical rationality. Moreover we can observe an
emerging system of di ferential inclusion consisting out of overlapping lines
of inclusion and exclusion and memberships in lux beyond the institution of
citizenship.
(Section 2) erefore, we first have to consider the »nation form« and the
complex interplay of democracy, nationality and welfare state. Citizenship as
well as non-citizenship thereby have to be shown as political categories which
are producing the problematization of immigration in world society.
(Section 3) Labor market access for asylum seekers and granted refugees
is a paradigmatic field to depict the inconsistent and heteronomous outco-
me of biopolitical selectivity. Biopolitics can be observed within the European
agendas as controlling migration (3.1) as well as, in recent legislation for asyl-
um seekers, regulating their access to labor and labor-related social services
(3.2). At the same time, this rationality produces con licting legal spheres and
institutions in multi-scaled policy areas.
(Section 4) Based on local case studies, the contribution gives an insight
into the contradictious e fects of immigration policies on the local level.
2. The national social state
Talking about the borders of citizenship implies to talk about migration and
the concept of the nation state. is starting point follows a trend inmigration
research that Nieswand calls the decentralization of migration. at means
not only to deal scientifically with the challenges of migration and ›integra-
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tion‹ of migrants into a new society, but also with the structural and world
social dynamics which produce the specific forms of problematization and
handling immigration (Nieswand 2016: 285).1
e international political system is segmented in nation states. e con-
cept of a nation state is the historical-political form of organizing society.
Like every form of unity, the nation is an imagined unity that needs to be ma-
terialized. It materializes in symbols as well as in technical artefacts. In the
course of the 18th century and mainly the 19th century, nations began writing
and producing its histories and curating their specific heritage. Emblemati-
cally, the United States’ history – it’s unity and di ference – is set in scene in
the National Mall in Washington D.C (Manow 2018). ereby the nation can
constitute its unity in di ferent ways. In the German case, the nation estab-
lished itself as a mainly ethnically defined union against particular political
entities. In the French case, the nation did not answer to particularism but
to the misuse of power, which was not exercised by the people, but by some
privileged (Bommes 1999: 109-115). e national history of statehood makes
it always possible to emphasize the somehow politically or culturally unified
people. e end of the cold war also revitalized the accentuation of nationa-
list patterns of identifying and unifying. In a liberal sense, former member
states of the Warsaw Pact abolished communist dictatorship but developed
more and more an intensive and externally-endangered and ethnically-defi-
ned unity. Both pathways, the liberal democratic and the ethnical, are possible
patterns to fill the empty signifier nation, so that, for example the 1989 Ger-
man national-liberal slogan »We are the people« (»Wir sind das Volk«) soon
turned out to be a xenophobic phrase (Glück 2018).
As Earth is almost completely covered by territorially defined nation sta-
tes, the individual states as well as an international state system successfully
monopolize the legitimate means of movement. erefore, the state assigns
his citizens with documents: »the notion of national communities must be
codified in documents rather than merely imagined« (Torpey 2010: 6) and it
interpellates (Althusser 2016: 85) citizens as voters, pupils, taxpayers or soldi-
ers.
1 Problematization is a Foucauldian term (Foucault 1996: 78; Foucault 2004b: 114f) that
describes an angle, which is less interested in the problem definitions based on exis-
ting institutions and more focused on the observation of forms of knowledge and prac-
tices producing the problems of migration.
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Democracy describes power relations. e concept of a nation describes
a form of unity in the context of other unities. Both evolve in parallel to the
welfare state. e construct of a welfare state is the active agent, trying to im-
plement the modern promises of permanent economic growth, consumption
and wealth. A national social state (Balibar 2010: 25) represents the two sides
of state activity: the welfare state regulating social con licts and reproducing
the relations and means of production and the nation form (Balibar 2011),
which is the symbolic form of a both sacrificed and secularized unity.
is welfare state is far from being an universalistic form. Moreover, its
concrete spatial and historical shape depends on the societies’ mode of pro-
duction (e.g. fordistic and post-fordistic), the political system, the nation‘s
political parties and, last but not least, the economic growth (for an overview:
Myles and Quadagno 2002). e post-war Keynesian welfare state emerged as
an answer to the rise of socialist movements among industrial workers and in
the cold war against the socialist block. For some time in the post-war period,
it seemed to be the political solution for societal contradiction by successful-
ly regulating the con lict between labour and capital. At the same time, it
guaranteed the stability of a nation and linked social and political rights wi-
thin the institution of citizenship, thereby producing insiders and outsiders.
Rights, equality and social protection on the one hand and the expectation
of loyalty and obligation on the other hand mutually tie together state and
citizens (Bommes 1999: 125).
e welfare state‘s objective is less the legal term of the people than the
sociological and empirical term of the population (Foucault 2004b: 114). e
invention of the population is based on forms of statistical knowledge, pro-
ducing this empirical artefact in visualized numbers, curves and statistics.
Di ferently to the people or the nation, the governed population is subject to
multiple divisions, based on nationality, on gender, on age, or class compositi-
on as well as on di ferent territorial developments in segregated spaces (Jessop
2016: 35). e statistical observation of the population enables to handle and
govern objectives like birth rates, family structures, migration, education, vo-
cational training and so on. By governing the population, the welfare state
moderates chances of inclusion into and exclusion from the social systems
and legitimates itself with the objective to guarantee public wealth and social
equality between state citizens. While the welfare state legitimates itself with
the promise of growing wealth and equality, it is less interested in inequality
between the states. Moreover, the relative equality within the state makes the
inequality between the states invisible (Stichweh 1998: 51), as elected politici-
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ans are primary obliged to the well-being of their voters and not to the well-
being of the rest of the world. Enduring cross-border migration contradicts
the assignment of people to territorial states. Enduring cross-border mobility
brings the tension between insiders and outsiders into the nation state‘s ter-
ritory and points at the central tension between particularistic-social rights,
which are exclusively bounded by national membership, and the drivers pro-
ducing enduring cross-border mobility, such as post-colonial con licts and
international system of labour division.
e question of inclusion and exclusion in legal, political and social rights
is politically contested and historically alterable. Referring to the form of de-
mocracy, it arises questions of voting, representation and political inclusion
(Bausch 2015). Referring to the nation, it evokes questions of loyalty and unity.
Referring to the welfare state which governs the statistically produced popu-
lation based on economic knowledge (Foucault 2004a: 164-165), it induces a
debate about costs and benefits of migration, about push and pull factors
and about inequality between state citizens, immigrants and their descen-
dants. With this shortly outlined co-evolution of the nation form in mind,
the welfare state and the self-description as democracy, the following section
depicts an evolving system of di ferential inclusion not only between citizens
and non-citizens, but also between di ferent groups of migrants within the
state. ereby it focuses on legislation concerning refugees’ labor market ac-
cess and argues that welfare state refugee policies are following biopolitical
calculations. It also shows the outcome of these policies on a local level.
e research was conducted in three selected German municipalities
which di fer in their organizational framework to govern labor markets
and in their size. Finally, they are located in three di ferent federated states
(Bundesländer), with di fering legal responsibilities, policy objectives for
refugee integration and, last but not least, with varying resources of public
services. e eight expert interviews in each municipality (n=24) aim to
grasp the partly contradictory organizational rationalities and reactions on
forced migration. e research focusses on methods of coordinating federal
actors, like the local employment agency or the regional department of the
Federal Bureau of Migration and Refugees, with municipalities administra-
tion, such as the municipal immigration o fice (Kommunale Ausländerbehörde)
or integration o fices, and with the welfare market actors implementing
the integration courses or measures of activation. e selected data for
this contribution highlight questions of identifying and the contradictions
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and interplay between the local labor administration and the municipal
immigration o fices.
3. Border extensions: the case of labor market access of
refugees in Germany
e paradoxical nation form produces the problematization of immigration
that the national social state tries to solve and control at the same time. e
term »di ferential inclusion« describes the increase of »di ferentiation and
selectivity of human mobility« (Könönen 2018: 55; see also Morris 2010: 9-12).
is tendency can be observed in the evolution and growing complexity of im-
migration law. Immigration law assigns legal status, identities andmotives of
mobility based on the di ferentiation of citizens and aliens, and is thereby the
productive instrument to »categorize and individualize« (Balibar 2009) non-
citizens. At the same time, it extends external state borders into the inner si-
de of the nation state or the respective political union. is su fix is necessary
because the nation state´s migration policy – and by this, the immigration
law itself – became more and more part of inter-state formations reacting to
the mobility of world’s societies. In the German case, immigration law does
not consist in a single code, but in a complex intersection of legal spheres,
mainly the Residence Act (AufenhthG), the Asylum Law (AsylG), the Second,
the ird or the Eight Book of the Social Code (SGB II, III and VIII) and the
Asylum Seekers Benefit Act (AsylbLG). Figure 1 shows the di ferentiation of
legal residence status for foreigners, based on the attribution of motives to
enter the country.
3.1. From deterrence to managing migration
In this context, asylum is one attributed reason to achieve a residence permit.
Nowadays relevance of refugee law as a form of protection only makes sen-
se with the development of border and passports controls, visas restrictions
and an uprising technical infrastructure directed to control the population’s
movements (Behrman 2018; Behrman 2019: 284).
In the post-war era, asylum was based on the Art. 16, para. 2 cl 2 of the
German Constitution (Grundgesetz – GG), which provided protection against
political persecution, as well as on the Geneva Convention, which grants pro-
tection to people who have a »well-founded fear of being persecuted for rea-
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Figure 1: Attribution of motives to stay
Source: Author’s compilation based on Statistisches Bundesamt 2019 and BT-Drs
19/8258
sons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or
political opinion.«National as well as international law needs to be implemen-
ted. e set of laws, regulations, institutions and procedures that implement
asylum law in the Federal Republic of Germany can be called a system of asyl-
um enforcement. Under the circumstances of the old Art. 16 of the German
Constitution, the asylum enforcement system was the nation state’s singular
and probably failed instrument to control asylum migration. It relied on de-
terrence throughout mobility restrictions, work ban and a di ferentiation of
access into the social security systems. ese restrictive instruments should
avoid giving incentives to ›abuse‹ asylum. ese policies led to the paradox
situation that »the country with the world’s most liberal asylum law was also
the one with most illiberal asylum practice« (Joppke 1997: 294).
e growing numbers of asylum seekers in the course of the armed con-
licts in former Yugoslavia led not only to new debates about asylum, but also
to pogrom-like violent crimes and the so-called asylum compromise. With
the new version of Art. 16a of the GG, asylum grant no longer depends on the
light motive, but on the escape route. Art. 16a (2) of the GG cannot be invo-
ked by those who enter federal territory of a Member State of the EC (EU) or
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another third country in which the application of the Geneva Convention and
the European Convention onHuman Rights is ensured. is new regulation is
already applied in the context of the developing European migration policies
(Münch 2013: 76).
Within an emerging European migration law, the Maastricht Treaty did
not only transform former foreigners into union citizens with legal rights, a
certain degree of political rights and quite limited social rights; it also decla-
red asylum and migration policies to a matter of common interest. Within
the Amsterdam treaty, the member states committed themselves to develop
a Common European Asylum System. What we can observe evolving on a
European level since then, is an institutional architecture of making border,
which at the same time follows a certain rationality described as migration
management. is semantics indicates a significant shi t in migration poli-
cies, which from now on follows the two-folded aims to simultaneously com-
bat illegal migration and foster the wanted forms of migration (Buckel 2012:
90). e managerial semantics promises leadership, rationality, control, ef-
fectiveness and the problem-solving capacity. is new frame is due to the
realization that migration › lows‹ cannot be prevented by single nation states;
moreover, the mobility of world societies cannot and shall not be prevented
at all. e semantics of › lows‹ and ›waves‹ and other frequently water-related
metaphors show a rationality which is geared towards the naturalized popu-
lation (Meyer/Purtschert 2017: 156).
e opposite of controlled andmanagedmigration is uncontrolled migra-
tion. Uncontrolled migration is illegal migration, from people trying to reach
Europe in order to seek asylum or achieve another residence permit. e Eu-
ropean Visa policies, which have been designed with the Schengen Agree-
ment, are producing the › lows‹ of illegalized migration and made it impos-
sible to reach Europe via legal pathways. Uncontrolled migration is linked to
security issues (»heightened terrorist activities«; European Commission 2018:
6), to a lack of integration into the society (the problem of unity) and to the
›humanitarian e forts‹ to protect migrants from smugglers and other forms
of exploitation on their route.
e Migration Management rationality is astonishingly clear. Foucault
calls this kind of rationality and technique biopolitical. Biopolitics target on the
enhancement of the natural processes of the population. e natural proces-
ses of the population are determined by the reality of human beings who act
economically and who are coordinated by market mechanisms and exchange.
For the modern era, the market is the true reality of society (Vogl 2002: 371)
Borders of Citizenship? 135
and also the biopolitical knowledge is based economically. According to this
reality, biopolitical rationalities take care of every individual being (Foucault
1981) and thereby raise the productivity and strength of the body politics wi-
thin a hostile global environment. Biopolitics includes investment in the hu-
man capital of societies. As education, activation labor market measures or
preventive health promotion, immigration policies are a sort of investment
in societies’ collective human capital. Bröckling (2017: 333) recently quoted,
if life was subordinated to economic calculations, and became a function of
investment, disinvestment would be death. On the other hand, body politic
is permanently endangered by people who lack the capacity to integrate, who
cannot adapt to the shared life styles and mainly who are not expected to
meet the requirements of the market. is attribution intersects with racial
di ferentiations. ey can be observed on a global scale but also within the
European Union, where harsh divisions between wanted and unwanted (so
called poverty-driven) migration are constructed (Ulbricht 2017: 271). As out-
comes of colonial history, economic rationality and racist attributions aremu-
tually linked. In the case of Germany as in other western European countries
(La leur 2018), European freedom of movement is more and more problema-
tized as uncontrolled migration. is problematization leads to a legislation
limiting the access to social service in order to control movements with social
legislation and with restrictive local organizational practices (Riedner 2017:
101).
e technical and institutional outcome of this biopolitical rationality is a
multi-scaled apparatus dealing with immigration issues. In a functional way,
this apparatus is scientifically described as a multi-level governance system
?; in a more distanced sense it is grasped as a heteronomous migration re-
gime (Pott/Rasch/Wolf 2018). e theoretical framework of Governmentality
Studies degrades the state and also the evolving European state apparatus to
a set of technical instruments based on a political rationality. In consequence,
it is not »the old nation state« which tries to control the processes of borde-
ring, but an institutional ensemble of a supranational migration apparatus
consisting of diverse European authorities and jurisdictions, including not
only the European Union institutions or the administrations of the member
states, but also private actors (like formal or informal transport companies
and enterprises) and humanitarian agencies (de Genova 2017: 17). Most rese-
archers stress the nation state‘s loss of capacity to control migration within
this architecture, while it is rarely pointed out that this is more a transfor-
mation of exercising power than an attempt to abolish the claim to sovereign
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control. On the contrary, an »orderly management of migration lows« has to
be ensured. Sovereign control in this context means the attempt to extend the
governance of human mobility by the capability to institute, personalize and
interpellates human beings, and that depends on calculations concerning the
expectable exploitability of human capital.
e narrative of asylum misuse led to a set of administrative measures
that, still today, will not give disincentives for asylum migration (SVR 2019a:
71). Taking in account not only asylum and residence law, but also the di ferent
fields of social (mainly the books of the social code) and employment regulati-
on (BeschV), the processes of bordering do not only concern the nation state’s
or nowadays Europe’s external border, but also di ferent administrations and
levels within the nation states. e following section shows the intrastate at-
tempts to govern and to exploit human mobility and analyzes the relevant
legislative changes for asylum seekers concerning the labor-related issues.
3.2. Incentives and compulsions
Labor market access for refugees in Germany is caught between migration
policies and an activating labor market policy. Migration policies intend to
govern migration based on a push-pull model. In contrast to this, activation
policies rely on investment in human capital with the intention to produce a
self-responsible workforce that is not dependent on social benefits and try to
increase the labor market supply side.
Access to labor-related social services and to the labor market depends on
di ferent factors. e first of them is the outcome of the asylum procedure. It
is the Federal O fice for Migration and Refugees (BAMF) that decides in its re-
gional branches on the legal status of third country nationals in the FRG. It is
a filiated with theMinistry of the Interior and also organizes and implements
the federal language courses, so-called integration courses.2 e Janus-faced
Migration and Refugee O fice plays roles as gate keeper and as main actor to
provide the first step to an ideally modelled integration process (OECD 2017:
24).
2 This course is directed to all foreigners living in Germany. It includes language lear-
ning (normally 600h, or 900h or 400h) and an orientation part, which aims to provide
daily life skills and knowledge about the legal system (100h) (cf. Integration Course
Regulation – Integrationskursverordnung). The access is restricted to refugees with of-
ficially recognized status as refugees or refuges who are expected to be recognized (§
44 AufenthG).
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ere are mainly five possible outcomes of the asylum procedure: being
recognized as entitled to protection under
1. the Geneva Convention (§ 3 AsylG),
2. the asylum article (§16a GG) or
3. the subsidiary protection regime (§ 4 AsylG),
4. In addition, rejected asylum seekers can fall within the national ban on
deportation, or
5. their asylum application can be rejected and they are subject to deporta-
tion (see figure 3).
Most refugees are recognized under the Geneva Convention. e old Art. 16 of
the German Basic Law quantitatively no longer plays a role. Recognized asyl-
um seekers have full access to the labor market and to labor market measures.
e distinction between di ferent types of protection has only indirect conse-
quences, for example, being recognized under subsidiary protection hinders
family reunification (§ 140 (3) AufenthG) and the duration of the recognition
is first limited for one year.
e second crucial factor for the labor market access for refugees is the
duration of the stay. In this context, the European Reception Directive is the
most extensive European intervention into the national social state. Mem-
ber states obligate themselves to grant access to medical care and a human
standard of living. Labor market access must be granted not later than nine
months a ter the time of the application (Art. 15 Abs. 1, European Recepti-
on Directive). German legislation even reduced this time to three months (§
61 Abs. 2 AsylG), but not without making exceptions. § 61 Abs. 1 AsylG bans
people living in an initial reception center as well as people from secure sta-
tes of origin from access to labor. People who are not o ficially tolerated and
who shall be deported (60 000 persons) (SVR 2019b) are also under work ban.
ese prohibitions can contradict the Art. 15 of the Reception Directive.
e legislation responding to the forced migration in the years 2014 to
2016 tried to facilitate and accelerate labor market access for refugees. e
legal packages passed in 2015 and the following years are not easily to be ca-
tegorized as either being dominantly liberal or restrictive. Moreover, they in-
clude restrictive measures for some refugees and liberal measures for others.
ey
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• extended the list of secure states of origin (§ 61 (1) AsylG), from which
refugees have no chances to be granted asylum in Germany,
• opened legal pathways for people from Serbia, Montenegro, Albania,
Bosnian and Herzegovina to migrate with an existing contract for labor
purposes to Germany (26 Abs. 2 BeschV),
• invented the notion of the »good perspective to stay« that enables people
to participate at the integration course during the ongoing asylum pro-
cedure and to accelerate processes of language learning and, thereby, of
labor market integration.
e law liberalizes access to social services for asylum seekers who are expec-
ted to stay and who will be recognized as refugees; it is restrictive for asylum
seekers from countries with a recognition rate of less than 50 %.
e Integration Law of 2016, which is also a legal package concerning the
Second and the ird Book of the Social Code and the Residence Act as well
as the Asylum seekers benefit Act (AsylblG), is once more a combination of
pressure and incentive to act economically. It introduced
• an obligation to remain at the assigned place of residence for three years
(§ 12a AufenthG) and makes at the same time an exception for people who
work, study or start a vocational training. e residence obligation is in-
troduced because of spatial di ferentiation in Germany and the misgiving
that due to local housingmarkets, spatial segregationwould be intensified
(Bt-Drs. 18/8829, p: 3), although the positive e fects ofmobility restrictions
are scientifically doubted (IAB 2019).
• possibilities to reduce social benefits for asylum seekers and tolerated per-
sons if they do not cooperate (§ 1 (4 and 5) AslyblG).
• measures of activating labor market policies for rejected refugees.
• a permission to stay for the duration of an apprenticeship of three years
and for two more years of work.
e law of 2016 was revised in 2019. It extends the possibilities to acquire
a permanent residence permit in Germany through work. It points at the
increasing quantity of people who got their application for asylum rejected
but still stayed in Germany for di ferent reasons (IAB 2019). is a fects both
refugees who start a vocational training and tolerated refugees who are in
employment relationships and provide their own livelihood. is legislation
opens new pathways to acquire a permanent residence in Germany.
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e rejected asylum seekers, who are subject to deportation and who no-
netheless permanently live in Germany, are the most troublesome group of
third country nationals.
Figure 2: No residence permit
Source: Author’s compilation based on Statistisches Bundesamt 2019 and BT-Drs
19/8258.
ere are about 180 000 asylum seekers who are rejected and have a tem-
porary permission to stay. In addition to the 300 000 people who have an
authorization to stay in the country for the duration of the asylum procedu-
re, there are also 345 000 third-country nationals who have no permission to
stay (see Figure 3). ese people have no access to the integration courses.
ey remain within the asylum seekers benefit act and have no access to the
activating labor market measures of the local job centers.
e renewed law is dedicated to people who are well-integrated. In this
context, integration mainly stands for individual success in education and
work (Schammann 2017b: 751). While residence laws until now attributed the
motives to stay in Germany, it now establishes a new selectivity within these
causes. is selectivity is based on educational and economic capacity.Hannes
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Schamman (2017b) called this a meritocratic turnaround, now also present in
asylum policies.
e always two-sided legislation does not miss to implement repressi-
ve measures at the same time. Currently, a new legal package is negotiated
which aims to facilitate and accelerate deportations, e.g. in cases of substance
misuse or other crimes. e law mainly a fects people who do not coopera-
te with the administration in identifying them: »German authorities need to
know who resides in our [emphasis added] country. e obligation to present
a travel document has to be enforced, especially for tolerated refugees« (BMI
2019: 2).
e managing migration agenda interrelated with the discourses of de-
mographic change and the interest to increase the supply of workforce to the
labor market now also a fect the residence law for asylum seekers. e mul-
tiplication of entitlements to stay in Germany can be seen as borders within
the nation state, increasing the selectivity of asylum-related human mobility.
Recent legislation packages open the access to social services and labor for
people who have been assessed as worth investing in. In contrast to the gro-
wing complexity of the di ferent immigration-related legal spheres, the core
of this legislation is not very sophisticated at all. It follows a classical mo-
del of conditioning, i.e. it promises incentives to act in an expected manner
on the one hand and works with threats, compulsion and deportation on the
other hand. e Janus-faced migration apparatus fosters education and trai-
ning and enables people to live their lives in peace, democracy and wealth. At
the same time this apparatus works at the borders of legality, always trying
to expand these borders in order to push back illegal and useless lives. e
following section outlines the contradictions of these policies in focusing on
the legislation and on central local actors implementing this legislation for
people whose asylum application has been rejected.
4. Questions of identifying: Tolerated refugees between
the rationalities
A ter being recognized as a refugee, the asylum seekers fall under the juris-
diction/legislation of the Second Book of Social Code, mostly until they find
work. ere have been 990 000 people in February 2019, from whom 598 000
are capable to work (BA 2019: 14). All activating labor market measures are
now opened to them. It is important to recognize that tolerated refugees do
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not fall under the legislation of the Second Book of the Social Code (SGB II),
which provides basic income and tries to enable people to find work by indivi-
dual training. In contrast, tolerated refugees receive their basic income from
the municipalities and do not leave the jurisdiction of the Asylum Seekers
Benefits Act, so municipalities continue to be financially responsible for this
category of refugees. us, municipalities have to deal with the consequences
of restrictive national politics and implement integration policies besides the
policies of nation states (Scholten 2019). e following section shows how local
institutions deal with these persons.
e focus on local fields of labor and asylum (Etzold 2017) follows a gro-
wing interest in local varieties (Schammann 2017a) in order to grasp the com-
plex interplay of actors from di ferent policy fields in multi-scaled arrange-
ments. In a functional sense, research stresses the local capacities to solve
problems; in a more political sense, researchers emphasize the local auto-
nomy in shaping integration policies. »Solidarity Cities« give room to new
political ideas apart from nation states violence (Neumann 2019).
e following section depicts the core of control that is the power to decide
on and interpellate one’s identity. e chapter focuses on the labor-related role
of the municipal immigration o fices3 and thereby shows the tension between
migration policies and activating social policies.
Whilst the Federal O fice for Migration and Refugees (BAMF) decides on
the legal status of asylum seekers and organizes the integration courses as
well as other language learning measures, it is subject to the 16 federal sta-
tes (Länder) to implement the residence law. ey supervise the municipal
immigration o fices and determine the responsibilities to implement the fe-
deral law. e federal state of Bavaria, for example, organizes deportations
and is responsible for all rejected asylum seekers. In contrast, in the state of
North Rhine-Westphalia the municipal immigration o fices deal with these
issues (for example ZustVAuslR-BY; Zust AVO NRW).
ere are more than 500 municipal immigration o fices within the FRG,
which have, corresponding to the inhabitants and the local immigration sit-
uation, quite di ferent personnel resources (Bogumil/Hafner/Kastilian 2017:
29). ese organizations su fer from a structural personnel shortage. at is
due to the growing immigration-related tasks and the depicted di ferentia-
tion of motives to remain in Germany. As one local expert illustrates, it is hard
3 The municipal immigration o fice (Kommunale Ausländerbehörde) is quoted as MIO.
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to attract sta f to implement the residence law, which is for many administra-
tors less attractive than working in an integration‘-related field (Frankfurter
Rundschau 2019). At the same time, the residence law intersecting with labor
law is a complex and very unstable legal sphere. e legislative furor in the
field produces legal uncertainty. An expert quotes:
»A colleague compiled a list of all legislative changes within the last five
years. You have to say: that is unbelievable. At the beginning, one tried to
facilitate deportation; a terwards one tried to facilitate the possibilities to
stay. The Articles 25a and b were added to approve integration e forts. Well,
that is also some years ago now. That is all not stable over time. You can-
not say that the government tried to complicate the lives of foreigners. That
would not be true, moreover sometimes in this direction sometimes in an-
other direction. Overall: I cannot identify a direction within this legislation«
(MIO, June 2018).
Political legal activism, under pressure to prove the political ability to act, at
the same time produces uncertainty in law implementation. In this sense,
Eule (2017: 177) quotes that the municipal immigration o fices are not only a
crucial actor in the field but also – due to legislative uncertainty and their
decision-making scope – an unpredictable player.
Until 2005, it was only the labor administration who examined if the-
re were preferential applicants for a job vacancy which was to be filled by a
foreigner. is examination privileged nationals and European citizens and
aimed to prevent the labor market from wage reductions caused by immigra-
tion. Since the 2005 immigration law, the municipal immigration o fices have
to permit work for foreigners. at is a shi t in responsibilities from welfare
state actors to migration control actors (Goebel 2019: 109). Municipal immi-
gration o fices only consult the labor administration in select cases to verify
the labor market situation, but it is the immigration o fice which grants the
permit to work.
In the case of rejected refugees who are tolerated (§ 60 para. 2 AufenthG),
the employment legislation quotes that these persons can receive a work per-
mit a ter three months of residence within the FRG (§32BeschV). Mostly local
authorities grant this permit, because it reduces the costs for social bene-
fits that municipalities need to cover. On the other hand, by allowing rejected
refugees to work in Germany it becomes increasingly di ficult to deport them.
Deportation is the core of the BAMF decision. e longer people live and work
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in Germany, the harder it is to deport them. People acquire social rights, they
get children who are in school, they marry nationals or other foreigners with
possibly di fering legal status. In short: they integrate themselves into soci-
ety. In legal terms, this is taken into account as individual e forts to integrate
in society (§ 25a and § 25b AufenthG) and in luences the decision to deport
rejected refugees or to extend their toleration:
»Sure, if someone has been working in Germany for some seven or eight
years, it will be hard to deport this person. Normally we think, we can de-
port for two, maximum three years; if we don`t succeed within three years,
it will be hard to deport (MIO, June 2018)«
Identification is the crucial issue in this context and current legislationmainly
addresses this question. Within the 180 000 people who are tolerated, there
are about 74 000 people who have no identity papers and 72 000 people who
are tolerated out of unspecific »other reasons« (Bt-Drs. 19/8258: 38). Looking
at the 2018 refugee migration to Germany, we can observe that out of the 83
000 people who applied for asylum for the first time, there were 48 000 (or
54 %) without identity papers, coming e.g. from Nigeria, Iran or Afghanistan
(Bt-Drs. 19/8701). More than 90 % of refugees from these states of origin ar-
rive in Germany without identity papers. is is due to di ferent reasons, for
example, the lack of registration and passport systems, the loss of their pa-
pers en route to Europe – and it could also be a strategy to stay in Germany,
as the systems gives incentives to cover the identity:
»Well, that’s like it is: If people do not relinquish their identities, we cannot
deport but a terward these people will also not acquire a permanent per-
mission to stay. These people remain tolerated. When we find out who they
are, we`ll deport them, yes, I would say it is like this. Sure, this is contradic-
tory. It means in e fect they can receive a permission to stay, when we know
who they are. But the problem is: if we know who they are, we will deport
them« (MIO, January 2018).
e legal consequences are harsh. People are under employment ban, if the
reasons that prevent from deportation can be accounted to them (§ 60a para.
6 cl. 1 Nr. 2). In addition, these people have the obligation to stay at their at-
tributed places. ey have no chances to receive the mentioned toleration for
causes of vocational training or employment (see above). Until today, in some
cases the vocational training gave reason to receive a toleration status. e
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new legislation waives this opportunity (SVR 2019b) and quotes that, a ter fi-
nishing the vocational training, these people will still be obliged to clear their
identities. e newest legislation emphasizes that it is not worth disguising
identities and therefore gives incentives not to lie and implements restric-
tive measures based on a suspicion. is kind of messages sent in form of
deterrence did not prevent people to seek asylum in Germany until today. In
contrast: it institutionalizes exclusion and generates precarious immigrants.
However, the new legislation tries to specify what »collaboration« to clear
one’s identity means. It is a di ficult issue because people who led from their
country of origin normally cannot easily return and even the contact with an
embassy is not always reasonable. With this in mind, the scope of the decisi-
on of the municipal immigration o fice shi ts to the question whether a per-
son without identity papers fulfills the obligations of cooperation to clear the
identity. e local varieties of implementing these questions lead to further
e forts in some federal states to centralize migration policies (Niedersachsen
2019).
Other local players also observe this scope of decision. e local branch of
the Federal Employment Agency (BA) is the local labor o fice. It is responsi-
ble for the labor market integration of tolerated people as well as for people
who are expecting their asylum decision. e respective ird Book of the So-
cial Code defines its purposes as »the promotion of employment that should
counteract the emergence of unemployment, shorten the duration of unem-
ployment and support the balance of supply and demand in the education and
labor market« (§ 1 SGB III). Tolerated people need a permission to work from
the foreigners’ o fice:
»Sure, for tolerated refugees and these, who are still in the asylum proce-
dure, they have this clause in their papers, saying that the local immigra-
tion o fice needs to give permission to start working. Everybody is uncertain
in this issue. The applicants, the entrepreneurs, the voluntary-helpers, and
also, we are unsure. We never can precisely predict, if the immigration o fice
will give the permission. […] They began to rely on these identity questions
and they began to stress, that they do not open a perspective to stay, for peo-
ple they do not know who they are. There were some refugees, they started
their training yet and then, suddenly, the permission was not extended any
longer. Also, the work-permission: there were some people who have been
working for a year and then their permission to stay was not prolonged. That
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means we have people receiving social benefits and they want to work. I re-
ally do not understand it« (Public Employment Service, January 2018).
e velocity of legal chances in this field does not only produce an opacity of
decisions and actions and a certain degree of contingency in these decisions,
but also leads to structural mutual misunderstandings.
5. Conclusion
Di ferential inclusion is a concept to empirically grasp the proliferation of le-
gal status beside the normality of citizenship. is is necessary because the
various forms of inclusion and exclusion are becoming normality beside full
citizenship rights. Di ferential inclusion is not a new phenomenon, concer-
ning the continuity of di fering legal positions within a nation state as well
as the non-formal mechanisms of exclusion like ethnicity and gender. What
is new is the pluralization of legal status positioning caused by a growing
selectivity of human mobility. Economic calculations are the center part of
these biopolitical calculations. e local labor administration and the muni-
cipal immigration o fice are only two stakeholders with di fering legal bases
and organizational rationalities shaping the local fields of asylum and labor.
ey coproduce social policies (Bakoben et al. 2019) together with the local
branches of the Federal Migration and Refugee O fice, with social worker, vol-
unteers, teachers, security agencies, lawyers, economic actors who are very
interested in the labor force of refugees (especially the Chamber of Cra ts).
e local fields of labor and asylum are highly fragmented between di fering
rationalities and interests. e depicted rationality of identifying in order to
control migration and the activation paradigm is accompanied by the muni-
cipalities’ interest in integrating refugees to avoid social spending. It remains
a scientific task to empirically outline these overlapping and partly con licting
interests and rationalities within the local fields of labor and asylum.
e blindfold of these institutions – that means in this case the legal and
organization-centered concept of di ferential inclusions – is obvious. It em-
phasizes the productivity of immigration law but covers the multiple subject
positions and thereby the »subjective viewpoints of border crossing and strug-
gles« (Mezzadra/Neilson 2013: 166) completing the institutional side of di fe-
rential inclusion. Beside the historical dimension of the struggle for rights
(see Tischmeyer in this volume) and the state’s formal citizenship legislati-
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on (see Behrens in this volume) as well as the legislation beyond citizenship
which is shown in this contribution, it is the »enactments of citizenship« and
the political actions that appropriate legal and institutional frameworks for
one’s own purposes (see Rzadtki in this volume), completing a political un-
derstanding of citizenship.
However, the depicted biopolitical rationality and selectivity is far from
being an ›immigrant issue‹ only. e borders of citizenship and the legal pa-
thways in society are, in a figurative sense, the venue where the notion of
belonging is negotiated and where we can observe the human selectivity of
societies based on powerful self-descriptions of societies in economic terms.
Biopolitics a fect democratic institutions and thereby the institution of citi-
zenship in their core. Economic and biopolitical calculations do not answer
Kelsens (1963: 49) question »who actually belongs to the people« – which is
an eternal question of democracy – in legal terms. ey rely on unlimited
commodification and assess humans based on accounted exploitability. e
consequences of this contemporary transition from legally-oriented to econo-
my-based rationalities is hardly predictable, but like every hegemonic project
it is contested.
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Activist citizens beyond dichotomies:
Migrant rights activism in Hamburg
Lea Rzadtki
1. Introduction
Border, migration, and asylum policies have, over the last years, continued
to tighten dramatically (Ataç et al. 2015: 3; Lister 1997: 44; Nicholls/Uitermark
2017: 2f.; Schwenken/Ruß-Sattar 2014: 15f.). At the same time, refugees and
migrants are organizing themselves, protesting, and claiming rights on broa-
der scales (Johnson 2015: 5f.; McGuaran/Hudig 2014: 28; Nyers/Rygiel 2014:
204f.).While citizenship is o tenmerely addressed as a legal status, critical ci-
tizenship perspectives underline that citizenship is fundamentally about who
can be and who is framed as political (Rygiel et al. 2015: 4). ese perspectives
propose a decoupling of citizenship from the nation-state which, however,
does not mean that they ignore that the nation-state remains the dominant
empirical reality shaping citizenship (Brubaker 2015: 7). Instead, they reveal
that this link is not natural and can, therefore, be conceptually questioned (La-
zar/Nuijten 2013: 3). Critical citizenship approaches o ten explicitly focus on
non-citizens’ struggles over citizenship and, thereby, shi t attention to trans-
formations and appropriations of this concept.
In this chapter, I follow this direction by taking a closer look at migrant
rights groups in Hamburg. My empirical data show that these groups enga-
ge in more than just publicly visible protest actions and that they are more
heterogeneous than the o ten-formulated focus on non-citizens suggests.1 I
will conceptually develop these two observations with regards to citizenship:
exploring the relation between what is considered political and citizenship,
thereby further challenging the public/private dichotomy, and looking at how
1 In fact, this is why I refer to migrant rights as the more inclusive term beyond formal
categorizations.
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groups deal withmultiple internal di ferences,moving beyond the simplifying
German/refugee dichotomy. Subsequently, I will also link these observations
to existing literature dealing with similar dynamics, namely (Black and post
– colonial) feminist perspectives. Such theories have so far not been broadly
linked to critical citizenship studies and, even though my contribution can
only be a first step, it points out a direction that should be further explored.
2. Critical citizenship studies
Migration currently dominates public and academic debates. Even before re-
cent polarizations, particularly a ter the long summer ofmigration 2015, it has
o ten mainly been discussed as a problem that democratic nation-states face
(Rother 2016: 3). e focus has o ten been on how migration could be limited
(Earnest 2008; Hammar 1990), or on how (democratic) home and receiving
countries could handle its consequences (Benhabib 2004; Schulte 2009). Si-
multaneously, globalization and migration have been constructing di ferent
realities. Hammar introduced the notable concept of the »denizen« showing
one of such dilemmas in long-term residents not having basic political rights
(1990: 13). Perspectives, such as autonomy of migration, have been central in
criticizing such limiting views, based on the currently dominant restrictive
border regimes of the global North. Methodological nationalism is one cen-
tral critique: »As a result of methodological nationalism and the ethnic lens,
researchers o ten approach the terrain of the nation-state as a single homoge-
neous national culture, while defining a migrant population as a community
of culture, interest and identity« (Glick/Schiller 2012: 29). e supposedly in-
herent linkage of territory, cultural, and political community assumes nation-
states to be »bounded, autonomous and decontextualizable units« (Calhoun
1999: 218), thus, leaving it unquestioned as unit of analysis and defining em-
pirical frame (Castles/Davidson 2001: 15; Cohen 1999: 249). is is relevant for
the study of citizenship because such lenses take its linkage to the nation-
state for granted and conceptualize actors solely through their positioning
in this setting. erefore, Mikuszies et al. summarize the resulting need to
develop alternative perspectives raised by critical citizenship studies:
» e consensus of this debate is that a link of citizenship and ethnically-
founded nationality, going hand in hand with modern statehood, contributes
to migrants being excluded. is results in the need to develop new forms
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of citizenship to do justice in more inclusive ways to this changed situation«
(Mikuszies et al. 2010: 99 [Translated by the author]).
In fact, citizenship research has been engaged in exploring supranatio-
nal (Beck/Grande 2006; Borja 2000; Kochenov 2012; Shaw 2003), sub-natio-
nal (Hess/Lebuhn 2014; Kewes 2016; Purcell 2003; Smith/McQuarrie 2012), or
multi-layered models of citizenship (Nicholls 2013). Such foci open fruitful
debates on more inclusive models of citizenship and are explored in other
contributions in this edited volume. However, while these research strands
start to decouple citizenship from the nation, they mainly di ferentiate bet-
ween di ferent or shi t the debate to other policy levels. Critical citizenship
studies stand for questioning state-centered perspectives as such (Holston
1999b: 157; Köster-Eiserfunke et al. 2014). ey move beyond citizenship as a
legal status by shi ting the attention to migrants as political agents and, the-
refore, to their practices of citizenship (Holston 1999a: 1f.; Lazar/Nuijten 2013:
3; Nyers 2015: 34).
As discussed in the introduction to this volume, Engin Isin distinguishes
between three forms of citizenship. Citizenship as a status refers to formal ci-
tizenship and constructs exclusive categories of (non-)citizens (Isin 2008: 17).
Citizenship as habitus presupposes the legal definition but focuses on tradi-
tional political participation. According to Isin, habitus is the long-term ma-
king of citizens and, therefore, a passive »[acting] out already written scripts«
(2009: 381; 2008: 17). As opposed to this, acts of citizenship »create a scene«
(Isin 2009: 381). ey »[transform] subjects into claimants of rights over a
relatively short period of time« (Isin 2008: 17) and »break routines, under-
standings and practices« (Isin 2009: 379). rough such a conceptualization,
formal »non-citizens« can actually enact and transform citizenship because it
acknowledges that, just as the nation-state, citizenship is not a neutral con-
cept: »we think it is important to insist that the political and juridical inscrip-
tions of citizenship are the products of social, cultural, political and institu-
tional con licts and struggles« (Clarke et al. 2014: 104). So while it is, of course,
essential that there is research engaging in current regulatory systems, it is
as important not to ignore less institutionalized forms and imaginaries of ci-
tizenship. Nyers claims that rather than being about »expanding or widening
[…] the space of citizenship and belonging […], [migrant citizenships] indicate
that a significant, if uncertain, transformation has already occurred with this
basic political category« (2015: 34).
Increasingly, research on migrant rights struggles all over the world cap-
tures a political agency and relations mostly ignored by traditional views on
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citizenship, emphasizing citizenship as an unfinished transformative process
(Clarke et al. 2014: 177). Given that this is already a considerable step, I argue
that dynamics dealing with di ferences within thesemovements have received
little attention so far and still lack conceptualization. My aim is to contribu-
te to current critical citizenship debates by starting to link empirical obser-
vations of this to insights from (Black and post-colonial) feminist theories.
ese insights are o ten not explicitly integrated in current discussions on
citizenship because they are not focusing on migration. However, they ad-
dress similar dynamics of inequalities like the ones migrant rights groups are
facing so they can help to advance conceptualizations of citizenship in this
context as well.
3. Activism by, with, and for migrants
3.1. Methodology
is chapter is based on my dissertation research for which I follow a con-
structivist grounded theory methodology (GTM) a ter Charmaz (2014) and
Bryant (2017). eir constructivist approach emphasizes an interpretive phi-
losophical background, understanding data and analysis as socially construc-
ted and context-specific (Hildenbrand 2011: 556). Constructivist GTM is un-
derstood as a systematic, abductive, and comparative methodology aimed at
building middle-range theory (Bryant 2017: 89 f.; Peters 2014: 6). e abduc-
tive logic stands for a constant shi ting between data and theory, making the
approach neither purely inductive nor deductive (Bryant 2017: 278). Applying
this logic to my research, this means that I developed sensitizing concepts
based on a preliminary literature review which I used as starting points for
generating data. ese data were analyzed through di ferent coding techni-
ques which eventually involved their confrontation with existing literature.
Constant comparison, therefore, means that data generation and analysis in-
form each other (Bryant 2017: 200): Data are confronted with other data and
with theory, developing the analytical conceptualization. As a consequence,
in GTM, the conceptual and the empirical dimension are closely intertwined:
»in some sense, the researcher is simultaneously puzzling over empirical ma-
terials and theoretical literatures« (Schwartz-Shea/Yanow 2012: 27). In this
chapter, I develop two empirical and conceptual aspects from my doctoral
research and link them to existing literature.
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3.2. Field and case selection
My research focuses on activist groups engaged for migrant rights in Ham-
burg, Northern Germany. Hamburg has the second-biggest European port,
making it an important center of economic power and historically also one
of migration. Despite its partly very rich society, Hamburg has traditionally
been a social-democratic city but is also known for its radical le t neighbor-
hoods.With its about 1.8 million inhabitants it is a relevant urban metropolis
which »spatially concentrates« the resources and relations which movements
draw on (Nicholls/Uitermark 2017: 8).
For my research, I regularly accompanied three activist groups (and a few
more on an occasional basis) in their meetings and activities for two years
(2017-2019). My data consist of field notes from this participant observation
and twelve in-depth interviews with activists.2 Groups and interview partners
were selected purposively, based on the sensitizing concepts and my own po-
litical involvement. e size of the groups cannot be determined with precisi-
on. For regular meetings, there were usually between five and fi teen people.
e groups di fer in their concrete topical focus and forms of organizing3 but
they all engage for migrant rights, are or aim at being mixed with regards
to the legal status of the people involved, and explicitly consider themselves
political. e actual composition varies: one group focuses on women; anot-
her one is predominantly white German, most groups involve multiple kinds
of migrants. Both in regard to the activists involved in the groups and those
interviewed, there is a balanced range of legal status, age, race, and gender.4
2 When referencing my data, the systematization works as follows: »IDI« stands for in-
depth interview, followed by the participant (e.g. »IDI_P02«); »PO« means participant
observation, followed by group and fieldnote (e.g. »PO_G03_12«).
3 The majority of the groups is self-organized, i.e. they are no legal entity and run
through political engagement. One is a registered association including two part-time
paid positions.
4 Following Bakewell and Brubaker, I try to move »beyond categories« because o ten by
sorting people by categories, e.g. nationality, they are reduced to only one ascribed
identity (Bakewell 2008: 445; Brubaker 2013: 6). According to Holston, indeed, citi-
zenship has been established as one dominant categorization (1999a: 1f.). Here I most-
ly address people as »activist citizens« or »activists« in order to not reduce them to their
legal status. As this chapter is centrally about di ferences, that does not mean, howe-
ver, that I ignore the existence or significance of these categories. When using them, I
rather try to take a critical view on them.
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3.3. Positionality
Constructivist GTM is very apt for exploratory research of marginalized ac-
tivism. Ethical re lections about positionality, privilege, and relations bet-
ween researcher and participants are central to my research. Given the li-
mited extent of this chapter, I leave it at saying that I am trying to conduct
my research as critically self-re lexive as possible. I have gainedmany insights
from interpretive research, activist scholarship, participatory and ethnogra-
phic approaches, post-colonial and feminist theories but also, and particular-
ly, from conversations and discussions with and within the groups themsel-
ves. I am constantly re lecting and negotiating my position in and vis-à-vis
these groups as a white academic holding a German passport and an involved
activist.
4. Activist citizens re-negotiating citizenship
As previously discussed, critical citizenship studies have led to an increasing
awareness of how important it is to involve the perspectives of those exclu-
ded from citizenship.Most conceptual advances have beenmade by observing
the actual struggles over citizenship in societies, for instance by women and
Black civil rights activists. e latest focus on migrants builds on these con-
ceptual advancements but also brings new perspectives which still need fur-
ther exploration. In 2007 Lister observed that citizenship debates tend to be
very conceptual, identifying an »empirical void« (2007: 58). I would argue that
empirical engagement with the lived realities and struggles of migrants has
been constantly growing in the recent past. However, migrants are a group
that is o ten externally and internally excluded from citizenship, raising fur-
ther challenges, and their political struggle is much more diverse than o ten
depicted. In the following, I discuss how variety in activities and activists im-
pacts on our conceptual view of citizenship and how such a perspective can
be advanced by involving (post-colonial and Black) feminist theories.
4.1. Variety in activities: How everyday politics enable citizenship
When observing the activities of the migrant rights groups, it quickly beco-
mes clear that these go beyond classically »political« and partly blur with what
might be referred to as »social« ones. Groups engage in the traditional politi-
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cal dimension of the public. »Going outside«, »[making] the situation public,
[…] [giving] an awareness about the situation« are central concerns which are
classically aimed at through demonstrations, public events, or conferences
(IDI_P08, l. 113-131; IDI_P01, l. 474-479). Activists want to »[hold] up a mirror
to society« (IDI_P04, l. 596-604), »[transport] things publicly« (IDI_P06, l. 496-
508) but also mobilize people (PO_G06_05, l. 25-32). rough these societal
goals, activists engage in a reciprocal relationship with the state. ey make
direct demands to politicians, such as the closure of a certain camp, stopping
racist police controls, or obtaining freedom of movement (PO_G01_06, p.76;
PO_G01_17, p.99).
Simultaneously, groups and individuals are addressed by the state inmul-
tiple ways, making the relationality reciprocal: isolation (IDI_P15, l. 453-462),
criminalization (IDI_P03, l. 1244 f.), deportation (IDI_P01, l. 136-139; IDI_P06,
l. 745-749), or tightening of migration laws (IDI_P03, l. 901-905; IDI_P04, l.
428-441). Many activists distinguish this confrontational relationship to the
state from pure humanitarian work of other societal actors, which accord-
ing to them is unpolitical, uncritical (IDI_P06, l. 136-144; IDI_P08, l. 689-697;
PO_G06_01, p.73) and »moves within the limits of the law« (IDI_P03, l. 999-
1001). is statement underlines that migrants are o ten criminalized, poin-
ting out that what is termed social or humanitarian support adheres to given
rules and laws without questioning them. In this sense, some activists make
a clear distinction between what is political and what is not.
However, many activists simultaneously distinguish between social and
political work within their own group contexts. Social work, then, are ac-
tivities dealing with individual problems, i.e. support and care practices
(IDI_P03, l. 1017-1022; IDI_P08, l. 676-688). e di ference some activists
make is that their own social practices consciously undermine the current
state of things. Many activists clearly articulate that they see the conditions
in which migrants have to live as a purposefully imposed isolation by the
state (PO_G05_05, p.51). ey live in camps from various months to years,
which not only impedes them to live a normal life due to lack of privacy
and self-determined routines, but also makes it unlikely to properly arri-
ve in Hamburg through working, meeting locals, or learning German. So
providing housing, legal support, or language courses to (illegalized) people
becomes a direct challenge to the state (IDI_P01, l. 312-316; IDI_P03, 594-598;
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IDI_P04, l. 299-302). Most of the urgencies addressed like this are so basic
that addressing them becomes political in itself.5
Additionally, through spending time together, creating spaces to cook
or relax, the migrants’ structurally imposed isolation is undermined as well
(IDI_P11, l. 313-316; IDI_P14, l. 732-742; IDI_P15, l. 144-158; PO_G01_3, p. 18;
PO_G06_04, p. 17; PO_G09_02, l. 42-49). In that sense, giving people without
perspective some hope can be political: »It [our activities] cannot change
anythings. But … […] the people’s mood is become good and the people is
become […] hopeful« (IDI_P01, l. 279-284). One activist names these activities
»micro politics« (IDI_P14, l. 507). is underlines that the political action
in these contexts takes place on an everyday level that might o ten not be
identified as such. e classically vertical relationality of citizenship between
the state and the individual appears to be more complex when accepting this.
e empirical reality of a complex mixture of activities shows that it is
not enough to focus discussions about citizenship on legal rights claims. is
is also re lected in some publications which observe this dimension of ever-
yday politics as resisting or even undermining state (b)orders, defining them
as »invisible practices« (Ataç et al. 2015: 7), »imperceptible politics« (Köster-
Eiserfunke et al. 2014: 191f.), or »a wider collective practice that is transfor-
mative and underpinned by a logic of resistance« (Piacentini 2014: 177). Such
observations point out that a broader conceptual link of the political and ci-
tizenship is needed.
e employed vocabulary already emphasizes the proximity to feminist
struggles and theories of citizenship. Ruth Lister’s notion of a feminist per-
spective on inclusive citizenship is illuminating in this context: »A key tenet
of feminist citizenship theory is that understanding lived citizenship involves
a challenge to the public-private dichotomy that underpinned the traditional
association of citizenship with the public sphere« (2007: 55). She emphasizes
that feminist fights cannot take place without the ground-work of everyday
politics for satisfying »human needs« and, thereby, »[promoting] autonomy«
(Lister 1997: 16). Similarly, Martin et al. call for paying more attention to the
»social basis of political action, and to recognize otherwise-overlooked ac-
tions that create social change« (2007: 91). Kabeer argues that we should ge-
nerally take a more multi-dimensional view on rights. Especially concerning
5 Nevertheless, it is also important to underline that, especially for people in such condi-
tions, joining a group is not necessarily a political choice but one in search of concrete
support (IDI_P07, l. 257-266; IDI_P07, l. 312-317; IDI_P15, l. 209-220).
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citizenship debates, rights are o ten reduced to political and civil ones, as
opposed to social, economic, and cultural rights. Kabeer claims: »When they
[people] protest, their protests are not confined to one or the other of these
spheres, but tend to staddle them both« (2005: 15). ese feminist perspec-
tives on citizenship can easily be linked back to observations from my field
where one activist describes very vividly:
»We were very political but the people realized that we also need humani-
tarian support to sustain our fight. And you can see people try to open their
doors, you know, […] because they know that we need at least [a place] to sleep.
So […] in this sense you can say that the humanitarian support motivated our
political struggle« (IDI_P08, l. 680-685).
In the case of feminist fights, women were formally included but actually
excluded so that we can speak about an internal exclusion. is exclusion has
been famously revealed by the claim »the personal is political« (Hanisch 2006),
which broadens notions of the political: individual problems are structural.
When discussing citizenship in the context of migration, in addition to inter-
nal, there very obviously is also external, exclusion. People are excluded from
the categorization citizenship, or even more basically residency, and thereby
lack basic rights. e realization that individual problems actually have struc-
tural roots and are, thus, public in nature is one that explains the insistence of
activists to frame their social support activities as political as well (IDI_P06,
l. 483-491; IDI_P11, l. 476-479; IDI_P15, l. 592-602).
is does not mean that the political and citizenship should be con la-
ted. Indeed, Lister argues that citizenship is enacted publicly: »not all politics
necessarily counts as citizenship, for the latter, in its political sense, implies
active political participation, albeit broadly defined« (1997: 28). However, the
acts in less visible settings are still central to conceptions of citizenship as they
enable the political fight in the first place and question the status quo. Again,
it is Lister who observes that it might be less about the place where somebody
is acting and more about what the action is about and which consequences it
has (2007: 57). is fits to the notion that groups are doing more and less visi-
ble work simultaneously, meaning that for them, even though not the same, a
broad understanding of the political cannot be disentangled from citizenship:
»It’s that the human being is complex… and composed by all these things. And
[Name 76] also said that […] cooking is politics too. […] e human being eats
…, it needs friendships, relationships … and the human being has to realize
itself, right? So all of this comes in. All of this makes politics« (IDI_P17_1, l.
879-887 [Translated by the author]).
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Migrant rights activists engage in a wide range of activities, moving bey-
ond a dichotomy between public and private, which calls for a broadening of
the understanding of the political and results in being able to consider what
Isin terms acts of citizenship as citizenship at all. It should be explored further
how the di ferent dimensions of political action interact and can constitute
citizenship.
4.2. Intersection of differences: How inequalities shape citizenship
e migrant rights groups I have accompanied are composed of activists with
a variety of legal statuses (IDI_P06, l. 897-911; IDI_P11, l. 309-313; PO_G06_02,
p.15). is is the most visible and o ten defining of various di ferences in the
activist groups: It is not merely about distinguishing between Germans and
migrants, as there is a variety of migrants involved. ese include so-called
»regular migrants«, refugees formally granted asylum, and several illegalized
groups, to name just a few. is variety in statuses also results in very real
di ferences between these groups and their access to language classes, job
market, or other kinds of rights (IDI_P01, l. 556-571; IDI_P05, l. 1366-1382).
Supporting this notion, one activist underlines in a meeting: »It’s important
that it’s the system that is dividing people through di ferent treatments and
statuses« (PO_G02_06, p.68).
Similarly, someGerman activists are read asmigrants, based on their phy-
sical appearance, and thereby, experience racism and discrimination as well.
Moving beyond legal status, the activist groups are still highly diverse. Classi-
cal systems of oppression, such as race, gender, and class intersect with each
other, and are complemented by further di ferences in the context of these
activist groups. Next to having di ferent legal statuses, socio-economic, cul-
tural, and political backgrounds, activists also di fer in their aims, interests,
and necessities. Some activists point out how women are basically excluded
from activist groups because there is no childcare or due to the choice of
meeting places and times (IDI_P05, l. 818-825; IDI_P07, l. 49-55; PO_G06_02,
p.14). Language also emerges as a challenge because, even when interpretati-
on is organized, people depend on others, can only participate indirectly and
time-lagged (IDI_P06, 1021-1030; IDI_P14, l. 875-885; PO_G02_9, p.109). It oc-
curs that those in need of interpretation are seated in a corner in order not to
disturb the rest of the group, a practice which has been framed as »a symbo-
lic mechanism of exclusion« (PO_G02_9, p.110). Finally, local knowledge and
experience centrally determine how much someone depends on others:
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»[U]sually thesemeetings are pretty much… ›oh, we have these problems‹.
And then [how] can we fix it, and usually [it is] the Karto fel6 or the … […] so-
called supporters, activists, that have their contacts. And it’s really important
that they do … but I would like to get to a point where, as [Name 9] said […],
I don’t need to ask [Name 7] […] to write the [finance] application for me«
(IDI_P05, l. 867-874).
It is an expressed aim of the groups to work together on equal terms
(IDI_P06, l. 897-911; IDI_P08, l. 439-443; IDI_P11, l. 309-313; PO_G06_02, p.15).
is is most explicitly voiced concerning the interaction between Germans
and refugees but, as the previous examples have shown, it is not limited to
it. On the other side, legal status o ten concurs with many of these di feren-
ces so inequalities are constantly present in the groups.7 Actually challenging
them is di ficult because dependencies constantly reproduce power gaps and
hierarchies: »[T]hey [supporters] want to contribute and their contribution in
some ways might not be in the interest of the self-organized group, of the
refugees group« (IDI_P08, l. 355-369). To be able to challenge such dynamics,
intersectional di ferences have to be recognized: »we are all activists, but at
the same time we need to recognize certain things« (IDI_P05, l. 150-159).
My data show that some of these activist groups realize that they are re-
producing inequalities, for instance when not organizing interpretation or
childcare. Of course, in most cases they cannot undo the inequalities them-
selves but they can openly engage with the existing power structures and de-
velop strategies of alleviating them. Self-organization of refugees and mi-
grants, sometimes through settings which are exclusive to them, is one step
sometimes mentioned as empowering (IDI_P03, l. 317-325; IDI_P05, l. 1360-
1366; IDI_P08, l. 90-99; PO_G01_05, p. 49; PO_G02_5, p.51). One group started
to experiment with technical devices making interpretation a less excluding
process within the group conversation (PO_G01_33, l. 27-50). Another one de-
cided to buy speakers and an amplifier so that they were not dependent any-
more on other (German) groups providing them (PO_G02_07, p. 79). However,
such re lections are o ten »swallowed« by the emerging everyday urgencies.
6 Potato, used to refer to white Germans.
7 Nevertheless, there are examples to demonstrate that legal status is not the one and
only factor: It is o ten the migrants themselves who provide interpretation, local know-
ledge has to be acquired by everyone moving to Hamburg, Black people are not ne-
cessarily migrants, and a lack of childcare can also exclude German (single) parents.
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My empirical observations underline that there is a plurality of di feren-
ces within activist groups which intersect with each other, resulting in power
imbalances and challenges these groups are constantly struggling with. Ack-
nowledging but challenging the di ferences, one can say, captures the ways
these activist groups in Hamburg deal with their positionalities. Some to a
higher, some to a lesser extent, they engage in a continuous process of (re-
)negotiating possibilities and necessities. Some publications in studies of so-
cial movements and critical citizenship raise similar issues. Weldon argues
that internal politics are over-representing privileged instead of marginalized
groups in many movements (2011: 5). is is particularly central in struggles
over citizenship because migrants are externally and internally excluded and
work in highly heterogeneous constellations. Glöde and Böhlo acknowledge
the di ficulty which inequalities pose to joint political action (2015: 79), Fa-
daee critically re lects the dominance of European activists’ priorities (2015:
734). Kewes, Ataç, and Steinhilper emphasize problematic dependencies and
patronization (Ataç 2016: 642; Kewes 2016: 264; Steinhilper 2017: 81f.).
Black and post-colonial feminist perspectives o fer valuable insights into
such complex constellations of intersecting inequalities. e Combahee Ri-
ver collective strongly shows the di ferences within feminist but also Black
struggles by stating that »we have in many ways gone beyond white women’s
revelations because we are dealing with the implications of race and class as
well as sex« and by referring to negative reactions of Black men to Black fe-
minism (Combahee River Collective 1977). Ell Ooks argues similarly, showing
that it had first to be pointed out how »racism had shaped and informed
feminist theory and practice« (2000: 16). Today, intersectionality is an estab-
lished concept which captures the interaction of multiple power systems. It
also emerged from this increasing awareness for segmented life and move-
ment realities that imposing homogeneity to all people supposedly included
in a certain category or movement reproduces privileges and inequalities:
»[T]his interdependency between individual and group rights can o ten
serve to undermine the capacity of subordinated members of subordinated
groups to press for their individual rights when to do so appears to divide the
collective struggle for recognition or to play into hegemonic discourses which
denigrate such groups« (Kabeer 2005: 14).
Ünsal explicitly refers to migrant rights activism when she criticizes that
we mostly engage with the supporter/refugee distinction, ignoring intersec-
tional power structures: »We should respect the di ferent realities and reco-
gnize the discriminations in the movement« (2015: 15). Indeed, according to
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Lister, pretending unity without acknowledging di ferences »[reinforces] the
very exclusion against which these groups are fighting« (1997: 30). Overloo-
king that the migrant rights struggle is composed by a variety of di ferently
categorized people means marginalizing those su fering from essentializing
categories anyhow. ese insights from di ferent struggles call for a concep-
tualization of citizenship not only in its relationality between state and in-
dividual (Lister 1997: 3). Kabeer emphasizes a horizontal view of citizenship
as follows: »one which stresses that the relationship between citizens is at
least as important as the more traditional ›vertical‹ view of citizenship as the
relationship between the state and the individual« (2005: 23). What the fo-
cus on migrant rights groups adds is that this relationality expands beyond
the formal citizen. In all their diversity, the groups try to constructively deal
with inequalities and resulting hierarchies. Johnson describes this as mutual
recognition and solidarity: »It enables a relationship of mutual support and
protection that uses the security of the citizen, but does not reduce or subor-
dinate the power of themigrant« (2015: 16f.). is element ofmutual solidarity
is also re lected in a field note from a meeting: » en [Name 9] said […]: Ever-
ybody is giving and supporting with di ferent things so in the end it becomes
working together for a common goal« (PO_G06_02, p.12).
In aiming at this, it is central to recognize the intersectionality of di fe-
rent positions. It is not about a dichotomy that should be brought together but
about engaging with complex relationalities among individuals that act toge-
ther.While some positions might be specific to these migrant rights groups, I
argue that citizenship studies pay too little attention to groups’ internal com-
plexities and the resulting excluding dynamics. Feminist, Black, and post-co-
lonial perspectives have long emphasized the diverse nature of activist strug-
gles and intersectional identities and are, thus, a promising point of reference
that should be explored further in the current debates on citizenship.
5. Conclusion
Approaching discussions on citizenship throughmigrant rights groups clearly
has conceptual implications. As I have shown, critical perspectives have long
argued for less state-centered models and explicitly criticized the taken-for-
granted linkage between political agency and formal citizenship.What I hope
to have added through this contribution is,firstly, that looking at the everyday
reality of these activist struggles leads to a broader conceptualization of the
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political which enables us to better capture the range of activities discussed
as »acts of citizenship«. e vertical relationality between state and individual
becomes more complex from such a perspective. To frame individual support
politically means acknowledging personal situations as structural and, thus,
questioning current citizenship regimes further. Secondly, these struggles are
intersectionally heterogeneous contexts which are shaped by externally impo-
sed, essentializing categorizations that are reproduced in internal dynamics
of inequalities and exclusion. Exploring the ways through which groups deal
with this introduces a horizontal dimension of citizenship. By linking these
context-specific insights to existing literature from (Black and post-colonial)
feminist perspectives, we can start to intersectionally explore conceptualizati-
ons of citizenship beyond dichotomous distinctions of inclusion or exclusion.
erefore, I argue that it is reasonable to relate such perspectives more
systematically to migrant rights activism. Nevertheless, linking this to the li-
ved realities of activists is challenging because especially on an individual level
they are simultaneously fighting for – if not citizenship, then certainly for-
mal rights – and against citizenship in terms of current policies constituting
it (Erensu 2016: 665). erefore, I want to mention that conceptualizing such
struggles as citizenship does not help migrant activists: their real status does
not change. While they are addressed as activist citizens and conceptualized
as political actors, their precarious realities remain: people are transferred,
deported, discriminated. One could, then, question whether citizenship con-
stitutes the right frame of analysis for researching these struggles. However,
acknowledging the transformations of citizenship that feminist and Black ac-
tivists have already reached, adds an important corrective in that it reinforces
the observation that no concept of citizenship is ever fixed or neutral. Every
concept evolves over time and builds on others that are equally constructed. So
ultimately, I would argue that a conceptualization of these struggles through
citizenship, on the one hand, does justice to the truly inspiring agency these
people enact and, on the other hand, calls into question a dominant but con-
structed paradigm which completely shapes their lives. Stretching the con-
cept of citizenship in this way is essential for taking a critical stance on the
dominant supposedly neutral views underlying it.
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Who belongs to ›the people‹?
The societal boundaries of national and European
notions of citizenship
Carsten Wegscheider and Roula Nezi
1. Introduction
e process of European integration increasingly challenges the concept of
national citizenship through the development of a supranational citizenship
derived from countries’ membership in the European Union. While nation
states and borders gradually lose their political and societal significance, po-
licies aimed at deepening and promoting further integration give rise to a
backlash against the European Union. is backlash evolved around the si-
gnificance of national and European citizenship and is mainly related to the
conditions for belonging to ›the people‹.
Today’s concepts of citizenship distinguish between nation and state due
to the rise of supranational and multicultural states, where identities are de-
veloped alongside citizenship (McCrone/Kiely 2000). While this has not been
the case in the past, in contemporary democracies there is a clear distinc-
tion between citizenship and nationality. e concept of citizenship denotes
a person’s legal status and thus regulates the legal criteria and conditions for
the acquisition of citizenship. e concept of nationality, on the other hand,
refers to a person’s identity and thus to the subjective feeling and individual
construction of belonging. However, we know little about the extent to which
the citizens’ (political) identities in luence their attitudes towards and percep-
tions of di ferent notions of citizenship.
Previous research suggests two widespread notions of citizenship among
citizens – ethnic and civic –which are both related to the development of nati-
on states in Europe. e ethnic definition of citizenship considers ancestry as
themost important criterion for inclusion, and eventuallymembers of the na-
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tion share a common cultural heritage such as religious beliefs (Smith 1991). In
contrast, the civic definition entails that citizenship can be acquired through
e forts to join the group and adherence to legal norms (Reeskens/Hooghe
2010). For this reason, ethnic notions of citizenship tend to be considered
as highly exclusive: if you are not born into it (the country), you cannot acquire
it (Ignatie f 1994). is dichotomy of ethnic and civic notions of citizenship
can be transferred to both the national and the European level. ese di fe-
rences into citizens’ perceptions of symbolic boundaries1 are re lected upon
the legal criteria and prerequisites for obtaining citizenship, but also in the
societal and individual construction of (political) identities.
In our analysis we argue that citizen attitudes regarding requirements for
citizenship depend upon their political identity.
Accordingly, individuals with a strong national identity should support
restrictions on the conditions for acquiring citizenship at both the national
and the European level. Individuals with strong European identity should
support limitations at the European level. On the other hand, we expect that
the citizens’ sharing cosmopolitan views – people who emphasize equality
and oppose the idea of state borders – will reject both national and European
restrictions on the conditions for citizenship. To identify the societal bounda-
ries of the di ferent concepts of citizenship in European societies, we analyze
the causes of ethnic and civic notions of national and European citizenship
among citizens and provide an answer to the following question: what are the
causes of citizens’ ethnic and civic notions of national and European citizenship?
In our analysis we use data from the second pre-release of the European
Values Study (EVS) 2017, which covers 20member states of the European Uni-
on2. Using Bayesian hierarchical models, we examine the causes of ethnic
and civic notions of national and European citizenship. Our empirical results
confirm the importance of political identity for the support of restrictions on
the conditions for acquiring citizenship. While political identity determines
the support or rejection of national and European restrictions on citizenship,
social liberal values and anti-immigration attitudes are also very important
1 Symbolic boundaries are considered the lines that include and define some people,
groups, and things while excluding others (Epstein 1992: 232).
2 Though our initial goal was to include more waves and to extend the time span of our
analysis, unfortunately, previous waves do not include the battery of questions about
citizens` attitudes towards European citizenship.
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factors. Furthermore, the results suggest that both notions of European citi-
zenship are comparatively more inclusive to their national counterparts, alt-
hough the degree of inclusiveness is ultimately determined by the distinction
between the ethnic and civic dichotomy. is chapter is structured as follows:
In the next section, we brie ly review the literature on di ferent notions and
levels of citizenship and formulate our theoretical argument. Subsequently,
in the third section, we introduce the data and methods we are using. In the
fourth section, we present our empirical results, while we discuss the societal
and political implications of our findings in the final section.
2. Notions of citizenship
According to the basic assumption of political culture research, the stability of
a political system rests on the congruence between the political culture and in-
stitutionalized structures (Almond/Verba 1963) and is thus largely dependent
on the political support of its citizens (Easton 1965, 1975). A political system only
receives support if it is responsive to the political orientations and attitudes of
its citizens (Pickel/Pickel 2006, 2016). Besides their support for political autho-
rities and the political regime, a certain degree of social cohesion among citizens
and their willingness to collectively solve political problems is crucial for the
survivability of a political system (Easton 1965, 1975; Norris 1999, 2011). e
political system only receives support if the citizens’ ideas about the belon-
ging of certain groups to the people coincide with the actual composition of
society. Notwithstanding the importance of the concept of political community
for political culture research, there are di ferent ideas about who constitutes
a political community and how it should be defined.
In our analysis we define political community as a group of people who respect
commonly agreed habits of making and implementing political decisions (Deutsch
1954). is means, in other words, groups of people with a common sense
of belonging and obligations (Anderson 1991; Deutsch 1966; Wright 2011). e
immediate implication is that a political community and its social cohesion
are characterized by a shared sense of identity, and mutual loyalty among citizens
(Almond et al. 2008; Brubaker 2004). Social cohesion is thus based on a so-
cietal agreement on which social groups belong to the political community.
However, there are di ferent notions about what kind of boundaries these
imagined communities (Wright 2011) are based on and which criteria are used
to determine the belonging or exclusion of people.
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2.1. The national and European dimension of citizenship
Inmodern democracies, the symbolic boundaries and criteria by whichmem-
bership to a political community is regulated are inevitably linked to the con-
cept of citizenship (Simonsen/Bonikowski 2019). In addition to a bundle of
legal rights and (political) participation, citizenship regulates the belonging
of and the relationship between citizens and the political system (Bellamy,
Castiglione and Santoro 2004). ereby, the »socially constructed sameness«
(Kunovich 2009: 576) among the members of a political community can have
di ferent origins, forms and rules.
Since the contemporary political world is dominated by nation states, ac-
cess to state resources is primarily granted through national citizenship re-
gulations (Kunovich 2009). According to this traditional understanding, ci-
tizenship is tied to a historically grown national identity and defined by a com-
mon ethnicity, language, history, culture or the use of the same territorial area
(Almond et al. 2008). is inclusiveness and exclusiveness of national iden-
tity also illustrates the social closure of the concept of national citizenship
(Brubaker 1992).
While this may be true, the process of European integration increasingly
challenges the concept of national citizenship, with the aim of developing a
common European identity and thus a supranational citizenship (Nezi 2010;
Nezi 2009; Shore 2004). e European citizenship is linked to the idea of an
open and liberal society in which legal rights and political participation are
detached from the national identity, and citizenship is regulated by civil and
political norms rather than ethno-cultural criteria (Habermas 1992).
e European notion of citizenship meets the demands of cosmopolita-
nism – a worldview according to which all human beings belong to a single
community based on shared morality (Smith 1998). Cosmopolitans, as sup-
porters of the EU are o ten characterized, support a world without national
borders and emphasize the equality of all humans for which rights should
not be restricted based on certain individual characteristics (Merkel 2017). In
this regard, European citizenship enables the development of dual identities
and promotes integration and unity among European societies by breaking
down prejudices (Curtis 2014). At the same time, European citizenship on-
ly simulates an openness to the world, since the inclusion and exclusion of
people is simply raised to the level and borders of the European Union (Kun-
ovich 2009). For this reason, it is questionable whether European citizenship
is more inclusive compared to national approaches.
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e con lict between national and European notions of citizenship is par-
ticularly important in the light of recent political developments, especially
due to the backlash generated by the enforcement of European citizenship
(Brubaker 2017). is backlash fosters the rise of populist radical right par-
ties, who claim to bring power back to the national sovereign – ›the people‹.
Further to the political and societal con lict around the national and European
notions of citizenship, an additional con lict developed over the ethnic and civic
conditions associated with the democratic privilege of citizenship. In particu-
lar, liberal and authoritarian nativist ideas of citizenship compete with each
other.While political liberalism supports the idea of absorbing elements from
other cultural traditions and integrating di ferent ethnic groups, authoritari-
an nativism defines citizenship primarily through ethnic components and is
exclusive towards members of out-groups (Lubbers and Coenders 2017; Mud-
de 2007; Rydgren 2007).
2.2. The ethnic and civic dichotomy of citizenship
e societal con lict over the requirements for obtaining citizenship is based
on two fundamental principles and legal rights for the acquisition of citi-
zenship. e first one is the right of the soil, jus soli, according to which ci-
tizenship is granted to everyone born in the country, regardless of ethnicity.
According to the analysis by Brubaker (1992), France is a classic example of
a country following the principle of jus soli. In contrast, Germany is a clas-
sic example of a country following the principles of jus sanguinis – the law of
blood. In this case, citizenship can only be obtained if a person is of national
descent.
Previous research on nationalism suggested that citizens’ notions of citi-
zenship follow the principles of jus soli and jus sanguinis and can be distin-
guished between an ethnic and a civic dimension (Brubaker 1992; Kohn 1944;
Kunovich 2009; Reeskens/Hooghe 2010; Shulman 2002; Simonsen/Bonikow-
ski 2019). e ethnic notion of citizenship includes »relatively fixed attributes,
such as race, ethnicity, native-born status and national ancestry, as well as
deeply socialised cultural traits like religious beliefs« (Simonsen/Bonikowski
2019: 4). e civic notion of citizenship encompasses transformable and assi-
milating ideas such as respect for national political institutions and laws, ad-
aptation to cultural traditions or learning the national language (Lubbers/Co-
enders 2017; Simonsen/Bonikowski 2019; Smith 2001). ese self-conceptions
of collective in-group identity therefore include the symbolic boundaries and
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criteria for belonging to a nation (Bail 2008). However, these two dimensions
of citizenship are not necessarily mutually exclusive, because individuals may
hold both notions at the same time (Lubbers/Coenders 2017).
2.3. Hypotheses: Causes of notions of citizenship
In addition to the question on citizens’ perceptions of the requirements for
obtaining citizenship, there is also the question on the causes of the com-
peting perceptions of citizenship. Our main argument is that the societal
boundaries of notions of citizenship are based on individual political iden-
tities. e social identity theory (Tajfel 1982; Tajfel/Turner 1979) predicts that
identification with a particular group (in-group) strengthens negative attitu-
des towards members of what they define as an out-group. In our analysis,
we expect di ferent e fects of political identities on notions of national and
European citizenship:
We distinguish between three territorial levels individuals can identify
with; the national, the European and the global level. e national level refers
to the country in which a person lives (Lubbers/Coenders 2017; Smith 2007).
Individuals strongly identifying with their country are more likely to hold
negative attitudes towards people who do not hold the national citizenship.
Moreover, strong nationalist attitudes are also associated with the restriction
of certain groups on the European level to avoid jeopardizing national and
European homogeneity. erefore,we expect that citizens strongly identifyingwith
their country will also support limitations on the requirements for acquiring both the
national and the European citizenship, albeit with a stronger e fect at the national level
(H1a).
Due to the importance of the development of European integration, iden-
tification with Europe is our second political level. We expect people who
strongly identify with Europe to be more likely to stand up for an open and li-
beral (national) society compared to nationalists, since the idea of a European
identity corresponds more to the desire of a cosmopolitan society. On the
other hand, we expect that strong levels of identification with Europe also
lead to a desire to restrict the privilege of citizenship towards non-Europeans.
For these reasons, we expect that citizens identifying with Europe are more likely to
reject national restrictions on the conditions of acquiring citizenship, but more likely to
advocate requirements for obtaining European citizenship (H1b).
As a third political level, we refer to the identification with a cosmopolitan
global citizenship (Merkel 2017; Smith 1998). According to cosmopolitanism,
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all humans are equal and belong to a single community based on a commonly
shared morality. e idea of cosmopolitanism thus rejects (national) borders
and the exclusion of people on the basis of individual characteristics. In this
case, we expect that citizens identifying with the world are more likely to reject any
limitation of the conditions for acquiring national and European citizenship (H1c).
Based on a social-psychological perspective, we control for social iden-
tities which also distinguish between us and the supposed others. Drawing
on the approach of social capital, social trust in in-groups and out-groups
are suitable indicators for the binding and bridging of social capital (Put-
nam 2001). While strong in-group trust is positively associated with a sense
of community within a group, strong out-group trust also strengthens the
bridging between social groups with di ferent characteristics. us, in-group
trust should be associated with negative attitudes towards members of out-
groups, while out-group trust should increase tolerance towards out-groups.
Accordingly, we expect that people with high levels of in-group trust are more likely
to support restrictions on national and European citizenship, while people with high
out-group trust should be more likely to reject restrictions on national and European
citizenship (H2).
Previous research has already shown that nationalism is accompanied by
prejudice, xenophobia and racism (Brubaker 1992; Kunovich 2009). However,
populist radical right parties o ten argue that they are the defenders of social
liberal values against the treat of immigration. In fact, their authoritarian and
nativist ideology also contradicts these values, and these parties o ten repre-
sent illiberal values themselves (Akkerman 2005; Brubaker 2017; Mudde 2007;
Rydgren 2007). Accordingly, citizens with positive attitudes towards immi-
gration and supporting social liberal values, such as gender equality and gay
rights, should be more likely to be tolerant towards members of out-groups
(Heinisch/Wegscheider 2020; Stark et al. 2017). erefore, we expect citizens
with negative attitudes towards immigration to support restrictions of the conditions
for national and European citizenship, while citizens with social liberal values reject
these restrictions (H3).
3. Research design
In our analysis, we use data from the second pre-release of the fi th wave
of the European Values Study (EVS 2019). is data covers 37.277 European
citizens from 20 member states of the European Union: Austria, Bulgaria,
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Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Hun-
gary, Italy, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia,
Spain, Sweden, and Great Britain. is latest version of the EVS o fers the op-
portunity to analyze individual attitudes towards citizenship at the national
and the European level.
Ourmain dependent variablesmeasure the ethnic and civic dimensions of
national and European citizenship. Respondents were asked on a four-point-
scale to express their own views on how important they consider to be certain
characteristics of belonging to their country or to Europe. To analyze the eth-
nic notion of national citizenship, we use questions measuring the importan-
ce of having been born in the country and having country’s ancestry3. In addition
to the equivalent questions relating to Europe, which are used to construct
the ethnic notion of European citizenship, we also included a question on re-
ligious identity in our analysis. Existing research has demonstrated the im-
portance of religion and especially of Christianity at the European level for
ethnic attributions (Brubaker 2017). e above-mentioned questions measure
the importance of being born in Europe, having European ancestries, and being a
Christian4.
To develop a more comprehensive model, we included two additional de-
pendent variables analyzing the civic dimensions of national and European
citizenship. e national dimension of civic citizenship consists of threemea-
sures gauging the importance of respecting the country’s political institutions and
laws, speaking the national language, and sharing the national culture. e civic di-
mension of European citizenship is constructed based on a measure asking
respondents how important it is in their view to share the European culture.
Multidimensional phenomena such as citizenship are o ten di ficult to
measure accurately, because they are characterized by a wide range of di-
mensions. e civic dimension of citizenship, for example, consists of three
indicators that are not ranked in any particular order – political instituti-
ons and laws, the national language, and the national culture. ese three
dimensions should be combined into a single indicator that measures indi-
vidual attitudes towards the national dimension of civic citizenship. In soci-
3 The exact wording of the question is the following: Some people say the following
things are important for being truly [NATIONALITY]. Others say they are not im-
portant. How important do you think each of the following is?
4 People di fer in what they think it means to be European. In your view, how important
is each of the following to be European?
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al sciences, this is typically achieved by index construction. Indices combine
indicators representing di ferent dimensions of the same phenomenon. e-
re are two main approaches to index construction; the addition of variables
and the reduction of variables (Reckien 2018). In our analysis, we follow the
approach of the addition of variables and only consider variables that have
been identified as in luential in already existing studies (Brubaker 1992; Ku-
novich 2009; Reeskens/Hooghe 2010; Shulman 2002; Simonsen/Bonikowski
2019). ese variables are then summed up and normalized (Reckien 2018).
With response to our research question, we included variables measuring
the concepts of attachment with the country, Europe and the world, social identity,
anti-immigration attitudes and social liberal values.Tomeasure the level of attach-
ment with their country, Europe and the world, we use a series of variables
measuring how close respondents feel to their country, Europe and the world5.
Furthermore, we add a dichotomous variable indicating whether the respon-
dent has the nationality of the country or not6.
Social identity is operationalized by a battery of questions asking howmuch
people trust the so-called in-groups and out-groups7. We measure in-group
trust through the respondents’ trust in their family, people in their neighborhood,
and people they know personally. In contrast, we measure out-group trust as the
respondents’ trust in people they meet for the first time, people of another religion
and people of another nationality. Anti-immigration attitudes are measured using a
battery of questions asking whether immigrants take away jobs from nationals,
make crime problems worse, and are a strain on a country’s welfare system8. For
5 People have di ferent views about themselves and how they relate to the world. Using
this card, would you tell me how close do you feel to…?
6 Do you have [COUNTRY’S] nationality?
7 I would like to ask you how much you trust people from various groups. Could you tell
me for each whether you trust people from this group completely, somewhat, not very
much or not at all?
8 Please look at the following statements and indicate where you would place your views
on this scale?
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social liberal values, we use attitudes towards gender equality9 and whether re-
spondents consider homosexuality, abortion, and divorce as always justifiable10.
All measures included in the analysis are re-coded so that positive values
indicate that the phenomenon under study is present. To provide a detailed
example, when we construct an index to measure the level of support for gen-
der equality, positive values indicate that the respondent price gender equality
as very important. e same logic holds for the index measuring anti-immi-
gration attitudes; higher values indicate that the individual holds negative
attitudes towards immigration.
In addition to the indices described above, we include a series of variables
proven to have a strong impact on how citizens define citizenship. Existing
studies have stressed the importance of political ideology and education. As a
proxy for political ideology, we use the le t-right sale11 and for education the
highest formally completed level of education12. Furthermore, we control for
the age, income, and gender of the respondent13.
In our analysis, we move beyond existing scholarship in comparative po-
litics by employing a Bayesian hierarchical model. Bayesian approaches have
several advantages, especially when individual attitudes are nested within
countries. is is especially the case when the number of countries included
in the analysis is less than 20, as in our analysis (Stegmueller 2013).
To test our hypotheses, we use a linear hierarchical model where indivi-
duals are nested within countries. To statistically acknowledge the di ferences
among the included countries, we use a varying intercept model. We use the
so-called non-informative prior distributions, meaning that our model utilizes
the data to inform the model and to estimate each parameter14. e mathe-
9 For each of the following statements I read out, can you tell me how strongly you agree
or disagree with each. Do you strongly agree, agree, disagree, or strongly disagree? A
man’s job is to earn money; a woman’s job is to look a ter the home and family; On
the whole, men make better political leaders than women do; A university education
is more important for a boy than for a girl; On the whole, men make better business
executives than women do.
10 Please tell me for each of the following whether you think it can always be justified,
never be justified, or something in between, using this card.
11 In political matters, people talk of »the le t« and »the right«. How would you place your
views on this scale, generally speaking?
12 What is the highest educational level that you have attained?
13 This dummy has the value one for a female respondent.
14 Additionally, the regression coe ficient β is given a normal prior distribution with a
mean value of 0 and a standard deviation of 1.
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matical equation yij αj + βxij + ij represents the linear model where y is our
dependent variable, denotes the constant term of the regression that is va-
rying across countries (j), x represents the respective independent variable
measured at the individual level (i), while ε represents the error term.
4. Empirical results
Our results from the Bayesian hierarchical models are visually presented in
Figures 1 and 215. Figure 1 presents the determinants of ethnic and civic noti-
ons of national citizenship. Based on our literature review, we expected that
citizens strongly identifying with their country will also support restrictions
on the requirements for acquiring national and European citizenship (H1a).
e results suggest that, as expected, national identity, operationalized as the
level of attachment to the country, is an important determinant for both the
ethnic and civic components of national citizenship. From the three levels of
identity considered – national, European and the world – only the variables at
the national level are statistically significant for both dimensions of national
citizenship. While, contrary to our expectations, European identity shows no
significant results (H1b), people who identify with the world are less likely to
advocate restrictions on national citizenship based on ethnic characteristics
(H1c).
With respect to our hypothesis related to the social identity theory (H2),
our results confirm that the level of identification with in-groups and out-
groups in luences perceptions towards citizenship. Individuals who express
higher levels of trust to their in-groups are in favor of restrictions on citi-
zenship. Individuals expressing high levels of trust in out-groups reject these
restrictions. From this perspective, citizens who hold a nationalist notion of
citizenship strongly identify with their in-groups while showing a high level
of detachment from out-groups.
15 In the Appendix we included a series of tables reporting the coe ficients associated to
our models.
16 Notes: Plots show standardized coe ficients from Bayesian hierarchical models and
95 % credible intervals. See online appendix for full tables and results (Tables 1 and
2). If the interval crosses the horizontal line drawn at 0 in the horizontal axis, it
means that the estimated coe ficient is not significant.
17 Notes: Plots show standardized coe ficients from Bayesian hierarchical models and
95 % credible intervals. See online appendix for full tables and results (Tables 3
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Figure 1: Explaining notions of national citizenship
Source: Own compilation16. Data: European Values Study (EVS 2019).
Anti-immigration attitudes are considered a very strong component of
nationalism with coe ficients of 0.2 for the ethnic and 0.1 for the civic di-
mension of national citizenship. Accordingly, it is important for people who
and 4). If the interval crosses the horizontal line drawn at 0 in the horizontal axis, it
means that the estimated coe ficient is not significant.
Who belongs to ›the people‹? 185
Figure 2: Explaining notions of European citizenship
Source: Own compilation17. Data: European Values Study (EVS 2019).
hold negative attitudes towards migration that the barriers to acquire natio-
nal citizenship are very high, regardless of whether the conditions are eth-
nic or civic. Anti-immigration attitudes are also an important component of
right-wing ideology and nationalism, and this relationship is also re lected
in the strong negative relationship of nationalism with social liberal values
and attitudes towards gender equality. While people with progressive attitu-
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des towards social liberal values and gender equality are less likely to support
ethnic conditions for acquiring national citizenship, the e fects for civic noti-
ons are less pronounced for social liberal values and not significant for attitu-
des towards gender equality (H3). us, it can be concluded from this analysis
that the civic dimension of national citizenship is more inclusive than ethnic
notions, at least in relative terms.
Figure 2 illustrates the results of ourmodels analyzing the ethnic and civic
notions of European citizenship. Our analysis suggests that the determinants
of citizenship are similar at both levels of analysis – national and European.
e most important di ference is that individuals expressing a strong Eu-
ropean identity tend to bemore likely to hold ethnic and civic notions towards
European citizenship. is confirms our assumption that the European di-
mensions of citizenship are similarly exclusive, and that exclusion is transpo-
sed on the European level (H1b). As expected, strong levels of identification
with citizens’ respective country are associated with higher levels of exclusion
at the European level (H1a). While the e fect of identification with the world
is not significant for the civic notion, we see that people who have a global
identity are less likely to support ethnic conditions for European citizenship
(H1c).
Compared with the results for ethnic and civic notions of national citi-
zenship,wefind similar results for the e fects of the levels of trust in in-groups
and out-groups, anti-immigration attitudes as well as attitudes towards gen-
der equality and social liberal values on the respective European dimension.
We constantly observe the same patterns for the European notions of citi-
zenship as for the national ones. Conservative values (H3) and the demarcati-
on against members of out-groups (H2) go hand in hand with the support for
people’s exclusion due to certain characteristics from acquiring citizenship.
However, while our findings confirm that civic beliefs towards citizenship are
less exclusive compared to ethnic ones, our results also suggest that European
notions of citizenship are more inclusive compared to their national counter-
parts.
e results displayed in Figures 1 and 2 confirm our first hypothesis (H1)
regarding the e fect of political identity: People strongly identifying with their
country are more likely to support restrictions of the conditions for national
and European citizenship, with a stronger e fect at the national level (H1a).
Furthermore, citizens who identify with Europe are more likely to advocate
exclusion at the European level, while we do not find any significant e fec-
ts at the national level (H1b). In contrast, our findings for the cosmopolitan
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world view are statistically significant only for the ethnic dimension of natio-
nal and European citizenship and partly confirm our expectation that people
who identify with the world are less likely to support any restrictions on na-
tional and European citizenship (H1c).
Our analysis confirms that people with strong levels of trust in in-groups
are more likely to support restrictions on national and European citizenship,
while people with high trust in out-groups aremore likely to reject restrictions
on national and European citizenship (H2). Furthermore, anti-immigration
attitudes are strongly related to the support of ethnic and civic restrictions
of national and European citizenship, in contrast to those expressing liberal
ideas (H3).
5. Conclusion and discussion
e purpose of this study was to examine the causes of ethnic and civic no-
tions of citizenship at two discrete levels of identification – the national and
the European. We argued that each notion of citizenship is present at the
national and the supranational level and that political identity determines
the support or rejection of restrictions on citizenship at the respective le-
vel. While the ethnic notion of citizenship includes relatively fixed attribu-
tes such as national descent (Simonsen and Bonikowski 2019), civic notions
encompass transformable and assimilating ideas of inclusion (Lubbers and
Coenders 2017; Simonsen and Bonikowski 2019; Smith 2001).
To test our hypotheses, we used recent data from the European Values
Study 2017 (EVS 2019) covering 20 member states of the European Union and
employed Bayesian hierarchical models to provide robust results. Our empi-
rical results suggest that political identity matters for supporting restrictions
to citizenship. Individuals with a strong national identity support restriction
of citizenship at both national and European level, while individuals with a
strong European identity support restriction of citizenship at the European
level. From this perspective, both levels of citizenship are exclusionary.Howe-
ver, conservative values and anti-immigration attitudes are more important
for holding restrictive notions of citizenship. Our findings suggest that Eu-
ropean concepts of citizenship are more inclusive than their national coun-
terparts, but that exclusiveness is rather based on the distinction between the
ethnic and civic dichotomy.
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Our results thus illustrate two important findings: First, restrictions on
citizenship, whether at the national or at the European level, are always as-
sociated with an exclusionary mindset that contradicts the idea of an open
and liberal society. Second, while civic notions are more inclusive than ethnic
notions of citizenship, both ideas are exclusive in absolute terms. It is the-
refore necessary to develop concepts of citizenship that include a liberal and
open world view and do not exclude specific groups based on certain charac-
teristics, thereby jeopardizing the social cohesion of a political community,
whether organized at the national or supranational level.
Important questions for further research include the analysis of the in-
clusiveness and exclusiveness of the civic and European dimensions. Another
important question relates to the notions of citizenship that people represent
with cosmopolitan world views. Furthermore, the question arises whether
authoritarian ideas are related to certain notions of citizenship, and whe-
ther concepts of citizenship which are also represented by di ferent political
parties in luence the voting behavior of individuals. us, this analysis pro-
vides an important approach for future research on the societal and political
implications of the concepts of nationalism and citizenship.
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Migration has a structuring and transforming e fect on societies. Structu-
ring in the way that the political collective is formed by a new composition.
Transforming, as the demands placed on the political system are more he-
terogeneous. Especially the (new) composition of the political community on
territorially constituted borders can have far-reaching consequences for libe-
ral democracies (Foroutan 2019: 144). Even with a critical perspective, nations
are necessary in the contemporary situation because transnational democra-
cy or supranational democracy do not work (Fukuyama 2018). In less critical
position, studies show that democracies need national identity to be able to
operate (Eger/Valdez 2015; Helbing 2009; Manent 2013). Democracy is based
on solidarity in the community and one of the historically dominant sources
of group formation work through national identification (Pickel/Pickel 2018).
erefore, every construction of a perceived ingroup is linked to the exclusi-
on of a perceived outgroup (Tajfel/Turner 1979). Exclusive and discriminatory
forms of nationalism are not conducive to liberal democracy. Hence, the fol-
lowing question arises: What does the construction of the ingroup mean for
democratic values? As the dependent variable, liberal-democratic regime sup-
port is at the centre of the analysis.1
1 Special thanks go to Cemal Öztürk for the permanent constructive discussion, especi-
ally in the conceptualisation of the dependent variable.
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e normative-theoretical position is that democratic societies function
based onmutual recognition of their members as free and equal citizens (Ha-
bermas 1998) ,which includes supposed others such asmigrants, homosexuals
or women, and o fers possibilities to combine political culture research and
the theory of social identity.While the former argues that an indicator – iden-
tification with the national political community – provides information about
the cohesion of a society (Pickel/Pickel 2018), the latter cognitive-psychologi-
cal approach (Tajfel/Turner 1979) assumes a fundamental distinction between
»us« and the supposed »others«. Based on these considerations, the following
research question is examined: How do including and excluding ideas of iden-
tity, trust, and belonging a fect democratic value orientation of EU citizens?
EU countries were selected based on the essentially normative principles such
as human rights, liberal freedoms, respect for human dignity and the princi-
ples of equality and solidarity. ese guiding principles serve both as internal
self-assurance and as an external maxim for action (Schneider 2015: 313). Va-
rying reactions of (potential) immigrant societies – during the most recent
migration movement in 2015 – emerge from di ferent community concepti-
ons which function as identity markers and in luence the construction of a
perceived in- and outgroup. e main hypothesis assumes that exclusionary
ideas of community – regarding identity, trust and belonging – promote the
rejection of democratic values and thus endanger the political support for a
democracy of the people. Additional independent variables focus on the re-
lationships between resentments towards migrants, homosexuals as well as
gender equality and the suspected lower democratic orientation of the peop-
le. e analysis is based on the pre-release data of the European Value Study
2017 (EVS) and includes the following 20 member states: Austria, Bulgaria,
Croatia, the Czech Republic, Denmark, United Kingdom, Estonia, Finland,
France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Lithuania, Netherlands, Poland, Romania,
Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, and Sweden. e results of descriptive statistics,
correlations, and country-spread OLS-regressions are expected to re lect the
link between political communities and their importance for liberal-demo-
cratic regime support.
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2. Understanding democratic citizenship as liberal-democratic
regime support and socio-psychological sources
From the perspective of political culture research, I will develop a conceptu-
al approach for the anthology topic of democratic citizenship. First of all, it
seems useful to clarify the term »citizenship« and link it to other terms and
concepts like denizenship (Hammar 1990; Turner 2016) and democratic value
orientation (Welzel/Alvarez 2014).
Citizenship is primarily understood as a mechanism of legal equality in
which a state »formally defines its citizenry, publically identifying a set of
persons as its members and residually designating all others as noncitizens,
or aliens« (Brubaker 1992: 21). With the identification of members and non-
members, citizenship is both internally inclusive and externally exclusive. As
an institution, it is an instrument of social closure.However, nation-states are
not only home to their »own« citizens. Immigrants, regardless of the reasons
for migration, are residents as well and become part of the system and politi-
cal unity, for example by paying taxes. ese considerations refer to the terri-
torial closure associated with citizenship (Brubaker 1992: 23, 27). e inclusion
of non-members as denizens is an essential element of democratic states and
for a democratic understanding of citizenship.
»The concept of denizenship is a serviceable addition to the array of concepts
describing the ambiguities of modern social and political membership (…).
More precisely, denizens, as migrants, are o ten more dependent on human
rights and not citizenship for protection« (Turner 2016: 687).
e crucial di ference between citizens and denizens is the necessity of resi-
dence. Denizens are simply described as someone who lives in a certain place
and thus presupposes the presence in the country while being a citizen of a
nation is rather a characteristic of a person who remains even in absentia.
e concept of denizenship o ten refers to members of the country who are
already considered members because of their status as permanent residents.
Kymlicka and Norman (2000) correctly point out that citizenship within the
framework of democratic theories is not limited to the formal status of a per-
son and the resulting full membership in a community. If one follows Isin’s
(2008) view in the context of democratic theories, democratic citizenship can
be divided into three areas: In addition to formal status, the concept can also
cover political acts and habitus (see also the editors’ introduction). Political act
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refers to the use of political privileges, which are provided by the residence
in the territorial area or by the formal status. Habitus is defined according to
Bourdieu (2002: 27) »as a system of dispositions, that is of permanent man-
ners of being, seeing, acting and thinking, or a system of long-lasting (rather
than permanent) schemes or schemata or structures of perception, concepti-
on and action«.
e focus on habitus underlines the compatibility to the concept of politi-
cal culture. eories of political culture research share the view that function-
ing democratic systems are bound to cultural conditions and cannot be based
solely on the presence and e fect of democratic institutions (Fuchs 2002). A
persistent system is assumed if there is a congruent relationship between po-
litical culture and political structure. According to this paradigmatic assump-
tion, the political system needs a suitable socio-psychological substructure,
i.e. a democratic habitus (Almond/Verba 1963). us, the stability of a politi-
cal system is largely dependent on the political support of its citizens (Easton
1965, 1975).
Political culture is understood as »the particular distribution of patterns
of orientation towards political objects among the members of the nation«
(Almond/Verba 1963). erefore, citizens of a certain community and their do-
minant attitudes, norms and value orientations towards the political system
are at the centre of attention (Pickel/Pickel 2006). Dimensions of orientati-
on can be a fective (emotion), cognitive (knowledge) and evaluative (rating).
e political system is divided into three objects: the political community, the
political regime, and the political authorities. is study is located between
the poles of the community and the regime. While the independent variable
focusses on a community level (in more detail below), the dependent variable
focuses on the regime and three types of orientation towards the regime.
ere is controversy as to how citizens’ attitudes towards democracy can
be conceptualised and empirically measured. For a long time, there has been
a tradition of asking citizens in representative polls whether »democracy« is
their preferred political system (for an exception see: Klingemann 1999). is
procedure has been increasingly because several studies show that advocacy
of democracy does not necessarily mean acceptance of democratic norms –
such as freedom, equality, and the rule of law (Lauth 2004; also Cho 2015;
Welzel/Alvarez 2014). is scepticism is also based on empirical evidence re-
lated to the rhetoric of contemporary populists and autocrats: ey no longer
openly campaign against democracy. Rather, it has become their approach to
adopt the concept of democracy and to reinterpret it in an authoritarian way.
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Vladimir Putin’s »sovereign« democracy is one of the best-known examples.
Victor Orban’s »illiberal« democracy since 2014 shows that this trend is pre-
sent in Europe as well (Puddington 2017).
e simplified question of the advocacy of democracy is likely to be a
matter of lip service (Inglehart 2003: 51). Political culture research needs a
normative point of reference when it comes to conceiving democratic value
orientation. Otherwise, there is a risk of producing empirical artefacts and
encouraging problematic social diagnoses. In the short term, the advocacy of
a democratic political system is a necessary, but not su ficient, condition for
the genuine support of democracy. e normative point of reference chosen to
validate the democratic self-location of individuals is the liberal-democratic
basic order of a political system.
Analyses of democratic values increasingly focus on citizens’ understan-
ding of democracy and resulted in four notions like types of democratic con-
cepts (Pickel 2017; Welzel/Kirsch 2017). e liberal and social notations are
compatible with democratic theory (Rawls 1971; Dahl 1972; Held 2006). e
remaining two notations are the authoritarian and populist notation. Liberal
Democracy is the dominant form, the opposite of which is an authoritarian
democracy. In concepts of the understanding of democracy, authoritarian and
liberal notations are used as subtypes of a democratic understanding of de-
mocracy (Welzel/Alvarez 2014). ere are, however, many arguments against
this perception. ese primarily include the underlying normative point of
reference, the lack of a link to democratic theories, and finally the empirical
argument of an authoritarian redefinition of democracy. erefore,we submit
the liberal notation to correction by »subtracting« the authoritarian content.2
e last argument refers to the need for political support (Easton 1965,
1975). Unconditional political trust or satisfaction with the regime is not de-
sirable if democratic ideas may be unfulfilled by the regime: »[T]he tensions
between ideals and reality are essentially healthy for the future of democratic
governance, since this indicates the emergence of more ›critical citizens‹, or
›dissatisfied democrats‹« (Norris 2011). Critical citizens, although they consi-
der the existing structures of a representative government to be upgradeable,
are strongly oriented towards democratic values. Democratic values combine
2 Populist and social notations can also be included in liberal notation, but this will not
be discussed empirically. While a social adds another dimension to the liberal nota-
tion, namely the outcome dimension, populism is a challenging form, but not a non-
democratic one as the authoritarian notation (Welzel/Alvarez 2014).
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»people’s democratic desires with (1) a more liberal understanding of what
democracy means and (2) a more critical assessment of how democratic their
society actually is« (Welzel/Alvarez 2014). Based on these considerations, this
paper focuses on a critical-liberal desire for democracy by members of the
nation. is type of democratic value orientation consists of three elements: 1) the ad-
vocacy of a democracy, 2a) the internalisation of the democratic meta-norms of liberal
democracy, and 2b) a strict rejection of authoritarian systems of order (Norris 2011; Pi-
ckel/Pickel 2006; Lauth 2004), as well as 3) a critical satisfaction with the system in the
sense of critical citizens.
e present conception of democratic citizenship is best suited to cover
the area of habitus. Given the fact that the political act is not considered, the
formal status is irrelevant for the theoretical development of democratic ci-
tizens. People classified as democratic citizens can (but do not have to) have
formal citizenship, and thus benefit from equal rights or are politically active
in order to change the situation.3 In this theoretical conceptualisation, deni-
zens are classified as members of the nation. Consequently, everybody is a
member of the nation by residence within the territorial borders. Democra-
tic citizenship, in contrast, is nothing more than a democratic habitus that is
empirically manifested in liberal-democratic regime support.
e democratic quality of a society only becomes noticeable through plu-
rality. Migration stands for a visible form of this plurality. e normative-
theoretical position states that democratic societies function based on the
mutual recognition of their members as free and equal citizens (Habermaas
1998), which includes supposed others such as migrants, homosexuals or wo-
men. Socio-psychological research concentrates on the dynamics of inter-
group relationships. For many studies on prejudice, discrimination, and in-
group or exclusion dynamics, the social categorisation process of the theory
of social identity serves as a starting point (Tajfel/Turner 1979). Prejudice can
be understood as »an antipathy based on faulty and in lexible generalisation.
It may be felt or expressed. It may be directed toward a group as a whole,
or toward an individual because he is a member of the group« (Allport 1954:
9). Every construction of an ingroup goes along with the identification of an
outgroup. e democratic challenge is to avoid discriminatory processes and
define more inclusive belongings.
3 Regarding the editors‹ introduction, the understanding developed here can ideally be
assigned to the area of a democratic resident.
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According to political culture research, one indicator – the identification
with the national political community – provides information about the co-
hesion of a society (Pickel/Pickel 2018) and thus contributes to the stability
of a democratic system (Mummendey et al. 2001: 159). In contrast, prejudi-
ce research suggests that a higher national identification can (but does not
necessarily) lead to a degradation of other national, ethnic or cultural groups
(Hopkins 2001; Pehrson et al. 2009). How can external boundaries be over-
come if they are important for collective identities, and if »the others« are
already members of the political community as denizens? It is important to
consider whether national identification and related kinds of belonging fa-
vour a shi t away from democratic value orientation (Helbing 2009).
Nations are imaginary communities that manifest themselves in indi-
viduals in a fective attitudes to collective symbols, language, history, and
traditions (Anderson 1991; Brubaker 1992). e »we«-feeling delimits the
political culture of a nation, region or municipality (Elkins/Simeon 1979;
Werz/Koschkar 2016). Any construction of boundaries is an imagination
that includes some people and excludes others. National identity defines
the boundaries of the political community (Yuval-Davis 2011: 26). Strong
identification with the nation is called nationalism (Mummendey et al. 2001:
160)4. us, national identification is accompanied by a determination of
»we« and »them« and is oriented towards so-called social locations. »Request
of belonging that relate to social locations – origin, ›race‹, place of birth –
would be the most racialised and the least permeable« (Yuval-Davis 2011:
30). is creates a tension between national identification and democratic
value orientation (Pehrson et al. 2009). It is assumed that nationalist indi-
viduals tend to prefer exclusive rather than inclusive group identities (Gat
2012; Hjerm 1998; Welzel/Inglehart 2008). e di ferentiation refers to the
permeability that is set as a benchmark for »the others« in the sense of
belonging. In other words, it means that an exclusive understanding is based
on characteristics that cannot be fulfilled by migrants and can therefore be
classified as ethnocentric, e.g., ancestry and place of birth. In contrast to
4 The distinction between nationalism and patriotism is o ten introduced in debates on
national identity (van der Zwet 2015). Patriotism, in comparison, is claimed to have a
more inclusive sense of belonging; the conceptualisation shows a certain similarity to
the framework of the presented democratic orientation. National identity cannot be
used to measure patriotism, because »[p]atriotism is not necessarily directed toward
a nation-state (Kelman 1997: 166).
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that, inclusive group identities generally tend to focus on respect for political
institutions as well as on speaking the national language and are traits that
can be acquired (Helbing 2009).
H1: The more individuals tend towards nationalism, the lower their support
for democratic value orientation.
H2a: The more individuals tend to have an inclusive sense of belonging, the
stronger their support for democratic value orientation.
H2b: The more individuals tend to have an exclusive sense of belonging, the
lower their support for democratic value orientation.
Recognizing that the so-called »others«, through their residence within na-
tional territorial borders, are part of the political entity, they must be con-
sidered. Political communities are characterised as »that aspect of a political
system that consists of its members seen as a group of persons bound to-
gether by a political division of labour« (Easton 1965: 177). is willingness is
closely related to interpersonal trust, which Putnam calls social capital (Put-
nam 1993:36). However, interpersonal trust has di ferent nuances.
»In-group trust is limited to people with whom one has some familiarity,
be it on the basis of kinship, acquaintance, or neighbourhood. Out-group
trust relates to people whom one does not know or who di fer by origin, like
national or religious origin-two of the most powerful sources of collective
identity formation« (Gat 2012, quoted from: (Welzel/Delhey 2015).
It is argued that ingroup-trust is a necessary but not su ficient condition for
outgroup-trust. erefore, only in the context of the consideration of out-
group-trust, the relevance of trust for democratic value orientation becomes
apparent.
H3: The more individuals tend to trust outgroups, the stronger their support
for democratic value orientation.
Various studies show that identification with the we-group does not automat-
ically lead to a negative perception of outgroups. Furthermore, there might
be di ferent e fects for di ferent groups. For example, when di ferentiating
between di ferent religious groups, Islam or Muslims are o ten perceived as
more threatening in comparison to other religions Pickel 2018). e Inte-
grated reat eory (Stephan/Stephan 2006) postulates prominently that
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threat perceptions themselves play a decisive role in the genesis of prejudice.
At its core, the Integrated reat eory assumes that so-called realistic and
symbolic threat perceptions can favour prejudice against outgroups. A realis-
tic perception of threat is based on the perception that the »others« endan-
ger the physical and material well-being of one’s own group. For symbolic
threat perceptions, outgroups are perceived as a danger to one’s own cultural
and moral concepts and value orientation (Stephan/Stephan 1985). ese per-
ceptions of threats represent resentments towards migrants. It should be ex-
amined whether these perceptions of threats also favour a renunciation of
democracy.
H4: Individuals who have a tendency towards resentments of immigrants
also tend to have lower support for democratic value orientation.
e previous considerations result from exclusion mechanisms to presum-
ably »others«. Studies on group-related enmity assume a syndrome because
enmity towards ethnic groups goes along with enmity towards other groups
(Zick et al. 2008). Migrants and especially Muslims are o ten considered to be
opponents of gay rights and gender equality. Sometimes this is also used as a
pretext to legitimise one’s own antipathy towards Muslims. is is one char-
acteristic of the self-serving bias of prejudice and racism. Yet, anti-plural-
ism ideologies can also be directed internally against social groups instead of
ethnic groups. In that case, the resentments are also directed against homo-
sexuals and gender equality (Takács/Szalma 2011). ese two explanatory fac-
tors are also taken into consideration as alternative explanatory approaches,
which are also based on an ideology of inequality. It is assumed that by an
ideology of unequal value, citizens are likely to turn away from democratic
value orientation.
H5: Individuals who tend to hold anti-gay attitudes also tend to have lower
support for democratic value orientation.
H6: Individuals who tend to hold anti-gender-equality attitudes also tend to
show lower support for democratic value orientation.
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3. Research design: Data, operationalisation
and methodological approach
e empirical analysis is based on the European Value Study (EVS 2019). e
survey displays the tension between nationalism and democratic value ori-
entations for the following 20 EU member states: Austria, Bulgaria, Croatia,
the Czech Republic, Denmark, the UK, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany,
Hungary, Italy, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slo-
venia, Spain, and Sweden. All surveys were conducted between June 29, 2017,
and January 30, 2019. ey cover a sample of 37.277 respondents (EVS 2019).
Even if not all EU countries can be observed, at least the presented theoretical
concept can be tested empirically with the data set. e concept argues that
democratic orientation depends on questions of identification, trust, and be-
longing. According to political culture research, it is of course also possible
that orientation towards the regime in luence orientation towards the politi-
cal community and thus identification, trust and belonging, but this is usually
conceptualised as a feedback e fect later on (Pickel/Pickel 2006: 144).
Before I describe the operationalisation of the previously latent construc-
ts, I would like to point out that all scales were normalised to a range between
0 and 1. Di ferent decimals are shown depending on the scale level (e.g. 4 and
5 scales). However, the minimum of the scale was 0, the maximum 1. Using
normalisation as a method presents several advantages: For example, it per-
mits to compare non-standardised regression coe ficients (Welzel 2013: 64).
e analysis focuses on democratic value orientation as the dependent
variable of this analysis. Starting with democratic citizenship, the critical li-
beral support of democracy was theoretically identified. To investigate the de-
sire for democracy, the EVS contains the following question: »How important
is it for you to live in a country that is governed democratically?« (0=not at all im-
portant; 1=very important). However, this question does not measure the ci-
tizens’ commitment to democracy reliably. An additional way to capture de-
mocratic value orientation is the measurement of the liberal understanding
of democracy by including items on the characteristics, norms, and values of
democracy. ree items provide information about a liberal understanding of
democracy: 1) »characteristic for democracy is that people choose their leaders in free
elections«, 2) »civil rights protect people from state oppression«, and 3) »women have
the same rights« (all: 0=it is against democracy; 1=an essential characteristic of
democracy). ese items form the so-called Liberal Understanding of Democracy
Index (liberal notation).
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Second, the EVS also allows investigating the so-called authoritarian no-
tation. is is covered by the three other items, namely 1) »characteristic for
democracy is that religious authorities ultimately interpret the law«, 2) »the army ta-
kes over when government is incompetent«, and 3) »people obey their rules«(all: 0=it
is against democracy; 1=an essential characteristic of democracy). ese three
statements constitute another index that stands for an authoritarian under-
standing of democracy. A ter calculating the scores for each notation, the
scores of the authoritarian notation were subtracted from the scores of the
liberal notation. e resulting scale provides more reliable information on
the support for liberal democracy.
Finally, the analysis focuses on the discussion of critical support for liberal
democracy. For this purpose, the Liberal Democracy Index (Vdem) was inte-
grated into the dataset as another variable. Within this index, each country
was evaluated externally by a group of experts, resulting in a rating between
0 and 1 for its quality of democracy (Coppedge et al. 2019: 40). e citizens’
assessment of »how democratically is this country being governed today« (0=not at
all democratic; 1=completely democratic) was subtracted from the value of
the expert opinion on the question »to what extent is the ideal of liberal demo-
cracy achieved«(0=low; 1=high). Starting from the theoretical assumption of a
critical-liberal desire for democracy, the three scales were summarised multi-
plicatively. is procedure corresponds to the weakest link approach. Individual
support for democratic value orientation is thus determined by its weakest
pillar (Welzel 2013:63).
e central independent variables of the empirical analysis are national
identity as well as inclusive and exclusive ideas of belonging since nationa-
lism leads to a distinction between »us« and »them«. Several survey items
capture aspects of nationalism, such as »how proud are you to be a [Country] ci-
tizen« (0=not at all proud; 1=very proud). Moreover, it is crucial to measure
how inclusive or exclusive belonging to the nation is understood (»Please indi-
cate how important this is to be truly [Nationality]«). e following two questions
record inclusive ideas of belonging: »To respect [Country]‹s political institutions
and laws«; and »To be able to speak [the national language]«. Another two items
(»To have been born in [Country]«; and »To have [country]‹s ancestry«) record ex-
clusive ideas of belonging (all: 0=not at all important; 1=very important). e
respective two questions were combined in an additive index.
Trust is an important indicator when it comes to the willingness to enga-
ge politically or socially with persons from »outgroups« (Putnam 1993). Based
on theoretical considerations on the di ferent ranges of interpersonal trust,
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the variable »trust in supposed outgroups« was introduced into the analy-
sis (Welzel/Delhey 2015). For this purpose, the following items were utilised:
»How far do you trust people you meet for the first time«, »people of another religion«,
and »people of another nationality« (all: 0=do not trust at all; 1=trust completely).
e three items were combined to form an additive index.
e Integrated reat eory (e.g. Stephan/Stephan 2006) attributes a de-
cisive role in the threat experience of individuals for the genesis of prejudice
and exclusion mechanisms. e subjective assessment that »immigrants take
away jobs from nationals«, »immigrants increase crime problems«, »immigrants are
a strain on the welfare system«(0=immigrants do not or are not…; 1=immigrants
make or are…) and of »How would you evaluate the impact of [the immigrants] on
the development of [your country]?« (0=very good; 1=very bad) were combined to
form an additive index of resentment towards migrants.
Conforming to the argument that marginalisation of groups weakens de-
mocracy, two other social groups were identified, namely homosexuals and
women. Both groups are part of ingroups. However, they are both socially
marginalised. To measure anti-gay attitudes, respondents were asked whe-
ther they »don’t like homosexual as neighbours« (0=not mentioned; 1=mentio-
ned), whether they consider »homosexual couples as good parents as other couples«
(0=disagree strongly; 1=agree strongly), and whether they »justify homosexuali-
ty« (0=always; 1=never). An additive index was also created from these items.
e second marginalisation category refers to gender equality. To track
anti-gender-equality attitudes, the following six items were combined into an
index: »women really want home and children«, »family life su fers when awoman has
a full-time job«, »a man’s job is to earn money and a woman’s job is to look a ter home
and family«, »menmake better political leaders than women«, »university education is
more important for a boy than for a girl«, and »men make better business executives
than women« (0=disagree strongly; 1=agree strongly).
Socio-structural characteristics also seem to have an in luence on demo-
cratic orientation in addition to identity, trust and a sense of belonging. Com-
mon features in the context of research on intergroup relations or prejudice
research and on democratic support are age, gender, income and/or educati-
on and formal citizenship or migration background (Cho 2015; Pehrson et al.
2009). e gender of respondents is determined by the variable gender (1=male;
0=female). Formal citizenship is determined by the variable citizenship (0=not
a formal citizenship; 1=formal citizenship). e formal education level is in-
cluded in the analysis by using education (0=less than primary; 1=doctoral or
equivalent). e variable income (0=1st decile; 1=10th decile) is available for re-
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cording income. e Age (1=oldest respondent; 0=youngest respondent) of the
respondents was considered as last control variable in the analysis.
In the empirical part of this paper, themean values for the items above are
presented. ey provide a first impression of the social climate in the coun-
tries included in the analysis. In a second step, I approach the bivariate relati-
onship between nationalism and democratic value orientation with grouped
box plots. In order to analyse the robustness of the presumed tension between
nationalism, ideas of belonging and democratic value orientation, I present
the results of several OLS regressions by country. ese include the alternati-
ve explanatory factors of socio-psychological prejudice research 8kleinbaum
et al. 2013).
4. Empirical evidence: What impacts the democratic value
orientation of EU citizens?
Before moving to the inferential statistical analysis, descriptive statistics will
provide an overview of the social climate in the selected EU countries and the
EU as a whole. Table 1 shows a broad consensus regarding the importance of
living in a democracy: 92.7 % of EU citizens prefer to live in a democracy.
However, as expected, the level of satisfaction with democracy in one’s
own country is lower (67.1 %). It also reveals that a liberal notation of demo-
cracy seems to be well-established. Nearly 90 % of the respondents believe
both that democracies are characterised by the choice of leaders through free
elections and that women and men enjoy the same rights. 82.8 % of EU ci-
tizens also regard the protection of people against state repression as a cha-
racteristic of democratic systems. However, authoritarian notations are also
classified as democratic. Almost one in four persons (23.3 %) believes that an
army takeover in case of government failure is democratic. Likewise, 36.9 %
assume that people should obey their rulers. e religious authorities (14.6 %)
are rated much lower as a characteristic of democracy. Looking at nationa-
lism and an exclusive sense of belonging, the results show that the majority
of citizens are proud to be a citizen of their country (87.5 %). Furthermore,
more than half of the respondents find that ancestry is decisive for true mem-
bership. 60.1 % of the EU population believes that it is necessary to be born in
the country for being a true national.
Table 1 does not specify the di ferences across countries. e visualisation
using box plots (figure 1) depicts the dispersion in addition to mean values
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Table 1: Distribution of democratic value orientation and nationalism
Source: EVS 2019, own calculation and illustration, Agreement rate in % of.
of the critical-liberal desire for democracy, di ferentiated according to na-
tionalist attitudes. Figure 1 plots the degree of democratic value orientation
between the extremes of identifying and not identifying with the nation. In
this way, the tension between nationalism and democracy is depicted.
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Figure 1: Critical-liberal desire for democracy and nationalism among EU member
states
Source: EVS 2019, own calculation and illustration.
In most countries, there is a discrepancy between the democratic value
orientation of individuals who tend towards nationalist attitudes and indivi-
duals who do not identify with the nation. As Figure 1 illustrates, the mean
value of democratic value orientation of people not identifyingwith the nation
is higher compared to those who do identify with the nation (H1). e di fe-
rences are especially pronounced in Croatia, France, Hungary, Poland, Slova-
kia, Spain and the United Kingdom; whereas they are smaller in Denmark,
Estonia, Germany, Romania, and Sweden. e observation displays that the
phenomenon is not concentrated in particular EUmember states.However, in
several countries (such as Austria, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Italy, Lithua-
nia, and the Netherlands) it is also visible that there are no major di ferences
between the two groups in terms of their democratic value orientation. is
leads to the conclusion that nationalism is not a su ficient condition for the
absence of democratic value orientation, but in most cases does not contri-
bute to democratic value orientation. Slovenia and Finland are exceptions to
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this observation, although the di ferences between the groups are not high.
In Finland, in particular, a considerable minority does not tend towards na-
tionalism, with 95.6 % in favour.
OLS regressions have been calculated for all 20 EU member states, some
of which we shall inspect inmore detail. Figure 2 shows the plotted regression
coe ficients of the inferential statistical analyses. e vertical line re lects the
zero value, i.e. items in the positive range have a supportive e fect on a per-
son’s democratic value orientation. On the one hand, negative e fects of natio-
nalism, exclusive feelings of belonging and discriminatory attitudes towards
immigrants, homosexuals, and gender equality were assumed. On the other
hand, trust in foreign groups and a tendency towards an inclusive sense of
belonging are expected to positively a fect democratic value orientation.
While taking the tensions between nationalism and democratic value ori-
entation into account, the di ferent parts of the analysis illustrate that a dif-
ferentiated re lection is necessary. In most countries, the following can be
observed: the more people tend to nationalist attitudes (in 12 out of 20 coun-
tries) or to exclusive ideas of belonging (in 13 out of 20 countries), the less
they support democratic value orientation (H1 and H2a). National identifica-
tion does not go together with the support for democratic values in any of
the observed states. e same applies – with the exception of Hungary – to
an exclusive sense of belonging. Bivariate analyses at the country level also
demonstrate that if this exclusionary socio-psychological characteristic is wi-
despread in society, anti-democratic values are also much more widespread
here.
A significant e fect of the control variable formal citizenship accompanies
the exceptional observation of a positive e fect of an exclusive sense of be-
longing on democratic value orientation in Hungary. is control variable is
significant in none of the other cases. In other words, people who have formal
citizenship are less inclined towards democracy than people who do not. e
Hungarian observation suggests that historical developments and national
discourse have some explanatory power as well. In Hungary, this is partic-
ularly true for the inclusive discourse of national minorities abroad. At the
same time, nationalist narratives of an irredentist threat persist. is threat
is defined »as the threat of territorial claims by neighbouring countries« (Pirro
2014: 607), and refers to a linguistically and ethnically related nationalism. In
the case of inclusive belonging which refers to a democratic value orientation
(H2b), Lithuania, Slovenia, and Slovakia stand out.
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Trust in outgroups does not seem to be of great empirical importance.
Only Italians, Lithuanians, and Swedes, who show a larger radius of trust,
have a greater tendency towards democratic value orientation (H3). A signif-
icant e fect is only observed in Austria. is result follows similar patterns
as the findings for Germany, Italy, Lithuania, and Sweden regarding resent-
ment towards immigrants. In general, only Hungary and Poland confirm the
hypothesis that discriminatory attitudes towardsmigrants lead to anti-demo-
cratic value orientations (H4). Anti-democratic discourses on immigrants are
a popular argumentation pattern containing gender equality problems as well
as anti-gay attitudes, which are o ten attributed, for example, to Islam and
Muslims (Schmitz-Vardar/Leonhardt 2019; also: Heyne 2019). However, these
socially undesirable attitudes are only assigned to immigrant outgroups; this
discourse does not re lect on discriminatory exclusion mechanisms of the in-
group.
is observation of trust in outgroups and resentment towards immigra-
tion is consistent with Hypotheses 5 and 6. Here, it was assumed that discri-
minatory attitudes towards homosexuals or women favour anti-democratic
attitudes. Both relationships work in the expected direction. It is particularly
striking that the e fect of anti-gender-equality attitudes can be observed mo-
re frequently than anti-gay attitudes. Despite anti-gender-equality attitudes,
people in Lithuania tend towards democratic value orientation. In Lithua-
nia and Slovakia, agreement on gender equality is very high compared to the
other countries under consideration. Accordingly, it can be assumed that the
variable does not play a decisive role in the social climate.
Regarding the control variables, it has already been noted that formal ci-
tizenship does not seem to play a role in most cases. Also the other variables
education, income, and gender rarely have a significant e fect. Gender has
no significant e fect in 14 cases. Only in Denmark do men tend to support
democratic values less than women. In Finland, France, Germany, Great Bri-
tain, and Spain the observation is the opposite. e control variable age is an
exception to this. Older people tend share to democratic value orientation (in
15 countries). e income di ference is only significantly relevant in five ca-
ses. e directions also di fer: While people with higher income in Bulgaria,
the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Romania tend to have democratic value
orientations, the opposite is the case in Spain.
Overall, the model derived from theory only provides limited informati-
on on democratic value orientation in Bulgaria. Only the dimension of gen-
der-equality-attitudes is relevant. All other variables are not empirically si-
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gnificant in this case. e model fits best in Denmark, where nationalism,
an exclusive sense of belonging and anti-gay and anti-gender-equality attitu-
des are not compatible with democratic value orientation. Austria, Lithuania
and Germany, for example, illustrate that not every theoretical assumption
has empirical evidence without further context-sensitive information 8heyne
2019). Above all, the assessment of the social climate to the perceived others
is important.
5. Conclusion: Can nationalists be democratic citizens?
e nation is an »imaginary political community« to which people have an
emotional attachment. is basis of collective identity serves, however, as a
demarcation of presumed others at the same time. e di ficulty in this con-
text is that nations consist of plural societies. is plurality is o ten associated
with immigration (Buonfino 2004). erefore, the question of the boundaries
of national communities arises anew because the imaginary others are part
of the political entity. e guidelines of the EU do not only serve as internal
self-assurance but also as external maxims for action (Schneider 2015: 313).
is leads to the following question: How do including and excluding ideas of
identity, trust, and belonging a fect the democratic value orientation of EU
citizens?
Several studies demonstrate a tension between nationalism and democra-
cy (such as Helbing 2009). Nationalism has a Janus-faced character: On the
one hand, it produces solidarity and trust as senses of belonging. For a func-
tioning democracy, these characteristics are elementary. On the other hand,
nationalism provides arguments for excluding so-called »others«. e theore-
tical basis for an empirical approach is political culture research (Fuchs 2002;
Pickel/Pickel 2006), including socio-psychological explanatory approaches re-
garding the emergence of group-related prejudice (instead of many Adorno
et al. 1950; Allport 1954). Political cultural research assumes that democraci-
es are dependent on cultural anchoring in society. Following the normative-
theoretical premise that democracies depend on the mutual recognition of
their members as free and equal citizens (Habermas 1998), exclusive sources
of national a filiation and resentment towards marginalised groups point to
a lack of social support for democratic standards (Groß et al. 2012).
e findings of the empirical analysis show that the dimensions of demo-
cratic value orientation di fer. is is in line with empirical observations that
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distinguish between desire for democracy and support for democracy (Norris
1999). e consideration of an a fective bond is not su ficient as the concept
of democracy allows for many di ferent associations. erefore, basic support
is usually high – leading to a lack of variable variance to record e fects – and
the »democratic content« of this support remains unknown. Even within the
EU, a democratic habitus is not a norm. Democratic value orientation are
rarer, especially in Hungary, Slovakia, and Romania. Particularly in Slovakia
and Romania, the proportion of people with an exclusive sense of belonging
is also high. e three cases – just as the associated discussion of the e fect
of exclusive mechanisms of group identity – show very well that the context
can play a decisive role when it comes to perceptions and attitudes at the
individual level. However, ideas of community do not arise in a vacuum. In
fact, they are always context-sensitive, which should not be neglected when
conducting macro or multi-level analyses. e OLS regressions, which were
determined separately for each country, show that above all, discriminatory
attitudes towards women and homosexuals are a good predictor for explai-
ning anti-democratic value orientation. is meets the expectation because
these two mechanisms specifically concern ingroup dynamics.
ese findings – that people tend to democratic value orientation despite
having low trust in outgroups or antipathies towards immigrants – are coun-
terintuitive and require empirical clarification. e anti-pluralism discour-
se fuels tensions between group-based hostility and democratic citizenship,
whereas public discourse o ten links discriminatory statements to democra-
tic values. Hostile positions to these values are o ten attributed to people of
other religions, nationalities or to immigrants. erefore, it is assumed that
one need not be tolerant towards these groups. Regarding the question of
whether nationalists can be democrats, it should be noted that nationalism
is a necessary but not a su ficient condition for an anti-democratic habitus.
is means that, as a rule, not every tendency towards nationalism goes hand
in hand with an anti-democratic attitude. Still, it is never conducive to the
critical-liberal advocacy of democracy.
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